Country Size,Currency Unions,and International Asset Returns

Differences in real interest rates across developed economies are puzzlingly large and persistent. I propose a simple explanation: bonds issued in the currencies of larger economies are expensive because they insure against shocks that affect a larger fraction of the world economy. I show that, indeed, differences in the size of economies explain a large fraction of the cross‐sectional variation in currency returns. The data also support additional implications of the model: the introduction of a currency union lowers interest rates in participating countries, and stocks in the nontraded sector of larger economies pay lower expected returns.     

An Examination of the Impact of the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 on Commercial Banks and Savings and Loans

This paper evaluates the effects of events leading to the passage of the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. The evidence suggests that the call for reform by President Reagan's Housing Commission and the Senate passage of the bill produced positive abnormal returns to stockholders of large savings and loans and commercial banks. Stockholders of small S&Ls and banks, on the other hand, generally experienced negative abnormal returns. Furthermore, when hopes of passage of the Act faded, significant negative (positive) abnormal returns were experienced by stockholders of large (small) S&Ls and banks.     

Bank Earnings Management and Tail Risk during the Financial Crisis

We show that a pattern of earnings management in bank financial statements has little bearing on downside risk during quiet periods, but seems to have a big impact during a financial crisis. Banks demonstrating more aggressive earnings management prior to 2007 exhibit substantially higher stock market risk once the financial crisis begins as measured by the incidence of large weekly stock price “crashes” as well as by the pattern of full‐year returns. Stock price crashes also predict future deterioration in operating performance. Bank regulators may therefore interpret them as early warning signs of impending problems.     

The Global Impact of Brexit Uncertainty

We propose a text-based method for measuring the cross-border propagation of large shocks at the firm level. We apply this method to estimate the expected costs, benefits, and risks of Brexit and find widespread reverberations in listed firms in 81 countries. International (i.e., non-U.K.) firms most exposed to Brexit uncertainty (the second moment) lost significant market value and reduced hiring and investment. International firms also overwhelmingly expected negative first-moment impacts from the U.K.'s decision to leave the European Union (EU), particularly related to regulation, asset prices, and labor market impacts of Brexit.     

A CLASS OF PERFORMANCE‐BASED SUBSIDY RULES*

We consider a benchmark static incentive scheme, i.e. a per unit subsidy, that induces a monopoly to produce a target output level. We show that the same output level can be achieved by a continuum of dynamic subsidy rules based on a performance indicator. The rules require only local information. The present value of the subsidies paid is smaller than the amount paid under the static subsidy. Each of the dynamic subsidy rules results at each moment in a lower per unit subsidy than the static subsidy. The subsidy rate depends on a state variable that reflects the monopolist's performance history.     

THE TECHNICAL INEFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF TURKISH BANKS AFTER FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION

The banking sector in Turkey has grown significantly over the last two decades of financial liberalization. One of the aims of the financial liberalization was to improve efficiency through restructuring programs including the privatization of state banks and the encouragement of mergers. In this paper we identify key factors determining the technical efficiency differentials among Turkish commercial banks in the pre‐ and post‐liberalization periods, using the technical inefficiency effects model. We found that loan quality, size, ownership of the banks, and profitability have a positive and significant impact on the technical efficiencies of banks. The results warrant implementation of effective regulatory measures to improve the quality of the earning assets of commercial banks. Furthermore, steps by the government to encourage acquisitions or mergers for private banks and the privatization of state‐owned banks seem to be consistent in improving the overall efficiency of commercial banking in Turkey.     

Capital Structure,Ownership, and Capital Payment Policy: The Case of Hospitals

This study examines effects of pertinent features of hospital capital payment policies on hospital capital structure decisions in a one-period stochastic, value-maximization model. Separate models are developed for for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals. Hospital debt-to-assets ratios are analyzed empirically using a cross-section of data from the American Hospital Association. Although the effect on capital structure of hospital reliance on cost-based reimbursement cannot be signed theoretically, in both for-profit and not-for-profit cases, a higher cost-based share leads to higher leverage. Factors associated with high bankruptcy risk (e.g., earnings volatility) cause hospitals to take on less debt.     

The Effect of Long-Term Performance Plans on Corporate Sell-Off-Induced Abnormal Returns

This study examines the association between long-term performance plans and wealth effects accruing to stockholders of divesting firms at announcements of sell-off proposals. The results indicate that divesting companies with long-term performance plans experience a more favorable stock market reaction at the announcement of sell-off proposals relative to firms without long-term performance plans. The findings imply that long-term performance plans serve as an effective mechanism to motivate managers to make better decisions.     

Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

This paper shows that if countries are farsighted when deciding whether to defect from a coalition, then the implementation of cleaner technologies, as embodied by a reduction in the emission per output ratio, may either improve or jeopardize the chances of reaching an international environmental agreement. A small change in the emission per output ratio can result in a discrete jump in the stable size of a coalition and global welfare evaluated under the stable coalition size. In the case of three countries, the grand coalition may be destabilized by the implementation of cleaner technologies, ultimately resulting in higher global emissions and lower global welfare. In the case of more than three countries, implementing cleaner technologies may result in a discrete jump, either upward or downward, of the largest stable coalition size and welfare. We examine both, the case of a flow and that of a stock pollutant. In the latter case, we show that the higher the stock of pollution at the instant when the cleaner technology is implemented, the more likely that a grand coalition of three countries is destabilized. Measures that enhance the natural rate of decay of stock pollutants are shown to have similar effects on the size of stable coalitions to reductions in the emission per output ratio.