A Re-Examination of Financial Analysts' Differential Earnings Forecast Accuracy*

Abstract. This research re-examines whether there are differences in the forecast accuracy of financial analysts through a comparison of their annual earnings per share forecasts. The comparison of analyst forecast accuracy is made on both an ex post (within sample) and an ex ante (out of sample) basis. Early examinations of this issue by Richards (1976), Brown and Rozeff (1980), O'Brien (1987), Coggin and Hunter (1989), O'Brien (1990), and Butler and Lang (1991) were ex post and suggest the absence of analysts who can provide relatively more accurate forecasts over multiple years. Contrary to the results of prior research and consistent with the belief in the popular press, we document that differences do exist in financial analysts' ex post forecast accuracy. We show that the previous studies failed to find differences in forecast accuracy due to inadequate (or no) control for differences in the recency of forecasts issued by the analysts. It has been well documented in the literature that forecast recency is positively related to forecast accuracy (Crichfield, Dyckman, and Lakonishok 1978; O'Brien 1988; Brown 1991). Thus, failure to control for forecast recency may reduce the power of tests, making it difficult to reject the null hypothesis of no differences in forecast accuracy even if they do exist. In our analysis, we control for the differences in recency of analysts' forecasts using two different approaches. First, we use an estimated generalized least squares estimation procedure that captures the recency-induced effects in the residuals of the model. Second, we use a matched-pair design whereby we measure the relative forecast accuracy of an analyst by comparing his/her forecast error to the forecast error of another randomly selected analyst making forecasts for the same firm in the same year on or around the same date. Using both approaches, we find that differential forecast accuracy does exist amongst analysts, especially in samples with minimum forecast horizons of five and 60 trading days. We show that these differences are not attributable to differences in the forecast issuance frequency of the financial analysts. In sum, after controlling for firm, year, forecast recency, and forecast issuance frequency of individual analysts, the analyst effect persists. To validate our findings, we examine whether the differences in the forecast accuracy of financial analysts persist in holdout periods. Analysts were assigned a “superior” (“inferior”) status for a firm-year in the estimation sample using percentile rankings on the distribution of absolute forecast errors for that firm-year. We use estimation samples of one- to four-year duration, and consider two different definitions of analyst forecast superiority. Analysts were classified as firm-specific “superior” if they maintained a “superior” status in every year of the estimation sample. Furthermore, they were classified as industry-specific “superior” if they were deemed firm-specific “superior” with respect to at least two firms and firm-specific “inferior” with respect to no firm in that industry. Using either definition, we find that analysts classified as “superior” in estimation samples generally remain superior in holdout periods. In contrast, we find that analysts identified as “inferior” in estimation samples do not remain inferior in holdout periods. Our results suggest that some analysts' earnings forecasts should be weighted higher than others when formulating composite earnings expectations. This suggestion is predicated on the assumption that capital markets distinguish between analysts who are ex ante superior, and that they utilize this information when formulating stock prices. Our study provides an ex ante framework for identifying those analysts who appear to be superior. When constructing weighted forecasts, a one-year estimation period should be used because we obtain the strongest results of persistence in this case.     

The Mode of Acquisition in Takeovers: Taxes and Asymmetric Information

We develop a model in which the mode of acquisition conveys information concerning the value of the bidder. The model incorporates the possibility that offers containing both cash and stock can be made in a setting consistent with the U.S. tax code. We demonstrate that bidders with unfavorable private information about their equity value choose offers containing some stock to avoid the capital gains tax consequences of cash offers. The model yields a number of unique predictions about the construction of acquisition offers. We present evidence consistent with the model.     

MODELING THE INCIDENCE OF SELF‐EMPLOYMENT: INDIVIDUAL AND EMPLOYMENT TYPE HETEROGENEITY

Modeling the incidence of self‐employment has traditionally proved problematic. Although the supply‐side characteristics of the self‐employed are well documented, we argue that the literature has neglected demand‐side aspects. We explore the determinants of self‐employment using the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances. We present results from an econometric framework that allows us to model, separately and simultaneously, the influences of individual heterogeneity (i.e., supply‐side factors) and employment type heterogeneity (i.e., demand‐side factors) on the probability of self‐employment. Our findings suggest that while individual characteristics are important determinants of self‐employment, there are factors specific to the type of employment that influence self‐employment. (JEL J23, J33, C25, C10)     

Why Are U.S. Stocks More Volatile?

U.S. stocks are more volatile than stocks of similar foreign firms. A firm's stock return volatility can be higher for reasons that contribute positively (good volatility) or negatively (bad volatility) to shareholder wealth and economic growth. We find that the volatility of U.S. firms is higher mostly because of good volatility. Specifically, stock volatility is higher in the United States because it increases with investor protection, stock market development, new patents, and firm‐level investment in R&D. Each of these factors is related to better growth opportunities for firms and better ability to take advantage of these opportunities.     

Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry

We test the hypothesis that when their compensation is linked to relative performance, managers of investment portfolios likely to end up as “losers” will manipulate fund risk differently than those managing portfolios likely to be “winners.” An empirical investigation of the performance of 334 growth-oriented mutual funds during 1976 to 1991 demonstrates that mid-year losers tend to increase fund volatility in the latter part of an annual assessment period to a greater extent than mid-year winners. Furthermore, we show that this effect became stronger as industry growth and investor awareness of fund performance increased over time.     

Executive Financial Incentives and Payout Policy: Firm Responses to the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut

We test whether executive stock ownership affects firm payouts using the 2003 dividend tax cut to identify an exogenous change in the after‐tax value of dividends. We find that executives with higher ownership were more likely to increase dividends after the tax cut in 2003, whereas no relation is found in periods when the dividend tax rate was higher. Relative to previous years, firms that initiated dividends in 2003 were more likely to reduce repurchases. The stock price reaction to the tax cut suggests that the substitution of dividends for repurchases may have been anticipated, consistent with agency conflicts.     

Achieving High Quality, Comparable Financial Reporting: A Review of Independent Enforcement Bodies in Australia and the United Kingdom

This article provides a review of the activities of two quite different types of national enforcement body, the U.K.'s Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). We present material (some not available elsewhere) about their activities over the period 1998–2004 and show that both types of body can fulfil an enforcement role, albeit subject to political forces. We also assess the relevance of the bodies' past activities for comparable international enforcement following the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005. A review of cases reveals that for both bodies approximately half were related to recognition and measurement issues, where interpretation can be crucial. Although there is potential for cross-country differences to arise, they may be mitigated by the participation of both bodies in international enforcement coordination activities. Past activities suggest that the scope of the bodies' activities and the extent of comparability of enforcement decisions are likely to reflect political views held within the government, corporate sector and accounting profession.     

A Simple Econometric Approach for Utility-Based Asset Pricing Models

Utility-based models of asset pricing may be estimated with or without assuming a distribution for security returns; both approaches are developed and compared here. The chief strength of a parametric estimator lies in its computational simplicity and statistical efficiency when the added distributional assumption is true. In contrast, the nonparametric estimator is robust to departures from any particular distribution, and it is more consistent with the spirit underlying utility-based asset pricing models since the distribution of asset returns remains unspecified even in the empirical work. The nonparametric approach turns out to be easy to implement with precision nearly indistinguishable from its parametric counterpart in this particular application. The application shows that log utility is consistent with the data over the period 1926–1981.