Pricing in Segmented Markets, Arbitrage Barriers, and the Law of One Price: Evidence from the European Car Market

The paper uses micro‐level price data from the European car market to examine why there are deviations from the law of one price. The absolute law of one price is strongly rejected, but there is convergence to its relative version. Two sets of explanations are considered: (i) price‐setting in segmented markets, and (ii) arbitrage barriers. Overall, the determinants of arbitrage costs have more explanatory power. The single most important factor is the distance between markets. Evidence for Belgium and Luxembourg suggests that a single currency lowers price differences significantly.     

Strategic trade policy for Eastern Europe

The integration of the former state-trading countries into international free trade may, on the one hand, sensibly complement the reforms now under way towards their becoming market economies; on the other hand, this move harbours the risk of perpetuating and indeed aggravating the economic backwardness of those countries. The detrimental effects can be avoided if a product-cycle-oriented economic policy is pursued which makes a deliberate point of utilizing the relatively rich endowment of human capital available in these countries.     

BUILDING CARS TO CUSTOMER ORDER — WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR INBOUND LOGISTICS OPERATIONS?

The automotive industry is undergoing a strategic transition. Cost pressure from rising stock levels in the market and increasing incentives needed to sell these vehicles are forcing vehicle manufacturers to rethink their prevalent “stock‐push” approach, building vehicles against a forecast and selling from stock, in favor of a stock‐less “build‐to‐order” order fulfillment strategy. More responsive order fulfillment at the vehicle manufacturer level however will not only require flexible and responsive component supply, but will also have wide ramifications for the logistics operations. Based on three case studies of major inbound logistics operations, this exploratory study assesses their ability to support such a build‐to‐order approach, as well as the potential implications of such transition. The paper concludes with a set of general strategies for how these implications could be mitigated.     

Competitive effects of Basel II on US bank credit card lending

We analyze the potential competitive effects of the proposed Basel II capital regulations on US bank credit card lending. We find that bank issuers operating under Basel II will face higher regulatory capital minimums than Basel I banks, with differences due to the way the two regulations treat reserves and gain-on-sale of securitized assets. During periods of normal economic conditions, this is not likely to have a competitive effect; however, during periods of substantial stress in credit card portfolios, Basel II banks could face a significant competitive disadvantage relative to Basel I banks and nonbank issuers.     

The Income Splitting Method: Is it Good for Both Marriage Partners?

Abstract. This paper analyzes how deviating from individual taxation affects married couples. The focus is on time allocation, on investment in family‐specific human capital and on distribution of income within the family. Two insights are discussed in detail. First, the distribution of tax‐reduction gains due to the income splitting system depends on whether the family has been started or not. After marriage, joint taxation increases redistribution among family members. Second, although joint taxation reduces the tax burden of the family, it might harm the marriage partner that is more productive in household production provided that potential marriage partners foresee the effects of joint filing on the time allocation within the family.     

Fairness in the Mail and Opportunism in the Internet: A Newspaper Experiment on Ultimatum Bargaining

Abstract. On 11 May 2001, readers of the Berliner Zeitung were invited to participate in an ultimatum bargaining experiment played in the strategy vector mode: each participant chooses not only how much (s)he demands of the DM1,000 pie but also which of the nine possible offers of DM100, 200, …, 900 (s)he would accept or reject. In addition, participants were asked to predict the most frequent type of behavior. Three randomly selected proposer–responder pairs were rewarded according to the rules of ultimatum bargaining and three randomly chosen participants of those who predicted the most frequent type of behavior received a prize of DM500. Decisions could be submitted by mail, fax or via the internet. Behavior is described, statistically analyzed and compared to the usual laboratory ultimatum bargaining results.