Elderly Female-Headed Households and the Decision to Trade Down

Results from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics show that elderly women appear to be much more circumspect than men about making housing changes. Some of this apparent difference occurs because elderly women have low levels of financial assets. Elderly women also appear to be much more likely than men, when they do move, to dissave out of home equity. Yet what appears on the surface to be a gender difference in the decision to dissave in later life turns out upon closer examination to occur because of divorce and the event of widowhood.     

An Analysis of the Ex Ante Probabilities of Mortgage Prepayment and Default

Observed mortgage prepayment and default rates have been far different than the ruthless option exercise rates predicted by contingent claims models of mortgage pricing. The discrepancies have been attributed to both the competing-risk nature of prepayment and default and to transactions costs. This paper tries a different means of reconciliation. We introduce a third stochastic process, household income, into the usual pricing model that includes only the spot interest rate and the house price. The presence of income allows considering consumption-theoretic determinants of termination. The role of mortgage underwriting rules in restricting optimal prepayment is also explicitly modeled. Numerical ex ante prepayment and default rates based on the theoretical model come much closer to historical experience.     

Appraisals,Transaction Incentives,and Smoothing

This article is structured around three principal objectives. The first is to determine whether any incentives for appraisals support an underlying purchase offer, which may be termed a transaction bias. Appraisals that are lower than purchase prices could involve additional cost for justification and thus undermine the transaction. The second objective is to test whether appraisal data are smoothed or exhibit less volatility than purchase data. The article compares the volatility of separate appraisal and purchase data. Given separate appraisal and purchase time series, the third objective is to derive the implied optimal appraisal updating rule.The model is applied to appraisal and purchase price indices for 3.7 million repeat transactions on mortgages bought by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by using monthly data from January 1975 to December 1993. The estimation procedure uses generalized autoregressive conditioned heteroskedastic (GARCH) analysis to take account of persistence in means and volatility in the house price time series. The article draws three principal conclusions. First, appraisals are systematically higher than purchase data, a first-moment differential. Second, appraisal smoothing does not occur generally. Third, the appraisal updating rule for the United States appears to involve error correction whereby underappraisals from pervious periods are eventually adjusted.     

Hospitals: The Market for Health Care Facilities

Health care facilities include hospitals and nursing homes. Demand for beds and occupancy depends on income, prices and insurer restrictions. The supply of beds is limited by regulatory certificates of need. The implied equilibrium vacancy leads to a trade-off with rate increases. Rate increases establish an asset price for a hospital bed. If prices of health care rise faster than income and nonhealth prices, patients demand less bed availability and occupancy. Rising vacancy and rising prices occur, consistent with the empirical observations for U.S. health care facilities. For 1980–2001, the equilibrium vacancy rate for U.S. hospitals is between 27% and 36% depending on capacity adjustments, bed availability and price expectations. Equilibrium vacancy is near the actual rate after 2000, but that rate is 11 percentage points higher than in the early 1980s when the number of beds was nearly one-third higher. Usually rent regulation leads to excess demand. But in a general equilibrium model with income, relative prices, expectations, supply and capital markets, price regulation can coexist with excess supply.     

An empirical analysis of property appraisal and mortgage redlining

The recent literature advances a hypothesis that addresses the possibility of mortgage redlining caused by a dynamic information externality in property appraisals and mortgage lending. In particular, Lang and Nakamura (1993) hypothesize that because property appraisals depend on past transactions, appraisals in neighborhoods where transactions were infrequent tend to be less precise. The greater uncertainty about house valuation in such neighborhoods can lead mortgage lenders to impose stringent requirements on borrowers. Lang and Nakamura's article, like most economic analysis of property appraisals, is theoretical. Using a sample of mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae, we present preliminary research results that cast doubt on appraisal behavioral rules such as weighted averages or backward-looking expectations on which Lang and Nakamura and other theoretical studies are based. Instead, our results refocus attention on the moral hazard issues of appraisal. We find that in more than 80 percent of the cases, the appraisal is between 0 and 5 percent above the transaction purchase price, in only 5 percent of the cases is the appraisal lower, and in 30 percent of the cases, the appraisal and transaction prices are identical. It would take a strong statistical model to generate such occurrences. Our resutls also indicate that appraisal outcomes are used as a risk factor with different weights for loans with different characteristics (loan-to-value ratios and house prices). The results suggest that more empirical investigation of appraisal practices be conducted to verify the validity of conventional wisdom embedded in theoretical studies, and we offer an econometric framework toward this end.     

Racial and ethnic differences in housing demand: An econometric investigation

This article empirically investigates the sources of housing demand differences between racial (black and white) and ethnic (Hispanic and non-Hispanic) groups. We estimate the tenure-adjusted housing demand equations from the 1989 American Housing Survey (AHS) national sample data and measure the effects of different sources for demand disparities in housing demand, but much less so in explaining racial differences in housing demand. Specifically, 98% (96%) of the housing demand differences between Hispanic and non-Hispanic owners (renters) is due to differences in group endowments. For the racial groups, 29% (51%) of the housing demand differences between black and white owners (renters) is attributable to differences in group endowments. The residual differences explain 71% and 49% of the black-white differentials for owners and renters, respectively. The residual components in our model capture the effect of institutional and structural factors intrinsic to the housing market (such as racial discrimination or residential segregation) and/or the influence of important omitted or harder-tomeasure variables correlated with race or ethnicity (such as wealth, employment history, credit history, and cultural differences in housing consumption).     

Spatial Dependence and House Price Index Construction

Accurate estimation of prevailing metropolitan housing prices is important for both business and research investigations of housing and mortgage markets. This is typically done by constructing quality-adjusted house price indices from hedonic price regressions for given metropolitan areas. A major limitation of currently available indices is their insensitivity to the geographic location of dwellings within the metropolitan area. Indices are constructed based on models that do not incorporate the underlying spatial structure in housing data sets. In this article, we argue that spatial structure, especially spatial dependence latent in housing data sets, will affect the precision and accuracy of resulting price estimates. We illustrate the importance of spatial dependence in both the specification and estimation of hedonic price models. Assessments are made on the importance of spatial dependence both on parameter estimates and on the accuracy of resulting indices.     

Do Borrowing Constraints Change U.S. Homeownership Rates?

This study has two main objectives. First, we estimate various alternative specifications of the tenure choice model with borrowing constraint variables, originally put forth by Linneman and Wachter, using a more recent sample of the Survey of Consumer Finance. Second, we simulate effects of policy changes governing constraints and changes in mortgage interest rates, both on households' owning decisions and on the aggregate homeownership rate. While the impact of constraints has been demonstrated in previous studies, our research provides the first microsimulation estimates of the impact for aggregate homeownership rates for the entire U.S. population.     

Residential-Mortgage Lending Discrimination and Lender-Risk-Compensating Policies

The Boston Federal Reserve study ( Munnell et al. 1996 ) concluded that illegal discrimination is a statistically significant contributor to the observed gap between white and minority residential-mortgage rejection rates. The Boston study speculated that discrimination arises because lenders do not equally apply risk compensation or mitigation policies for imperfect loans. Using the same 1990 Boston loan application data, our study specifically examines the relation between compensating policies and discrimination. Since compensating policies are encouraged by secondary-mortgage-market sale guidelines, we model both the lender's origination decision and its loan sale decision. Using a rule-based artificial-intelligence technique applied to each lender, we infer compensating policies (rules) that equally apply to all races and explain lending decisions. A minority-race indicator loses its statistical significance when an indicator of compensating-policy violations appears in the loan accept–reject equation. This result reflects the fact that the risk levels of marginal minority loans tend to be more extreme than those of marginal white loans. However, the result does not necessarily reject the existence of discrimination. Equally applied policies may be empirically indistinguishable from unfairly applied policies. In addition, equally applied policies may fail the adverse-impact doctrine if they do not serve a business necessity (such as profits). The industry's move away from discretionary, rule-based decisions to mortgage scoring answers the need for a decision framework that rigorously uses loan performance to evaluate all loan applicants fairly.