The welfare effect of a free trade agreement in the presence of foreign direct investment and rules of origin

This paper investigates the welfare effect of forming a free trade agreement (FTA). To receive tariff‐free treatment, firms must comply with the rules of origin (ROO). Outside firms could undertake either market‐oriented or export‐platform foreign direct investments (FDIs). ROO have the following effects: (i) An infeasible FTA may become feasible by deterring outside firms' FDIs, (ii) an FDI of a less efficient firm could replace that of an efficient firm, or (iii) FDIs made before the FTA is concluded might be eliminated. These potential effects complicate the welfare effect of the FTA and could decrease the consumer surplus.     

Individual Characteristics,Behavioral Biases,and Trade Policy Preferences: Evidence from a Survey in Japan

Import liberalization is one of the most actively debated issues in trade policy. This paper examines how trade policy preferences are related to individual characteristics based on a survey in Japan. Among 10,000 surveyed individuals, people working in non‐agricultural sectors, those working in managerial occupations, or those above retirement age tend to favor freer imports. This paper also finds that people who are influenced by the status quo bias are likely to oppose import liberalization even after controlling for each individual's various characteristics, suggesting that neither income compensation nor insurance schemes are sufficient for expanding support for free trade.     

Tariff elimination versus tax avoidance: free trade agreements and transfer pricing

International Tax and Public Finance - We explore the new roles of rules of origin (ROO) when multinational enterprises (MNEs) manipulate their transfer prices to avoid a high corporate tax. The...     

Effects of Multilateral Trade Liberalization on Prices*

To analyze the effects of simultaneous tariff reductions by multiple importing countries on prices, we construct a simple three‐country model where a good is produced by a monopolist with nonconstant marginal cost and imported by two countries. We compare two representative tariff‐reduction formulas: the “fixed‐amount” and the “uniform percentage” reductions. The uniform percentage reductions may increase the consumer price in the importing country, whose initial tariff is lower. Thus, importing countries with relatively low tariffs may prefer a bilateral trade agreement to a multilateral one to ensure consumer gains.     

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND RULES OF ORIGIN UNDER INTERNATIONAL OLIGOPOLY*

Free trade agreements (FTAs) have rules of origin (ROOs) to prevent tariff circumvention by firms of nonmember countries. This article points out that in imperfectly competitive markets, ROOs have another role overlooked in the existing literature. Instead of focusing on the impacts of ROOs in the intermediate‐good markets, we draw our attention to the final‐good markets to examine the effects of ROOs. We find that under some conditions, ROOs benefit both firms at the expense of consumers. Under some other conditions, ROOs benefit the firm producing outside the FTA and hurt the firm producing inside the FTA.     

On the optimal external tariff of a free trade area with internal market integration

Previous analyses of free trade areas suggest that member countries reduce external tariffs to the level that improves welfare of non-member countries. Using an oligopoly model with product differentiation, this paper shows that when a free trade area entails endogenous change from segmented to integrated markets for internally produced goods, external tariffs become strategic complements and their equilibrium level is higher than in the market segmentation case. In this case, the non-member may lose from the formation of free trade area whereas each member gains more.     

Multilateralism and Hub‐and‐Spoke Bilateralism*

This paper studies sequential negotiations of bilateral free‐trade agreements in an oligopoly model. The expansion of trading blocs through overlapping trade agreements allows the option of hub‐and‐spoke systems and achieves multilateral free trade as the equilibrium path, even if the expansion of trading blocs through the acceptance of new members is not feasible. The results suggest that free‐trade areas (FTAs) tend to expand more than customs unions (CUs). Lobbying by a producer can either promote or undermine the achievement of multilateral free trade through overlapping FTAs.     

The magnification effect in global value chains

We examine the “magnification effect,” which demonstrates that as the number of separable production stages increases, trade increases dramatically as trade costs decline. We empirically investigate the existence of this magnification effect by estimating gravity-type equations for worldwide trade to obtain the tariff elasticity of trade per industry. We find that tariff elasticity is higher in industries with a greater degree of global value chain participation. These results are observed for both gross and value-added trade. Furthermore, we find that tariff elasticity is higher in intra-Asian trade, especially in machinery industries.