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1.
This paper critically analyses the approach to the determination of values, or commodity contents, developed by Fujimoto and Opocher in 2009. Even setting aside various problematic definitional issues, the broader implications of the approach for classical theory are unclear. First, the value‐theoretic definitions of skill differentials and bads capture at best necessary conditions and it is unlikely that such definitions can be provided by focusing only on the technological data of the economy. Second, the approach has various interesting implications concerning the relation between productiveness and exploitation that directly contradict some of the authors' claims.  相似文献   
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The underwriter of an IPO has two sources of compensation for its services on behalf of the issuer. One is through a commission (spread), the other is by buying issued shares for itself (or its affiliates) and reselling them in the post-issue market. Profits from the former decrease along with the magnitude of underpricing while profits from the latter increase with it. Faced with these countervailing interests, the present paper analyzes how the underwriter decides upon the pricing and allocation of IPOs.   相似文献   
4.
A model of rational mortgage refinancing is developed where the drift and volatility of interest rate process switch between two regimes. Because of the possibility of a regime shift, the optimal refinancing policy is characterized by the different threshold of interest differential for each regime. Numerical simulation demonstrates that the optimal refinancing threshold in each regime can be smaller or larger than the threshold under single-regime models. Finally, we evaluate the predictions of the model, based on the estimated parameters for a two-regime model to capture the evolution of the mortgage rates in the US. Our model can produce both late and early refinancing, which is consistent with the observed refinancing behavior. The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Sumitomo Trust and Banking Co., Ltd.  相似文献   
5.
The Boston mechanism is a popular student-placement mechanism in school-choice programs around the world. We provide two characterizations of the Boston mechanism. We introduce two new axioms; favoring higher ranks and rank-respecting invariance. A mechanism is the Boston mechanism for some priority if and only if it favors higher ranks and satisfies consistency, resource monotonicity, and rank-respecting invariance. In environments where each type of object has exactly one unit, as in house allocation, a characterization is given by favoring higher ranks, individual rationality, population monotonicity, and rank-respecting invariance.  相似文献   
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This paper synthesizes in a Leontief economic model the arguments of exploitation and unequal distribution of wealth put forward by Roemer (1982, 1986) and of the power relationship between employers and employees with regard to the performance of labor presented by Bowles and Gintis (1988, 1990). The author introduces the level of the agent’s labor-discipline as measured by the ratio of labor effort per unit of labor time to the real wage rate. The connection bet ween this kind of power index and both exploitation status and wealth distribution is then examined. The result obtained is that, under some reasonable assumptions, the exploitation status and the level of labor-discipline accurately reflect the unequal distribution of wealth.  相似文献   
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This study examines how the host country experience of Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs) affects their staffing policies for executive manager positions at foreign affiliates. Hypotheses on executive staffing policies for foreign affiliates are tested using survey data collected from 103 Japanese affiliates in Korea. Findings show that the level of global integration and the degree of centralization of decision-making positively affect an assignment of parent country nationals as executive managers of foreign affiliates. We further find that foreign affiliates’ experience in a host country moderates the effects of both global integration and centralization on staffing decisions for the affiliates.
Namgyoo Kenny ParkEmail:
  相似文献   
9.
Hatfield and Milgrom [Hatfield, John William, Milgrom, Paul R., 2005. Matching with contracts. Amer. Econ. Rev. 95, 913–935] present a unified model of matching with contracts, which includes the standard two-sided matching and some package auction models as special cases. They show that the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is strategy-proof for doctors if hospitals' preferences satisfy substitutes and the law of aggregate demand. We show that the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for doctors under these same conditions. That is, no group of doctors can make each of its members strictly better off by jointly misreporting their preferences. We derive as a corollary of this result that no individually rational allocation is preferred by all the doctors to the doctor-optimal stable allocation.  相似文献   
10.
We offer a search and matching model with firms that create job vacancies and are willing to sponsor general skills training. The spillover of skilled labor between firms has the dual effect of increasing job vacancies and enhancing firms’ incentives for free riding. The former effect is combined with a reduction in search costs to cause a positive feedback between the supply of skilled labor and the creation of job vacancies, suggesting that firms encourage each other. On the other hand, with the latter effect, search costs are reduced, inducing firms to take a free ride on each other’s investments, thereby decreasing the supply of skilled labor and the creation of job vacancies. A reduction in search costs can lead to different results depending on which of the two mechanisms is actualized. Additionally, our analysis allows for “labor poachers,” or firms absorbing skilled labor in the market, to consider direct competition between training firms and poaching firms.   相似文献   
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