Doing more and doing better are two different entities: Different patterns of family control and environmental performance

Family firms bear two types of agency costs, including type I and type II agency problems, in corporate environmental practices: (1) Outside executives at family firms hesitate to engage in environmental strategies, which can lead to drops in profits; (2) Controlling families employ opportunistically environmental management to achieve their interests. We argue that a primary cause for the agency problems lies on ineffective internal corporate governance at family firms, which can cause loss of managerial (or power) balance between outside executives and family executives. Our findings show that family firms with ownership and strategic control (FSC), which family executives and outside executives monitor and constrain each other, can achieve the highest environmental performance. Moreover, external controls, including product market competition and provincial environmental regulations, substitute effective internal control of FSC. The environmental performance premium of FSC is more prevalent when the production market competition is lower. Family firms with ownership, operational, and strategic control (FOSC) can achieve higher environmental performance within a province with more stringent environmental regulations.     

低热硅酸盐水泥在特高拱坝中的应用

针对中热硅酸盐水泥在水化过程中释放的热量相对较多,难以满足特高拱坝温控防裂要求的问题,本文从研究低热硅酸盐水泥性能的角度出发,结合其在等特高拱坝中的应用情况,得出:相比于中热硅酸盐水泥,低热硅酸盐水泥在水化过程中释放的热量相对较小,有利于控制混凝土最高温度和温升速率,低热硅酸盐水泥的综合抗裂性能更好.目前,在溪洛渡、白鹤滩等特高拱坝应用低热硅酸盐水泥后并未发现任何裂缝,为在其他300级特高拱坝建设中使用低热硅酸盐水泥提供依据.     

Virtually No Effect? Different Uses of Classroom Computers and their Effect on Student Achievement

Most studies find little to no effect of classroom computers on student achievement. We suggest that this null effect may combine positive effects of computer uses without equivalently effective alternative traditional teaching practices and negative effects of uses that substitute more effective teaching practices. Our correlated random effects models exploit within‐student between‐subject variation in different computer uses in the international TIMSS test. We find positive effects of using computers to look up information and negative effects of using computers to practice skills, resulting in overall null effects. Effects are larger for students with high socioeconomic status and mostly confined to developed countries.     

Motivations and barriers of foreign R&D activities in China

The continued growth of the Chinese economy accompanied with the expansion of international investment in China has led to an increase in foreign research and development (R&D) activities in the country. Aside from the rising importance of R&D internationalization, research on foreign R&D in China has been neglected in the past due to its emerging status. In this article we examine drivers and barriers for conducting R&D in China. The focus of our research is on transnational companies typically characterized by decentralized R&D activities. Our research is mainly based on qualitative interviews with senior R&D managers. The success of foreign R&D activities in China strongly depends on the realistic estimation of its advantages and the proper identification and handling of barriers.     

“济南就是我的家”——济南外商服务月侧记

5月下甸,又是一个烈日炎炎的夏日,杰克·史密斯先生按照惯例早早就起了床。但与平日不同的是,作为公司行政总监的他并没有直接去自己的办公室开始一天的工作,而是手拿一份查体表来到了济南市中医院,成为济南市第二届外商服务月活动中的首项内容“为济南市外企员工查体活动”的第一批受益者。在经过非常细致的心、脑、血液等项目的     

防止或减少国际货运代理的责任风险

投保责任险，将风险事先进行转移，是防止或减少国际货运代理的责任风险的最好办法之一。除此之外，货运代理尚须采取其他的必要措施，以尽量避免损失的发生、降低其责任风险。     

诚实守信是构建和谐社会的前提--中国社会信任危机成因分析

诚实守信是构建和谐社会的前提.信任危机是当代中国构建和谐社会的最大障碍,其产生于社会的转型变革,形成于社会制度性体制的缺失,加深于人的存在危机.而消除的唯一途径只能是积极地构建一种新型的社会信任保障制度体制,以强化人们对制度性承诺的信任理念意识,为构建和谐社会创造条件.     

新巴塞尔协议与我国的银行风险管理

新巴塞尔协议代表了国际银行业风险管理的发展方向,已经成为世界银行业风险管理的国际准则。文章分析了巴塞尔协议的制度变迁,结合新巴塞尔协议的基本框架,分析了新巴塞尔协议对我国的影响,提出了新巴塞尔协议下我国银行风险管理的制度选择原则。     

Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics

We develop a general model of lending in the presence of endogenous borrowing constraints. Borrowing constraints arise because borrowers face limited liability and debt repayment cannot be perfectly enforced. In the model, the dynamics of debt are closely linked with the dynamics of borrowing constraints. In fact, borrowing constraints must satisfy a dynamic consistency requirement: the value of outstanding debt restricts current access to short-term capital, but is itself determined by future access to credit. This dynamic consistency is not guaranteed in models of exogenous borrowing constraints, where the ability to raise short-term capital is limited by some prespecified function of debt. We characterize the optimal default-free contract—which minimizes borrowing constraints at all histories—and derive implications for firm growth, survival, leverage and debt maturity. The model is qualitatively consistent with stylized facts on the growth and survival of firms. Comparative statics with respect to technology and default constraints are derived.