The standard of living in Latin America during the twentieth century1

New and consistent series for Latin American real incomes, life expectancy and adult literacy over the twentieth century reveal that living standards rose most rapidly between the 1930s and 1970s, a period characterised by increased state intervention and reduced trade openness. Within the region, Brazil and Mexico advanced most over the century as a whole despite the early start made by Argentina and Chile, although convergence between larger countries was accompanied by divergence from smaller ones. There was no sustained narrowing of the income gap with the US at all between 1900 and 2000 but some convergence in living standards due to improved life expectancy. Our new estimates of regional per capita income also permit a clearer comparison with both Europe and Asia. The major advances in living standards achieved in the middle decades of the century were closely related to early industrialization, rapid urbanization, and the extension of primary health and education. Subsequent economic volatility and fiscal fragility limited further increases in living standards, undermining social consensus on development strategy.     

Liquidity as Social Expertise

This paper proposes a theory of liquidity dynamics. Illiquidity results from asymmetric information. Observing the historical track record teaches agents how to interpret public information and helps overcome information asymmetry. However, an illiquidity trap can arise: too much asymmetric information leads to the breakdown of trade, which interrupts learning and perpetuates illiquidity. Liquidity falls in response to unexpected events that lead agents to question their valuation models (especially in newer markets) may be slow to recover after a crisis, and is higher in periods of stability.     

The Performance Effect of Feedback Frequency and Detail: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Customer Satisfaction

This paper presents the results from a field experiment that examines the effects of nonfinancial performance feedback on the behavior of professionals working for an insurance repair company. We vary the frequency (weekly and monthly) and the level of detail of the feedback that the 800 professionals receive. Contrary to what we would expect if these professionals conformed to the model of the Bayesian decision maker, more (and more frequent) information does not always help improve performance. In fact, we find that professionals achieve the best outcomes when they receive detailed but infrequent (monthly) feedback. The treatment groups with frequent feedback, regardless of how detailed it is, perform no better than the control group (with monthly and aggregate information). The results are consistent with the information in the latest feedback report being most salient and professionals in the weekly treatments overweighting their most recent performance, hampering their ability to learn.     

The Relation between Price and Performance in the Mutual Fund Industry

Gruber (1996) drew attention to the puzzle that investors buy actively managed equity mutual funds, even though on average such funds underperform index funds. We uncover another puzzling fact about the market for equity mutual funds: Funds with worse before-fee performance charge higher fees. This negative relation between fees and performance is robust and can be explained as the outcome of strategic fee-setting by mutual funds in the presence of investors with different degrees of sensitivity to performance. We also find some evidence that better fund governance may bring fees more in line with performance.     

Stock Market Volatility and Learning

We show that consumption‐based asset pricing models with time‐separable preferences generate realistic amounts of stock price volatility if one allows for small deviations from rational expectations. Rational investors with subjective beliefs about price behavior optimally learn from past price observations. This imparts momentum and mean reversion into stock prices. The model quantitatively accounts for the volatility of returns, the volatility and persistence of the price‐dividend ratio, and the predictability of long‐horizon returns. It passes a formal statistical test for the overall fit of a set of moments provided one excludes the equity premium.     

PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA OVER THE LONG RUN

The low pace of Latin American productivity growth in recent decades, despite extensive economic reforms, has yet to be understood in a longer‐run context where factors such as demographic changes, structural shifts, and investment levels can be taken fully into account. The OxLAD database provides comparable sectoral output and workforce series over 1900–2000 for the six leading economies in the region for the first time. Our analysis of this new dataset shows that: intersectoral resource reallocation reduced aggregate productivity growth in all three periods; total factor productivity growth was low throughout the century, and even negative in the closing three decades; and thus factor accumulation—investment in fixed capital and skilled labor—was the main source of productivity growth in Latin America during the twentieth century.     

THE PURCHASING POWER PARITY THEORY AND RICARDO'S THEORY OF VALUE

In this paper the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) theory and itscriticisms are analysed. The majority of studies show that inmost cases, the PPP indicator is not a good predictor for nominalexchange rate changes, nor a good indicator of relative competitivenessbetween countries. Instead, orthodox and non-orthodox economistsuse relative labour costs to represent real exchange rates.This has interesting implications for the currently acceptedprice determination theory. In turn, this also allows us touse a Ricardian model as developed by Pasinetti to calculatethe ratio of real, vertically integrated unit labour costs betweencountries as a real exchange rate determination theory and asa sectoral relative competitiveness indicator as well.     

OUTPUT‐EXPANDING COLLUSION IN THE PRESENCE OF A COMPETITIVE FRINGE*

Following the structure of many commodity markets, we consider a few large firms and a competitive fringe of many small suppliers choosing quantities in an infinite‐horizon setting subject to demand shocks. We show that a collusive agreement among the large firms may not only bring an output contraction but also an output expansion (relative to the non‐collusive output level). The latter occurs during booms and is due to the strategic substitutability of quantities. We also find that the time at which maximal collusion is most difficult to sustain can be either at booms or recessions. The international copper cartel of 1935–39 is used to illustrate some of our results.     

Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Employment History

In existing unemployment insurance programmes, it is standard to condition eligibility on the previous employment record of unemployed workers. The purpose of this article is to study conditions under which the efficient contract exhibits these properties. In order to do so, we characterize the optimal unemployment insurance contract in asymmetric information environments in which workers experience multiple unemployment spells. We show that if quits cannot be distinguished from layoffs, it is optimal to condition the benefits paid to unemployed workers on their employment history, in particular, the coverage should increase with the length of previous employment spells.     

State‐Dependent Transmission of Monetary Policy in the Euro Area

We estimate a logit mixture vector autoregressive model describing monetary policy transmission in the euro area over the period 1999–2015. In contrast to other classes of nonlinear vector autoregressive models, regime affiliation is neither strictly binary, nor binary with a transition period, and based on multiple variables. We show that monetary policy transmission in the euro area can be described as a mixture of two states. In both states, output and prices are found to decrease after contractionary monetary policy shocks. However, the effects of monetary policy are less enduring in the “crisis state.”