Optimal Taxation and Monopsonistic Labor Market: Does Monopsony Justify the Minimum Wage?

Does monopsony on the labor market in itself justify the implementation of a minimum wage when it would not be used in a competitive economy? This issue is studied in a model of optimal taxation. We find that there is no room for the minimum wage when there are a continuum of skills with no isolated mass point at the bottom of the wage distribution. Accordingly, in the empirically relevant situation, where there is a continuum of wages at the bottom of the distribution, the minimum wage is not helpful.     

Accounting Measurement Basis, Market Mispricing, and Firm Investment Efficiency

In this paper, we investigate how the accounting measurement basis affects the capital market pricing of a firm's shares, which, in turn, affects the efficiency of the firm's investment decisions. We distinguish two broad bases for accounting measurements: input‐based and output‐based accounting. We argue that the structural difference in the two measurement bases leads to a systematic difference in the efficiency of the investment decisions. In particular, we show that an output‐based measure has a natural advantage in aligning investment incentives because of its comprehensiveness. The (first‐)best investment is achieved when the output‐based measure is noiseless and manipulation free. In addition, under an output‐based measure, more accounting noise/manipulation always leads to more inefficient investment choices. Therefore, if an output‐based accounting measure is highly noisy and easy to manipulate in practice, the induced investment efficiency can be quite low. On the other hand, an input‐based accounting measure, while not as comprehensive, may induce more efficient investment decisions than an output‐based measure if some noise is unavoidable in either measure. The reason is twofold. First, input‐based measures may be associated with less noise and limited manipulation in practice. Second, and more importantly, we show that under an input‐based measure, a slight increase in accounting noise/manipulation may lead to more efficient investment choices. In fact, the (first‐)best result is achieved when the noise/manipulability is small but positive. In other words, for an input‐based measure, being less comprehensive makes small but positive accounting noise/manipulability desirable. Two extensions of the basic model are also explored.     

THE IMPACT OF ACADEMIC PATENTING ON THE RATE,QUALITY AND DIRECTION OF (PUBLIC) RESEARCH OUTPUT*

We examine the influence of faculty patenting on the rate, quality, and content of public research outputs in a panel dataset of 3,862 academic life scientists. Using inverse probability of treatment weights (IPTW) to account for self‐selection into patenting, we find that patenting has a positive effect on the rate of publications and a weak positive effect on the quality of these publications. We also find that patenters may be shifting their research focus to questions of commercial interest. We conclude that the often voiced concern that patenting in academe has a nefarious effect on public research output is misplaced.     

Do Prices Reveal the Presence of Informed Trading?

Using a comprehensive sample of trades from Schedule 13D filings by activist investors, we study how measures of adverse selection respond to informed trading. We find that on days when activists accumulate shares, measures of adverse selection and of stock illiquidity are lower, even though prices are positively impacted. Two channels help explain this phenomenon: (1) activists select times of higher liquidity when they trade, and (2) activists use limit orders. We conclude that, when informed traders can select when and how to trade, standard measures of adverse selection may fail to capture the presence of informed trading.     

Debt Stabilizing Fiscal Rules

Unstable government debt dynamics can typically be stabilized around a certain target level of debt by adjustments in various fiscal instruments, like government spending, transfers, or taxes. This paper investigates properties of debt stabilizing rules which link the needed budgetary adjustments to the state of the economy. The paper establishes that the magnitude of the target level of long‐run debt is a key determinant of whether it is possible to find a rule of this type that can be implemented under all available fiscal instruments. Specifically, considering linear feedback rules, the paper demonstrates that there may well exist a critical target level of debt beyond which this is no longer possible. From an applied perspective, this finding is of particular relevance in the context of a monetary union with decentralized fiscal policies. Depending on the target level of debt, there might be a conflict between a common fiscal framework that tracks deficit developments as a function of the state of the economy and the unrestricted choice of fiscal policy instruments at the national level.     

Data Games: Sharing Public Goods with Exclusion

A group of firms decides to cooperate on a project that requires a combination of inputs held by some of them. These inputs are non‐rival but excludable goods, i.e., public goods with exclusion such as knowledge, data or information, patents or copyrights. We address the question of how firms should be compensated for the inputs they contribute. We show that this problem can be framed within a cost sharing game for which the Shapley value comes out as a natural solution. The main result concerns the regular structure of the core that enables a simple characterization of the nucleolus. However, compared to the Shapley value, the nucleolus defines compensations that appear to be less appropriate in the context of data sharing. Our analysis is inspired by the problem faced by the European chemical firms within the regulation program REACH that requires submission by 2018 of a detailed analysis of all the substances they produce, import, or use.     

Informational Feedback,Adverse Selection,and Optimal Disclosure Policy

Faceless trading in a secondary stock market not only redistributes wealth among investors but also generates information that feeds back to real decisions. Using this observation we re‐evaluate the “leveling‐the‐playing‐field” rationale for disclosure to secondary stock markets. By partially preempting traders' information advantage established from information acquisition, disclosure reduces private incentives to acquire information, resulting in two opposite effects on firm value. On one hand, this narrows the information gap between informed and uninformed traders and improves liquidity of firm shares. On the other hand, this reduces the informational feedback from the stock market to real decisions. This tradeoff determines the optimal disclosure policy. The model explains why firm value can be higher in an environment that simultaneously promotes disclosure and private information production and why growth firms are endogenously more opaque than value firms.     

FIRMS’ CHARACTERISTIC AND EQUILIBRIUM WITH TRADEABLE PERMITS MARKET*

We study, in a simple model, the partial equilibrium of an industry with n firms endowed by different Cobb‐Douglas technologies which have different pollution effects. The price of input (labour) and the demand curve to the industry are given. Pollution is restricted by a tradeable market of permits in the industry. Each firm is characterised by a parameter combining production efficiency and pollution effect, its e‐characteristic. The equilibrium depends mainly on these e‐characteristics which are linked to the performance of the technologies. In the long run performances are defined per unit of capital. Last, we analyse the consequences of permits’ allocations on the profitability of the firms.     

Identification of Maximal Affine Term Structure Models

Building on Duffie and Kan (1996) , we propose a new representation of affine models in which the state vector comprises infinitesimal maturity yields and their quadratic covariations. Because these variables possess unambiguous economic interpretations, they generate a representation that is globally identifiable. Further, this representation has more identifiable parameters than the “maximal” model of Dai and Singleton (2000) . We implement this new representation for select three‐factor models and find that model‐independent estimates for the state vector can be estimated directly from yield curve data, which present advantages for the estimation and interpretation of multifactor models.