Oblivious equilibrium for concentrated industries

This article explores the application of oblivious equilibrium (OE) to highly concentrated markets. We define a natural extended notion of OE, called partially oblivious equilibrium (POE), that allows for there to be a set of strategically important firms (the “dominant” firms), whose firm states are always monitored by every other firm in the market. We perform computational experiments that explore the characteristics of POE, OE, and Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), and find that POE generally performs well in highly concentrated markets. We also derive error bounds for evaluating the performance of POE for cases where MPE cannot be computed.     

Structural models of complementary choices

This article reviews the rapidly growing literature on structural models of complementary choices. It discusses recent modeling developments and identifies promising areas for future research.     

Dynamic auction environment with subcontracting

This article provides evidence on the role of subcontracting in the auction‐based procurement setting with private cost variability and capacity constraints. We demonstrate that subcontracting allows bidders to modify their costs realizations in a given auction as well as to control their future costs by reducing backlog accumulation. Restricting access to subcontracting raises procurement costs for an individual project by 12% and reduces the number of projects completed in equilibrium by 20%. The article explains methodological and market design implications of subcontracting availability.     

Estimation of cost efficiencies from mergers: application to US radio

This article estimates fixed‐cost efficiencies from mergers using a dynamic oligopoly model in which mergers and repositioning of products are endogenous. The inference is based on revealed preference approach selecting cost synergies that rationalize observed merger decisions. The estimates can be used to assess the total welfare impact of retrospective and counterfactual mergers. The framework is applied to estimate cost efficiencies after the 1996 deregulation of U.S. radio industry. Within the period of 1996 to 2006 the cost savings resulting from mergers amount to $1.2 billion per year (equally split across economies of scale and within‐format cost synergies).