Dynamic Stock Markets with Multiple Assets: An Experimental Analysis

We study the performance of the rational expectations hypothesis in multiperiod experimental markets with multiple assets. We find that the markets are generally inefficient from the point of view of full information aggregation. However, arbitrage relationships hold, and it is not possible to detect the informational inefficiency by using some standard tests of market efficiency. These findings suggest that the lack of arbitrage opportunities and the failure of common tests to reject inefficiency are not sufficient to conclude that a market is informationally efficient.     

DOES DISAGGREGATION AFFECT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURE AND GDP? AN ANALYSIS USING REGIME SHIFTS*

This paper investigates the impact of policy shifts on disaggregated health expenditure‐GDP relationship in Australia. In contrast to previous studies the disaggregation is at the level of type of service delivered and not at the level of source of expenditure. Our results show that the subcomponents of health expenditure exhibit different patterns of behaviour at both cointegration and unit root stages once policy shifts or structural breaks are allowed in the empirical analysis. When the possibility of structural break is allowed we find a significant long‐run relationship between subcomponents of aggregate health expenditure and GDP that is not observed when break is not allowed. The underlying reasons for the occurrence of breaks and policy lessons are discussed subsequently.     

The Effects of Cross-Sectional Scale Differences on Regression Results in Empirical Accounting Research*

Abstract. This study investigates coefficient bias and heteroscedasticity resulting from scale differences in accounting levels-based research designs analytically and using simulations based on accounting data. Findings indicate that including a scale proxy as an independent variable is more effective than deflation at mitigating coefficient bias, even if the proxy is 95 percent correlated with the true scale factor. In fact, deflation can worsen coefficient bias. Also, deflation often does not noticeably reduce heteroscedasticity and can decrease estimation efficiency. White (1980) standard errors are close to the true ones in regressions using undeflated variables. Replications of specifications in three recent accounting studies confirm the simulation findings. The findings suggest that when scale differences are of concern, accounting researchers should include a scale proxy as an independent variable and report inferences based on White standard errors. Résumé. Les auteurs examinent, tant sur le plan analytique qu'au moyen de simulations basées sur les données comptables, la distorsion des coefficients et l'hétéroscédasticité résultant des différences d'échelle dans les plans de recherche comptable basés sur les niveaux. Leurs constatations révèlent que l'inclusion d'un substitut d'échelle à titre de variable indépendante est plus efficace que la déflation pour atténuer la distorsion relative au coefficient, même si le substitut présente une corrélation de 95 pour cent avec le véritable facteur d'échelle. En fait, la déflation peut accentuer la distorsion relative au coefficient. Aussi, il arrive souvent que la déflation, sans réduire de façon appréciable l'hétéroscédasticité, puisse diminuer l'efficience de l'estimation. Les erreurs-types de White (1980) se rapprochent des erreurs véritables dans les régressions faisant appel à des variables non déflatées. La répétition des mêmes caractéristiques dans trois études comptables récentes confirme les résultats de la simulation. Les conclusions de l'étude donnent à penser que lorsque les différences d'échelle sont sujet de préoccupation, les chercheurs en comptabilité devraient faire intervenir un substitut d'échelle à titre de variable indépendante et formuler les inférences à partir des erreurs-types de White.     

Attracting Attention: Cheap Managerial Talk and Costly Market Monitoring

We provide a theory of informal communication—cheap talk—between firms and capital markets that incorporates the role of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. The analysis suggests that a policy of discretionary disclosure that encourages managers to attract the market's attention when the firm is substantially undervalued can create shareholder value. The theory also relates the credibility of managerial announcements to the use of stock-based compensation, the presence of informed trading, and the liquidity of the stock. Our results are consistent with the existence of positive announcement effects produced by apparently innocuous corporate events (e.g., stock dividends, name changes).     

An Analytical Model for External Auditor Evaluation of the Internal Audit Function Using Belief Functions

The purpose of this paper is to advance research in internal audit (IA) evaluation by developing an IA assessment model that considers interrelationships among specific factors used by external auditors to evaluate the strength of the IA function. The model is based on three factors identified by auditing standards and by prior academic research: Competence, Work Performance, and Objectivity. We develop an analytical expression of the model using the belief function framework in order to overcome limitations of prior research. Our results reveal that modeling the “And” relationship is essential for assessing the strength of the IA function. As far as interrelationships are concerned, the analysis shows that, when the three factors have a strong or a perfect relationship, the strength of the IA function remains high even if there is positive or negative evidence about one of the factors. This result holds as long as there are high levels of belief about the other two factors. Further, we demonstrate how the quality of corporate governance affects the evaluation of the IA function and how a cost–benefit analysis can be applied to this framework to help determine the amount of external audit work needed to comply with standards. Our analysis reveals that the extent of external audit work to be carried out by the external auditor depends on the strength of the IA function and the amount of litigation and regulatory costs likely to be faced by the external auditor.     

Public Information Precision and Coordination Failure: An Experiment

More precise public disclosure reduces uncertainty about economic fundamentals, but it can increase uncertainty about other agents' actions, leading to coordination failure. We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the effects of public information precision and strategic complementarity on coordination failure. Information precision is operationalized in terms of “granularity” (level of detail). We found that (1) granular public disclosure, which is disaggregated and precise, increases the likelihood of coordination failure and decreases coordination efficiency when public information is pessimistic about future economic prospects; (2) the deleterious effect of granular disclosure is stronger when strategic complementarity is high; and (3) higher levels of strategic complementarity decrease coordination efficiency. Overall, the observed likelihood of coordination failure is higher and coordination efficiency is lower than predicted by theory. Our findings have implications for the Federal Reserve's decision to publicly disclose detailed stress test results for distressed banks, and the debate on whether the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board should publicly release reports on firm‐specific quality‐control deficiencies of audit firms.     

Risk Aversion and Arbitrage

This paper characterizes conditions under which asset returns and consumption are consistent with risk-averse preferences. It is shown that risk aversion is equivalent to “zero arbitrage” on a transformation of the payoff space. The implicit state prices which are dual to this no-arbitrage condition can be interpreted as prices of “pure consumption hedges.” This zero-arbitrage restriction implies the usual restrictions associated with nonsatiation. The analysis holds in both complete and incomplete market settings.     

Corporate Yield Spreads: Default Risk or Liquidity? New Evidence from the Credit Default Swap Market

We use the information in credit default swaps to obtain direct measures of the size of the default and nondefault components in corporate spreads. We find that the majority of the corporate spread is due to default risk. This result holds for all rating categories and is robust to the definition of the riskless curve. We also find that the nondefault component is time varying and strongly related to measures of bond‐specific illiquidity as well as to macroeconomic measures of bond market liquidity.     

Un modèle analytique d’évaluation de l’audit interne faisant appel aux fonctions de croyance, à l’usage de l’auditeur externe

Les auteurs ont pour but de faire progresser la recherche dans le domaine de l’évaluation de l’audit interne en élaborant un modèle d’évaluation de la fonction d’audit interne qui tient compte des relations entre les facteurs précis qu’utilisent les auditeurs externes pour évaluer la solidité de cette fonction. Le modèle repose sur trois facteurs définis par les normes d’audit et par les travaux de recherche antérieurs : la compétence, la qualité du travail et l’objectivité. Les auteurs élaborent une expression analytique du modèle à l’aide du cadre de référence des fonctions de croyance afin de dépasser les limites des études antérieures. Leurs résultats révèlent que la modélisation de la relation « et » est essentielle à l’évaluation de la solidité de la fonction d’audit interne. Au chapitre des relations, l’analyse montre que, lorsque celle qui unit ces trois facteurs est solide ou parfaite, la fonction d’audit interne demeure d’une grande solidité, même en présence d’éléments probants positifs ou négatifs à l’égard de l’un des facteurs. Ce résultat persiste dans la mesure où les niveaux de croyance au sujet des deux autres facteurs sont élevés. Les auteurs démontrent en outre comment la qualité de la gouvernance d’entreprise influe sur l’évaluation de la fonction d’audit interne et comment il est possible de recourir à l’analyse coûts‐avantages dans ce contexte pour mieux déterminer la quantité de travail d’audit externe qu’exige le respect des normes. L’analyse des auteurs révèle que l’étendue du travail d’audit devant être réalisé par l’auditeur externe dépend de la solidité de la fonction d’audit interne et de l’importance des coûts associés aux litiges et au respect de la réglementation auxquels le vérificateur externe doit faire face.