A Simple Way to Estimate Bid‐Ask Spreads from Daily High and Low Prices

We develop a bid‐ask spread estimator from daily high and low prices. Daily high (low) prices are almost always buy (sell) trades. Hence, the high–low ratio reflects both the stock's variance and its bid‐ask spread. Although the variance component of the high–low ratio is proportional to the return interval, the spread component is not. This allows us to derive a spread estimator as a function of high–low ratios over 1‐day and 2‐day intervals. The estimator is easy to calculate, can be applied in a variety of research areas, and generally outperforms other low‐frequency estimators.     

Limited Attention and the Allocation of Effort in Securities Trading

While limited attention has been analyzed in a variety of economic and psychological settings, its impact on financial markets is not well understood. In this paper, we examine individual NYSE specialist portfolios and test whether liquidity provision is affected as specialists allocate their attention across stocks. Our results indicate that specialists allocate effort toward their most active stocks during periods of increased activity, resulting in less frequent price improvement and increased transaction costs for their remaining assigned stocks. Thus, the allocation of effort due to limited attention has a significant impact on liquidity provision in securities markets.     

Can Brokers Have It All? On the Relation between Make‐Take Fees and Limit Order Execution Quality

We identify retail brokers that seemingly route orders to maximize order flow payments, by selling market orders and sending limit orders to venues paying large liquidity rebates. Angel, Harris, and Spatt argue that such routing may not always be in customers’ best interests. For both proprietary limit order data and a broad sample of trades from TAQ, we document a negative relation between several measures of limit order execution quality and rebate/fee level. This finding suggests that order routing designed to maximize liquidity rebates does not maximize limit order execution quality and thus brokers cannot have it all.     

Changes in Cash: Persistence and Pricing Implications

This paper decomposes the cash component of earnings and analyzes persistence characteristics and pricing implications of various subcomponents, with particular attention to changes in cash. Changes in underlying fundamentals might dictate changes in cash to new optimal levels. Alternatively, suboptimal changes in cash might result from agency costs allowing managers’ actions to diverge from the best interests of shareholders. We predict and find that both suboptimal increases and decreases in cash bode poorly for future earnings. In fact, we find that suboptimal increases (decreases) in cash have less (greater) persistence than any of the earnings components we study, including accruals and net distributions to both shareholders and debt holders. Market efficiency tests indicate that the market severely punishes firms with suboptimal decreases in cash, but we find no evidence to support the hubris hypothesis that the market overreacts to the earnings implications of unwarranted increases in cash.     

The Development of Secondary Market Liquidity for NYSE-Listed IPOs

For NYSE‐listed IPOs, limit order submissions and depth relative to volume are unusually low on the first trading day. Initial buy‐side liquidity is higher for IPOs with high‐quality underwriters, large syndicates, low insider sales, and high premarket demand, while sell‐side liquidity is higher for IPOs that represent a large fraction of outstanding shares and have low premarket demand. Our results suggest that uncertainty and offer design affect initial liquidity, though order flow stabilizes quickly. We also find that submission strategies are influenced by expected underwriter stabilization and preopening order flow contains information about both initial prices and subsequent returns.     

THE ROLE OF DIFFERENTIATION STRATEGY IN LOCAL TELECOMMUNICATION ENTRY AND MARKET EVOLUTION: 1999–2002*

We examine the role of differentiation among competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) in nearly 1,200 U.S. cities in 1999 and 2002, before and after a valuation crash affecting communications firms. We test and reject the null hypothesis of homogeneous competitors. We also find strong evidence that differentiated CLECs account for both potential market demand and the business strategies of competitors when making their entry decisions. Finally, product heterogeneity in markets in 1999 helps predict how the structure of markets evolved through 2002. We conclude that the policy debate for local telecommunications regulation should account for differentiated behavior.     

The Role of IPO Underwriting Syndicates: Pricing, Information Production, and Underwriter Competition

We examine syndicates for 1,638 IPOs from January 1997 through June 2002. We find strong evidence of information production by syndicate members. Offer prices are more likely to be revised in response to information when the syndicate has more underwriters and especially more co‐managers. More co‐managers also result in more analyst coverage and additional market makers following the IPO. Relationships between underwriters are critical in determining the composition of syndicates, perhaps because they mitigate free‐riding and moral hazard problems. While there appear to be benefits to larger syndicates, we discuss several factors that may limit syndicate size.     

Endogenous Destruction in a Model of Armed Conflict: Implications for Conflict Intensity,Welfare, and Third‐Party Intervention

This paper employs a contest approach to study a class of territorial conflicts in which conflict‐related arming is (endogenously) destructive of the contest prize. Of particular focus is the effect of endogenously destructive conflict arming upon conflict intensity and utility levels among primary parties to conflict. Also of interest are implications of endogenous destruction upon third‐party welfare effect in conflict. As compared to the case of a fixed‐prize conflict, we find starkly different arming and welfare outcomes in the case of an endogenously destructive conflict. We also find stark differences in third‐party effect under this distinct setting.