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Using new, survivorship bias‐free data, we examine the performance and persistence in performance of 4,617 active domestic equity institutional products managed by 1,448 investment management firms between 1991 and 2008. Controlling for the Fama–French (1993) three factors and momentum, aggregate and average estimates of alphas are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Even though there is considerable heterogeneity in performance, there is only modest evidence of persistence in three‐factor models and little to none in four‐factor models. 相似文献
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This paper studies how information disclosure affects investment efficiency and investor welfare in a dynamic setting in which a firm makes sequential investments to adjust its capital stock over time. We show that the effects of accounting disclosures on investment efficiency and investor welfare crucially depend on whether such disclosures convey information about the firm's future capital stock (i.e., balance sheet) or about its future operating cash flows (i.e., earnings). Specifically, investment efficiency and investor welfare unambiguously increase in the precision of disclosures that convey information about the future capital stock, since such disclosures mitigate the current owners' incentives to underinvest. In contrast, when accounting reports provide information about future cash flows, the firm can have incentives to either under‐ or overinvest depending on the precision of accounting reports and the expected growth in demand. For such disclosures, investment efficiency and investor welfare are maximized by an intermediate level of precision. The two types of accounting disclosures act as substitutes in that the precision of capital stock disclosures that maximizes investment efficiency (and investor welfare) decreases as cash flow disclosures become more informative and vice versa. 相似文献
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ROBERT BUSHMAN SUNIL DUTTA JOHN HUGHES RAFFI INDJEJIKIAN 《Contemporary Accounting Research》1997,14(1):43-68
Abstract. This paper investigates how strategic trading around the time of earnings announcements affects market liquidity (e.g., bid-ask spreads). We model an investor with private information in advance of an earnings announcement (e.g., inside information). The investor trades before and after the earnings announcement in a market populated by liquidity-motivated traders who have some discretion over the timing of their trades. The main result of the analysis is that an earnings announcement that reduces an insider's private information may lead to a less liquid market in the postannouncement period. 相似文献
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We examine the selection and termination of investment management firms by 3,400 plan sponsors between 1994 and 2003. Plan sponsors hire investment managers after large positive excess returns but this return-chasing behavior does not deliver positive excess returns thereafter. Investment managers are terminated for a variety of reasons, including but not limited to underperformance. Excess returns after terminations are typically indistinguishable from zero but in some cases positive. In a sample of round-trip firing and hiring decisions, we find that if plan sponsors had stayed with fired investment managers, their excess returns would be no different from those delivered by newly hired managers. We uncover significant variation in pre- and post-hiring and firing returns that is related to plan sponsor characteristics. 相似文献
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