Enterprise resource planning enabling segmental information reporting practices of UK‐FTSE 100

The ERP impact on management accounting practices has been widely recognised as having a knowledge gap in relation to how it may facilitate Segmental Information Reporting following the International Financial Reporting Standard No. 8’s (IFRS‐8) management approach. This study contributes to filling this gap by investigating the joint effect of the ERP and IFRS‐8 Post‐Implementation Review (PIR) on dimensions: quality, quantity and the reporters’ identity of FTSE‐100 companies in the period 2013–2017. The study found that ERP is significantly and positively associated with the dimensions of segmental information reporting. The implications of this study extend research and the practices of segmental reporting on the importance of ERP in operationalising segmental reporting and in understanding variations.     

Bank capital structure,capital requirements and SRISK across bank ownership types and financial crisis: panel VAR approach

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - This paper analyzes the simultaneous and dynamic multi-directional interrelationships between bank capital structure, capital requirements and SRISK...     

Competition For Board Seats Following Stock‐For‐Stock Mergers

We examine the board structure of firms following stock‐for‐stock mergers. We find that former target inside (outside) directors are more likely to join the combined firm board when target insiders (outsiders) have a relatively strong position on the pre‐merger target board. The relative size of the target firm, target firm profitability, and target blockholder ownership also influence whether target directors join the combined board. We conclude that competition for board seats on the combined board is won by target directors with greater bargaining positions.     

Intensive Board Monitoring,Investor Protection and Segment Disclosure Quality: Evidence from EU

Abstract

This study examined the association between intensive board monitoring (IBM) and segment disclosure quality (SDQ). It also investigated whether this association can be moderated by firm's home country investor protection (IP) level. Based on a panel of 271 non-financial European Union (EU) listed corporations covering the 2007–2012 period, this study estimated two multiple regression models including industry and year fixed effects. We found evidence that the segment disclosure quality is higher when a majority of outside directors serve on monitoring committees. We, also, found that the positive association between IBM and SDQ is more pronounced for firms in a weak IP environment and less pronounced for firms in a strong IP environment. Thus, we provided evidence in favor of a substitutive relationship between IBM and IP level with respect to their association with SDQ. Our findings are evidenced by several robustness tests.     

Diversification,capital structure,and performance: A simultaneous equation approach

This paper examines the relationships between diversification, capital structure, and performance jointly on the financial sector. Our dataset covers 412 French financial institutions over the period ranging from 2002 to 2012. Furthermore, we use a three‐stage least squares to check reverse causality. Our three‐stage least squares results show positive significant simultaneous interdependencies between performance and leverage. Performance reduction and debt levels increase are associated with activity diversification. Performance and leverage reduction is due to geographic diversification. Our estimation confirms reverse association between the interaction of diversification, leverage, and performance. Moreover, the findings are robust after taking into account alternative measures of diversification.     

Board composition after mergers,does it matter to target shareholders?

This paper examines whether post-merger board composition affects the premiums paid to target shareholders. Using a sample of 207 stock-for-stock mergers from 1996 to 2004, we show that target merger premiums vary inversely with target director representation on the post-merger board. We also provide some evidence that both inside and outside target directors may trade shareholder wealth for board seats in the combined firms. However, we do not find board ownership moderates the relation between target merger premiums and post-merger board composition. Consistent with previous studies of management incentives in mergers, our empirical evidence supports the non-perfect agency theory. That is, target directors may sacrifice target shareholder interests to obtain a seat on the post-merger board.