Application of Fuzzy Risk Analysis for Selecting Critical Processes in Implementation of SPC with a Case Study

Fuzzy risk analysis is widely used in risk assessment of components by linguistic terms. Fuzzy numbers are used to quantify the associated uncertainty. This study employs fuzzy risk analysis to evaluate processes for implementing statistical process control (SPC) in a specified manufacturing system. To reach this goal, fuzzy risk analysis has been applied based on both ranking and similarity of generalized trapezoidal fuzzy numbers in a stepwise procedure. Therefore, a new approach has been introduced for fuzzy risk analysis of processes to overcome the shortcomings of previous fuzzy risk analysis approaches. As a result, fuzzy risk analysis is used as a decision making technique to select critical processes under uncertainty. Also, the application of the proposed SPC implementation algorithm is illustrated in the manufacturing line of a car battery factory.     

Investors’ perception of CEO overconfidence: evidence from the cost of equity capital

Prior literature documents that CEO overconfidence plays an important role in corporate financial reporting and accounting decisions. However, an unexplored issue is how investors perceive the risks associated with CEO overconfidence. This study examines the effect of CEO overconfidence on the cost of equity capital. We find that the association between CEO overconfidence and the cost of equity is nonlinear: a moderate level of CEO overconfidence results in the lowest cost of equity capital after controlling for other known determinants of the cost of equity. We also find an inverted nonlinear relation between CEO overconfidence and equity issuance, which corroborates our main conclusion of the nonlinear effect of CEO overconfidence on the cost of equity. Our results are robust to alternative overconfidence measures, cost of equity measures, and change analysis.     

Auditors’ scepticism in response to audit committee oversight behaviour

We use two experiments and a survey to examine how audit committee (hereafter, AC) oversight behaviour, particularly AC sceptical attitude and proactive behaviour, affects auditor scepticism, and whether the influence is driven by the risk aspect of auditors’ assessment of AC oversight behaviour. We find that when ACs exercise insufficient scepticism, auditors (junior auditors, managers, and partners) perceive AC oversight as weak, and increase their scepticism. However, AC proactive behaviour does not significantly influence auditor scepticism. Our findings suggest auditors view weak AC oversight as a risk indicator and respond by exercising greater scepticism.