Disclosure of Private Information and Reduction of Uncertainty: Environmental Liabilities in the Chemical Industry

We investigate the potential uncertainty-reducing role of accounting information in the context of contingent Superfund liability valuation. We first develop theoretical arguments for the way reduction of uncertainty regarding these contingent liabilities is expected to affect security prices. Empirical proxies are developed for two types of uncertainty surrounding contingent Superfund liabilities: site uncertainty and allocation uncertainty. In a valuation framework, we then investigate whether financial statement disclosures and accruals reduce uncertainty and thereby affect security valuation. Specifically, we analyze the interaction of private information contained in firm disclosures and accruals with inherent uncertainty surrounding contingent Superfund liabilities. Results suggest that in a regulatory environment allowing substantial reporting discretion, firm-provided financial statement information affects valuation of contingent Superfund liabilities by reducing uncertainty. Further, we find that information revealed through accruals versus disclosures is differentially effective at reducing site and allocation uncertainty.     

The Value Relevance of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowances: An Exploratory Study in the Related United States SO2 Market

This paper examines the valuation implications of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions allowances. We posit that the value of a firm's bank of emission allowances has two components that are likely to be positively valued by the capital market: (1) an asset value component; and (2) a real option value component. Since the necessary data to examine this research hypothesis in the setting of GHG emission allowances is not yet available, we test our conjecture by examining the value relevance of sulfur dioxide (SO₂) emission allowances held by US electric utilities. Empirical results reveal that the capital market assigns a positive price to a firm's bank of SO₂ emission allowances, consistent with the argument that emission allowances have, at least, an asset value component that is assigned a positive price by the market. We also find weak evidence consistent with the market assigning a real option value to the allowance banks.     

Executive compensation and non-financial risk: An empirical examination

Executives face potentially severe (non-financial) personal risks if firm environmental performance is below industry best practice. We examine the relation between CEO compensation and the non-financial risk associated with environmental exposure, and how use of environmental performance as an explicit determinant of compensation affects this relation. We find evidence that CEOs are compensated for exposure to environmental risk, even after controlling for financial risk. We also find that this premium is reduced when the CEO has greater opportunities to improve the firm’s environmental performance.