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Severin Borenstein Jeffrey K. Mackie-Mason Janet S. Netz 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2000,9(2):157-188
Over 20 recent antitrust cases have turned on whether competition in complex durable-equipment markets prevents manufacturers from exercising market power over proprietary aftermarket products and services. We show that the price in the aftermarket will exceed marginal cost despite competition in the equipment market. Absent perfectly contingent long-term contracts, firms will balance the advantages of marginal-cost pricing to future generations of consumers against the payoff from monopoly pricing for current, locked-in equipment owners. The result holds for undifferentiated Bertrand competition, differentiated duopoly, and monopoly equipment markets. We also examine the effects of market growth and equipment durability. 相似文献
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Severin Borenstein Meghan R. Busse Ryan Kellogg 《The Journal of industrial economics》2012,60(2):220-248
We study how incentive conflicts known as ‘career concerns’ can generate inefficiencies not only within firms but also in market outcomes. Career concerns may lead agents to avoid actions that, while value‐increasing in expectation, could potentially be associated with a bad outcome. We apply this theory to natural gas procurement by regulated public utilities and show that career concerns may lead to a reduction in surplus‐increasing market transactions during periods when the benefits of trade are likely to be greatest. We show that data from natural gas markets are consistent with this prediction and difficult to explain using alternative theories. 相似文献
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An Empirical Analysis of the Potential for Market Power in California's Electricity Industry 总被引:13,自引:0,他引:13
Using historical cost data, we simulate the California electricity market after deregulation as a static Cournot market with a competitive fringe. Our model indicates that, under the pre-deregulation structure of generation ownership, there is potential for significant market power in high demand hours, particularly in the fall and early winter months when hydroelectric output is at its lowest level relative to demand. The results also show that two of the most important factors in determining the extent and severity of market power are the level of available hydroelectric production and the elasticity of demand. 相似文献
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Conventional economic theory assumes that firms minimize costs given output, but news articles and managers indicate that firms cut costs when they are in economic distress and grow fat when they are relatively wealthy. Under conventional theory, firm value is convex in the price of a competitively supplied input or output, but we find that the stock values of many gold‐mining companies are concave in the price of gold. We show that this is consistent with fat accumulation when a firm grows wealthy. We then address alternative explanations and discuss where fat in these companies might reside. 相似文献
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The fundamental objective of most regulatory mechanisms is to expand output at a sufficiently low cost to consumers. Many useable mechanisms, such as Loeb and Magat's, require detailed demand information and substantial profit recapture by the regulator in order to achieve this objective. We present an apparently unexplored alternative approach-inducing competition among firms for shares of a monetary reward. Payments to a firm for output expansion thus depend on both its own behavior and the actions of other firms, which can even be firms in unrelated industries. We show that in a wide variety of circumstances, the resultant increase in consumer surplus exceeds the reward. Hence, even with no profit recapture, our approach can lead to Pareto improvements. 相似文献
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AbstractWe present a simple stock-flow consistent (SFC) model to discuss some recent claims made by Angel Asensio in a paper published in this journal regarding the relationship between endogenous money theory and the liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest. We incorporate Asensio’s assumptions as far as possible and use simulation experiments to investigate his arguments regarding the presence of a crowding-out effect, the relationship between interest rates and credit demand, and the ability of the central bank to steer interest rates through varying the stock of money. We show that in a fully-specified SFC model, some of Asensio’s conclusions are not generally valid (most importantly, the presence of a crowding-out effect is ambiguous), and that in any case, his use of a non-SFC framework leads him to leave aside important mechanisms which can contribute to a better understanding of the behavior of interest rates. More generally, this paper once more demonstrates the utility of the SFC approach in research on monetary economics. 相似文献
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Severin Borenstein Jeffrey K. Mackie-Mason Janet S. Netz 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2000,9(3):157-188
Over 20 recent antitrust cases have turned on whether competition in complex durable-equipment markets prevents manufacturers from exercising market power over proprietary aftermarket products and services. We show that the price in the aftermarket will exceed marginal cost despite competition in the equipment market. Absent perfectly contingent long-term contracts, firms will balance the advantages of marginal-cost pricing to future generations of consumers against the payoff from monopoly pricing for current, locked-in equipment owners. The result holds for undifferentiated Bertrand competition, differentiated duopoly, and monopoly equipment markets. We also examine the effects of market growth and equipment durability. 相似文献
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