Stationary solution to the overlapping generations model of fiat money: Experimental evidence

Overlapping generations model of fiat money yields an infinity of competitive equilibrium solutions, only one of which is stationary. Economies reported in this paper involved a sequence of overlapping generations of three or four individuals; each individual lived for two periods. In their young age individuals were endowed with chips that could be traded for fiat money wish the individuals of the old generation. In their old age, individuals could exchange their units o flat money for the consumption good. Results of the experiments exhibit some support for the stationary solution. The results are robust to two designs of exchange institutions (double oral auctior and supply schedule auction) and to two different endogenous ways of converting money into chips at the end of the game (average price prevailing during the last period the game is actually played and the average price forecast made during the last period the game is actually played).A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the meeting of the Economic Science Association and at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. The authors are grateful for comments received from various participants at both presentations. Financial support was provided by the McKnight Foundation, the Honeywell Foundation, National Science Foundation (SES 89-12552), and Richard. M. and Margaret Cyert Family Funds.     

Is mandated independence necessary for audit quality?

Independence (in fact as well as in appearance) is widely thought to be necessary for the quality of audits, and audit quality is often equated with independence. Private incentives to demand (and supply) independent certification of financial statements are thought to be insufficient, thus the need to mandate independence through regulation. This study presents data from a field experiment on the unregulated market for certification of baseball cards to assess the role of independence vis-à-vis other auditor attributes such as competence, price, and service on audit quality. In our field experiment, we examine prices of baseball cards sold on eBay with or without third party certification. In addition, the certifier was either independent or deeply immersed in providing other services to market participants. We find that market participants pay a significant premium for certified cards. Certifiers who are deeply immersed (and therefore apparently less independent) also provide higher quality service in the form of being stricter graders, command larger price premiums, and dominate in market share. Implications for independence and audit quality are discussed.     

Asymmetric wealth gains in joint ventures: Theory and evidence

I examine the causes of asymmetric wealth gains (instances where one partner gains and the other partner loses) and the extent of these gains in joint ventures. I argue that asymmetric gains arise as the common benefits created by the venture are offset by the negative wealth effects of resource appropriation for one parent. Using a sample of 412 joint ventures I find that in 42% of the ventures one parent gained and the other lost. In addition, I find that when the abnormal returns of parents within a venture were compared, firms that gained more from forming the venture experienced [−1,0] returns of +3.22% and firms that gained less experienced [−1,0] returns of −1.37%. Additional analyses showed that asymmetric wealth gains tended to occur in ventures where one parent had relatively high valued resources and the other parent had relatively lower valued resources thus suggesting that resource appropriation may be an important cause of this pattern of gains.     

Monopoly versus Competition in Setting Accounting Standards

Financial accounting standards are set by organizations granted a significant degree of monopoly power by various governments. While there has been considerable debate on the merits of national (e.g., US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)) versus international (International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)) monopolies, little attention has been paid to the merits of using competing standard‐setting organizations (SSOs) for setting accounting standards. We compare the standard‐setting processes of the FASB/IASB to the processes of four technology‐oriented SSOs to assess the role of competition. We also provide a case study of monopoly and competitive standards in telephony. Both telephony and accounting yield some gains from coordination, and similar arguments are used (under the labels of comparability and consistency of accounting) in debates about granting a monopoly to their respective SSOs. Our results show that a group of volunteers competing with the government‐sanctioned monopoly of International Telecommunications Union transformed the telephone industry. Thanks to this standards competition, we enjoy free video internet calling and massive cost savings. Implications for accounting standard setting are discussed.     

Large shareholders and disclosure strategies: Evidence from IPO lockup expirations

We examine the effect of large shareholders? ex ante selling incentives on firms? voluntary disclosure choices in the setting of IPO lockup expirations. We find evidence that managers delay disclosures of bad news, not for their own benefit, but to enable influential pre-IPO shareholders to sell their shares at more favorable prices. Delays are more pronounced when aggregate selling incentives are greater, when uncertainty is high, and when venture capitalists, influential investors with strong selling incentives, own more shares. Simultaneously, managers? disclosure decisions reflect litigation concerns; no significant delays occur when litigation risk is high or when managers trade themselves.     

An economy with personal currency: theory and experimental evidence

Is personal currency issued by participants sufficient to operate an economy efficiently, with no outside or government money? Sahi and Yao (in J Math Econ, 1989) and Sorin (in J Econ Theory, 1996) constructed a strategic market game to prove that this is possible. We conduct an experimental game in which each agent issues his/her personal IOUs, and a costless efficient clearinghouse adjusts the exchange rates among them so the markets always clear. The results suggest that if the information system and clearing are so good as to preclude moral hazard, any form of information asymmetry, and need for trust, the economy operates efficiently at any price level without government money. These conditions cannot reasonably be expected to hold in natural settings. In a second set of treatments when agents have the option of not delivering on their promises, a high enough penalty for non-delivery is necessary to ensure an efficient market; a lower penalty leads to inefficient, even collapsing, markets due to moral hazard.     

Musgrave’s “target saver” theory: Implications for macroeconomic stability and economic policy effectiveness”

Musgrave develops the concept of the “target saver,” in which the household saves in the present in order to finance a target level of consumption outlays in the future. The resulting household behavior is one in which a rise in the rate of interest in the present period reduces the amount of saving needed for future consumption, so that household saving is inversely rather than positively a function of the interest rate. The present study examines the potential implications of the target saver in the aggregate for macroeconomic stability and economic policy effectiveness.      

Partially suppressed markets: Controls,rent seeking and the cost of protection in the indian sugar industry

Zusammenfassung Partiell beschr?nkte M?rkte: Kontrollen, “ent seeking” und Protektionskosten der indischen Zuckerindustrie. -Dieser Aufsatz untersucht den indischen Zuckermarkt, der durch partielle Kontrollen und eine dualistische Preisbildung gekennzeichnet ist. Die aus der empirischen Analyse gewonnenen Sch?tzungen der Nachfrageund Angebotselastizit?ten werden benutzt, um die üblichen Protektionskosten der Produktion und des Konsums zu sch?tzen sowie die weniger konventionellen Kosten des “ent-seeking” à la Tullock. Diese Kosten deuten auf gro?e Effizienzverluste hin, die eintreten, wenn alle durch Kontrollen hervorgebrachten Renten durch kompetitives “ent-seeking” hinwegkonkurriert werden. Diese Kosten lagen in einigen Jahren zwischen Null und 55 vH des Wertes der Zuckererzeugung, woraus sich ergibt, da? Protektionskosten plus “nt-seeking” insgesamt in einigen Jahren sogar Wohlfahrtsverluste erbracht haben. Angesichts solch gro?er Verluste kann die politische ?konomie fortgesetzter Kontrollen der indischen Zuckerindustrie nur im Rahmen der Public-Choice-Theorie verstanden werden.

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Résumé Marchés partiellement supprimés: contr?les, ?rent-seeking? et les frais de protection de l’industrie indienne sucrière. -Dans cet article l’auteur analyse le marché indien sucrier sous des conditions des contr?les partiels et de la détermination de prix dual. Il applique des estimations d’élasticité de demande et d’offre obtenues de l’analyse empirique pour estimer les frais conventionnels de production et de consommation de la protection et les frais inconventionnels de ?rent-seeking? à la Tullock. Les derniers frais indiquent des grandes pertes d’efficience si toutes les rentes générées par les contr?les sont actuellement entra?nées sous un ?rent-seeking? compétitif. Ces frais rangent entre zéro et à peu près 55 pourcent de la valeur de production sucrière dans certaines années et cela indique que dans quelques années les frais de protection plus ?rent-seeking? ont résulté dans une valeur totale négative en termes de bien-être. En vue de ces grandes pertes de bien-être, l’économie politique de la continuation des contr?les dans l’industrie indienne sucrière ne peut être comprise que dans le contexte de la théorie du choix publique.

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Resumen Mercados parcialmente suprimidos: controles, ?rent seeking? y el costo de la protection en la industria azucarera de la India. -En este trabajo se analiza el mercado del azúcar en la India bajo condiciones de control y precios duales. Se utilizan estimaciones de elasticidades de demanda y oferta obtenidas del análisis empírico para estimar el costo de la protección por el lado de la producción y del consumo de la manera convencional como también según el método no convencional de Tullock para obtener el costo del ?rent seeking?. Este último indica importantes pérdidas de eficiencia si todas las rentas generadas por los controles desaparecen bajo un ?rent seeking? competitivo Estos costos son del orden del 0 al 55 % del valor de la producción de azúcar en ciertos a?os, lo cual significaría que en algunos a?os el costo de la proteccion más el del ?rent seeking? podrían haber contribuído a un valor total negativo en términos de bienestar. Dadas estas importantes pérdidas de bienestar, la economía política de una continuation de los controles en el industria azucarera de la India sólo puede ser comprendida en el contexto de la teoría del ?public choice? y la captura de regulaciones por los regulados.