Accounting Window Dressing and Template Regulation: A Case Study of the Australian Credit Union Industry

This article documents the response of cooperative institutions that were required to adhere to new capital adequacy regulations traditionally geared for profit-maximising organisations. Using data from the Australian credit union industry, we demonstrate that the cooperative philosophy and internal corporate governance structure of cooperatives will lead management to increase capital adequacy ratios through the application of accounting window dressing techniques. This is opposite to the intended purpose of template regulation aimed at efficiently increasing operating margins and lowering risk. Our results raise several debatable issues regarding the ethics of accounting management and the imposition of one-shoe-fits-all external regulation.      

Asymmetric trading by insiders – comparing abnormal returns and earnings prediction in Spain and Australia

This paper examines whether the ‘external governance’ imposed by comparative financial accounting standards reduces the trading advantage of insiders. We do this by directly comparing insider trading returns and insider’s ability to predict future earnings from accruals in Spain and Australia. Results show higher excess returns and greater prediction of future earnings from conditioned insider trading in Australia that is then utilized by financial analysts to lower forecast errors – particularly in contrarian‐based accruals trading. Possible explanations include: (i) a high asymmetric quality for market‐based accruals, (ii) information transfer from informed insiders to uninformed insiders and financial analysts and (iii) a more timely dissemination of financial information in Spain through different ownership and governance structures.     

Applying developed‐country regulation in emerging markets: an analysis of Thai insider trading

This paper undertakes an out‐of‐sample test of developed‐country insider trading regulation in an emerging market environment (Thailand), where severe information asymmetry, lax enforcement and poor pricing efficiency are endemic. Thai insider trading regulation, which mimics developed market rules, fails on all three measures of success. Insiders trade with impunity during a regulated trading ban. Their trading performance outperforms other investors at all times, and they continue to exploit their privileged position with respect to information flow. Our study suggests it is inappropriate for emerging market regulators to adopt developed market regulation without first considering the unique characteristics of their own environment.