The Theory of Capital Structure

This paper surveys capital structure theories based on agency costs, asymmetric information, product/input market interactions, and corporate control considerations (but excluding tax-based theories). For each type of model, a brief overview of the papers surveyed and their relation to each other is provided. The central papers are described in some detail, and their results are summarized and followed by a discussion of related extensions. Each section concludes with a summary of the main implications of the models surveyed in the section. Finally, these results are collected and compared to the available evidence. Suggestions for future research are provided.     

The Capital Budgeting Process: Incentives and Information

We study the capital allocation process within firms. Observed budgeting processes are explained as a response to decentralized information and incentive problems. It is shown that these imperfections can result in underinvestment when capital productivity is high and overinvestment when it is low. We also investigate how the budgeting process may be expected to vary with firm or division characteristics such as investment opportunities and the technology for information transfer.     

Aggregating Incomplete Lists of Journal Rankings: An Application to Academic Accounting Journals*

We introduce a branch‐and‐cut algorithm to aggregate published journal rankings based on subsets of the accounting literature in order to create a consensus ranking. The aggregate ranking allows specialist and regional journals, which may only be ranked in a limited number of studies, to be placed with respect to each other and with respect to the generalist journals that are usually included in ranking studies. The approach we develop is a significant advance over ad hoc approaches to aggregating journal rankings that have appeared in the literature and may provide a theoretically sound and replicable basis for further exploration of the concept of journal quality and the stability of journal rankings over time and ranking methods.     

Capital Structure and the Informational Role of Debt

This paper provides a theory of capital structure based on the effect of debt on investors' information about the firm and on their ability to oversee management. We postulate that managers are reluctant to relinquish control and unwilling to provide information that could result in such an outcome. Debt is a disciplining device because default allows creditors the option to force the firm into liquidation and generates information useful to investors. We characterize the time path of the debt level and obtain comparative statics results on the debt level, bond yield, probability of default, probability of reorganization, etc.