Optimal Monetary Policy in a Small Open Economy with Home Bias

We analyze optimal monetary policy in a small open economy characterized by home bias in consumption. Peculiar to our framework is the application of a Ramsey-type analysis to a model of the recent open-economy New Keynesian literature. We show that home bias in consumption is a sufficient condition for inducing the monetary policymaker of an open economy to deviate from a strategy of strict markup stabilization and contemplate some (optimal) degree of exchange rate stabilization. We focus on the optimal setting of policy both in the case of firms setting prices one period in advance and in a gradual fashion subject to adjustment costs. While the first setup allows us to analytically highlight home bias as an independent source of equilibrium markup variability, the second setup allows to study the effects of future expectations on the optimal policy problem and the effect of home bias on optimal inflation volatility. The latter, in particular, is shown to be related to the degree of trade openness in a U-shaped fashion, whereas exchange rate volatility is monotonically decreasing in openness.     

INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND COMPETITION IN COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS*

We develop a model of information exchange between calling parties. We characterize the equilibrium when two interconnected networks compete by charging both for outgoing and incoming calls. We show that networks have reduced incentives to use off‐net price discrimination to induce a connectivity breakdown when calls originated and received are complements in the information exchange. This breakdown disappears if operators are allowed to negotiate reciprocal access charges. We also study the relationship between sending and receiving retail charges as a function of the level of access charges. We identify circumstances where private negotiations over access charges induce first‐best retail prices.     

PARALLEL TRADE,INTERNATIONAL EXHAUSTION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A WELFARE ANALYSIS*

This paper analyses the issue of parallel trade (arbitrage) for products protected by intellectual property rights. We discuss a basic trade‐off that arises between the ex post better allocation that typically occurs under parallel trade when demand dispersion is not too high, and the ex ante reduced product quality because of lower investment. We show that the size of the welfare effects is significantly affected by the presence of a ‘generic’ product, which represents a form of competition for the monopolist. The monopolist will introduce a ‘fighting brand’ to compete with the generic, which dilutes but does not eliminate the result on the adverse effects of parallel trade on investments.     

The International Dimension of Inflation: Evidence from Disaggregated Consumer Price Data

We estimate the contribution of international common factors to the dynamics of price inflation rates of a cross-section of 948 CPI products in four OECD countries: United States, Germany, France, and United Kingdom. We find two main results. First, on average, and at least in the sample 1991–2004, one international common factor explains between 15% and 30% of the variance of consumer prices (depending on the transformation applied to the data). Given the high level of disaggregation of our panel, this estimate is best viewed as a lower bound for the contribution of international factors to inflation dynamics. Second, we find a strongly positive and statistically significant relationship between exposure of consumer inflation to international shocks and trade openness at the sectoral level. The latter result holds regardless of whether the original data are expressed in local as opposed to common currency.     

BUYER POWER AND THE ‘WATERBED EFFECT’*

When a buyer is able to obtain lower input prices from a supplier, is it possible that other buyers will have to pay more for the same input as a result? Is this bad for consumers? We present a model that analyzes the conditions under which the asymmetric exercise of buyer power can lead to consumer detriment through raising other buyers' wholesale prices (the ‘waterbed effect’).