The Optimal Choice for Lenders Facing Defaults: Short Sale,Foreclose, or REO

When mortgage borrowers default and have no desire or ability to keep their property, then loss mitigation involves a sale of the property via one of the following options: (1) the lender allows pre-foreclosure “short sale” by the borrower, (2) the lender institutes the foreclosure process under a notice of default and the property is sold during the process by the borrower, and (3) the lender forecloses on the property, takes title, and sells the property in the market as real estate owned (REO). Sale of the property in the above three options is conducted by a motivated seller, either the owner or the lender, who desires to sell the property as quickly as possible. Thus, relative to a no-default sale, the house is most likely to be sold at a discounted price. It is generally expected that the discount would be lower in the case of a “short sale.” This option, however, may result in a longer marketing time, thus a higher total loss, than the other two options. We developed a model that allows simultaneous estimation of price and time-on-market effects of “short sales,” foreclosures, and REO options. We find that the short-sale option has the lowest-price discount, but significantly higher costs associated with marketing time. The pattern of price discount and marketing time reverses as we move to a sale while in the process of foreclosure and to a sale with an REO status.     

Asset Write‐downs: Evidence from 2001–2008

Accounting for asset write‐downs has received substantial media attention throughout the Global Financial Crisis and has been the subject of academic debate and numerous accounting regulations during the past three decades. This study provides evidence of the magnitude and frequency of quarterly asset write‐down activities for a sample of US firms between 2001 and 2008 and examines whether reported asset write‐downs mirror market and economic indicators during the sample period.     

Spatial collisions and discordant temporalities: everyday life between camp and checkpoint

How do we make sense of the colonial subject that is neither in revolt nor in open crisis? How do people reproduce their lives, fashion routines, etch out some meaning when the political is evacuated, when time is on hold? These questions loom over a contemporary disjuncture in Palestine, marked in part by the splintering and opening up of the field of subjective bonds, attachments and associations to new modalities of production, less circumscribed by previous normative parameters and engendering a host of complexities and ambivalences in politico-social relationalities. Yet most scholarship on Palestine remains caught up in reductive binaries of violence versus resistance and heavily reliant on rigid and aggregated categories, the bulk of it unable to capture entire assemblages of action, subjective dissonance, productive ambiguities and contingent vitalities that inflect so much of contemporary quotidian life. The refugee in particular has emerged as a destabilizing figure, capable of subversively using the spatio-temporality of the camp as the very resource through which to disturb ascribed categorizations. Reading the paradoxical multiplicity of actions that refugees — women, children and the elderly — perform in the space between Qalandia camp and its checkpoint provides an insight into some of what defines contemporary refugee subjectivities — flexibility, a readiness to take risks, an ability to maneuver through different temporal orders and instrumentalize the spatial fragmentation. These subjects, traversing and negotiating liminality in everyday life, point to lived and bodied affirmations of presence and visibility that cannot be understood through frameworks of recognition and rights.     

The square-root law,uncertainty and international reserves under alternative regimes: Canadian experience, 1950–1976

A transactions-precautionary model of demand for international reserves is developed and tested against Canadian data. The results indicate that: (i) the demand for reserves is characterized by economies of scale with respect to the volume of transactions that are invariant to the exchange rate regime, but (ii) structural change took the form of a relatively larger responsiveness of reserves holdings under fixed rates to a measure of permanent variability in transactions.     

Agent Change and Seller Bargaining Power: A Case of Principal Agent Problem in the Housing Market

When a seller hires an agent to sell his/her property, a successful outcome depends on the list price, marketing time, unobserved relative bargaining power of the buyers and sellers, and the effort levels of the seller and the seller’s agent. A divergence with respect to the list/transaction prices and the expected effort levels between seller and agent will create a principal-agent interest conflict. This conflict in some cases results in an agent change before the house is sold. The change will reduce the relative bargaining power of the seller, affecting the observed marketing time and transaction price. This study estimates the effects of an agent change on marketing time and transaction price after controlling for degree of overpricing, list-price revisions, marketing time, and endogenous selection bias. Our results show that: (1) on average, an agent change increases the marketing time by about 3 months and adversely affects the transaction price by about 2.7 %. Furthermore, we found that an agent change before the expiration of the listing contract, compared to that of after the expiration, has a smaller effect on the marketing time (2.3 vs. 3.8 months) and has a smaller transaction price discount (2.1 % vs. 4.2 %).     

Black immigrants in the U.S. labor market: An earnings analysis

This article investigates the existence and sources of earnings differentials between black Americans and black immigrants, and between black and nonblack immigrants. Employing the Public Use Sample of the 1980 census, the gross earnings differentials between black immigrants and black Americans are estimated to be 8.7 percent in favor of Americans (i.e., Americans earn 8.7 percent more than immigrants). About 2 percentage points and 6.7 percentage points of the gross differential are, respectively, due to differences in average characteristics and in returns to the characteristics. The gross differential between black and nonblack immigrants is 22.1 percent in favor of nonblack, of which 13.8 percentage points are due to differences in average characteristics and 8.3 are due to differences in returns to characteristics.     

Capital Structure, Agency Problems, and Deposit Insurance in Banking Firms

This paper applies and synthesizes various theories of corporate finance, including capital structure, agency insurance, and regulation, to the case of banking firms and the deposite insurance system. It is argued that a value-maximizing bank would reach its optimal capital structure by minimizing the agency costs of incentive conflicts among stockholders, managers, uninsured depositors, and the deposit insurance agency. Although a regulatory imposed capital requirment may reduce the agency costs inherent in the insurance contact, it cannot produce a universal capital structure that is optimal for all insured banks. The observed capital structure patterns also suggest that banks actively seek an optimal capital structure.     

Principal–Agent Conflict and Broker Effort Near Listing Contract Expiration: The Case of Residential Properties

In the real estate market the seller/agent relationship changes over the course of the listing contract. As the contract expiration nears, brokers may increase efforts generating more potential buyers and, perhaps, a higher offered price. Brokers may also persuade the seller to reduce the reservation price. These two aspects have different implications for the selling price of the property. Employing a sample of 24,100 properties sold in Clark County, Nevada, we investigate the relationship between the selling price and the time-to-expiration of the listing contract. We find that prices are lower if the property is sold near the expiration of the listing contract, indicating that the price-reduction effect dominates the broker-effort effect.