Entry limiting agreements: First‐mover advantage,authorized generics,and pay‐for‐delay deals

During patent litigation, pay‐for‐delay (P4D) deals involve a payment from a patent holder of a branded drug to a generic drug manufacturer to delay entry and withdraw the patent challenge. In return for staying out of the market, the generic firm receives a payment, and/or an authorized licensed entry at a later date, but before the patent expiration. We examine why such deals are stable when there are multiple potential entrants. We combine the first‐mover advantage for the first generic with the ability of the branded manufacturer to launch an authorized generic (AG) to show when P4D deals are an equilibrium outcome. We further show that limiting a branded firm's ability to launch an AG before entry by a successful challenger will deter such deals. However, removing exclusivity period for the first generic challenger will not.     

Green Public Procurement: A Neglected Tool in the European Green Deal Toolbox?

Intereconomics - Public procurement amounts to around 14% of European Union GDP and, given this size, could well represent an important tool to foster the green transition. However, green public...     

Stock market volatility forecasting: Do we need high-frequency data?

The general consensus in the volatility forecasting literature is that high-frequency volatility models outperform low-frequency volatility models. However, such a conclusion is reached when low-frequency volatility models are estimated from daily returns. Instead, we study this question considering daily, low-frequency volatility estimators based on open, high, low, and close daily prices. Our data sample consists of 18 stock market indices. We find that high-frequency volatility models tend to outperform low-frequency volatility models only for short-term forecasts. As the forecast horizon increases (up to one month), the difference in forecast accuracy becomes statistically indistinguishable for most market indices. To evaluate the practical implications of our results, we study a simple asset allocation problem. The results reveal that asset allocation based on high-frequency volatility model forecasts does not outperform asset allocation based on low-frequency volatility model forecasts.     

Broadcasting and Sport

The broadcasting of sport is heavily regulated. Our main findingis that common trends, and differences, in the quality, quantity,and price of televised sport across Europe and USA cannot beadequately explained without reference to policy interventionsby national and supranational government, and by competitionand regulatory authorities. These interventions have a significantimpact on the organization and governance of sports, as wellas the structure of broadcasting markets and the conduct ofbroadcasting companies. Foreclosure of broadcasting marketsthrough exclusive, long-term contracts, bundling and verticalintegration, access of viewers to major sporting events, andcollective selling stand out as the most significant policyissues. We conclude by noting a number of policy implications.     

The Marshallian macroeconomic model: A progress report

In this progress report, we first indicate the origins and early development of the Marshallian macroeconomic model (MMM) and briefly review some of our past empirical forecasting experiments with the model. Then we present recently developed one-sector, two-sector and n-sector models of an economy that can be employed to explain past experience, predict future outcomes and analyze policy problems. The results of simulation experiments with various versions of the model are provided to illustrate some of its dynamic properties that include “chaotic” features. Last, we present comments on planned future work with the model.     

Managing Price Risk in the Pakistan Wheat Market

The government intervenes in the wheat market in Pakistan toensure food security for consumers and to provide adequate andstable incomes for producers. The cost of this interventionis high, and its impact on the performance of agriculture hasbeen significantly negative. The World Bank is urging policychanges such as removing agricultural trade restrictions, pricesupports, and subsidies. However, policymakers often resistsuch reforms, fearing that they will expose the domestic marketto fluctuating international commodity prices. This article assesses the risk management needs of the sectorand evaluates whether using financial instruments—suchas commodity hedging using futures, options, or swaps—wouldimprove risk management. Simulations based on monthly data for1994 show that market-based methods of risk management couldreduce the impact of international price volatility on the domesticmarket without incurring high government cost or distortingprice signals.     

Means-Testing the Child Benefit

Improving the distributional impact of transfers may be costly if it reduces labor supply. In this paper we show how effects of changes in the design of the child benefit program can be examined by employing information from behavioral and non-behavioral simulations on micro data. The direct distributional effects are assessed by tax-benefit model calculations, while female labor supply responses to alternative child benefit schemes are simulated under the assumption that choices are discrete. Distributional effects after labor supply responses are also shown. The study confirms that greater targeting of the child benefit is traded against reductions in female labor supply.     

The customer is not always right

Consumers can sustain markets that are morally questionable. They can make immoral or morally suspect demands of individual businesses, especially small businesses. Even when they do not, the costs to firms of consumer protection can sometimes drive them to ruin. This paper presents cases where deference to the consumer is variously unwarranted, cases that may prompt second thoughts about some kinds of consumerism.Tom Sorell is Reader in Philosophy at the University of Essex. He was educated at McGill University and Oxford. He is on the editorial board ofBusiness Ethics: A European Review, and is the author (with John Hendry) ofBusiness Ethics (Butterworth-Heinemann, 1994).