On Patent Licensing in Spatial Competition

We consider the optimal licensing strategy of an outsider patentee as well as an insider patentee in a linear city framework where firms compete in price. We show that offering royalty is best for an outsider patentee for both drastic and non-drastic innovations. For an insider patentee, offering no license is the best when the innovation is drastic, while royalty is optimal when the innovation is non-drastic. The incentive for innovation is higher for an outsider patentee compared to an insider patentee. The overall increase in welfare due to an innovation is the same for both outsider and insider patentees.     

Does success diminish competitive responsiveness? Reconciling conflicting perspectives

Previous research provides conflicting evidence of the association between the past performance of a business and its competitive responsiveness, with researchers observing both positive and negative relationships. To clarify this issue, the authors test a model using survey data from the retailing industry. The model delineates direct and indirect mediated paths through ability to respond, motivation to respond, and awareness of competitors’ actions to show how past performance can have both positive and negative influence on competitive responsiveness. However, the overall impact of past performance of an organization on its competitive responsiveness is positive. The implications of these findings for research, practice, and theory are discussed. Satish Jayachandran (satish@moore.sc.edu) is an assistant professor of marketing in the Moore School of Business at the University of South Carolina. His research interests are focused on issues related to the market responsiveness of firms. His research has been published in theJournal of Marketing and theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science. He was a recipient of the Harold H. Maynard Award for 2001 from theJournal of Marketing. He was nominated a young scholar by the Marketing Science Institute in 2003. Rajan Varadarajan (varadarajan@tamu.edu) is Distinguished Professor of Marketing and holder of the Ford Chair in marketing and e-commerce at Texas A & M University. His teaching and research interests are in the areas of strategy, international marketing, and e-commerce. His research on these topics has been published in theJournal of Marketing, theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, theAcademy of Management Journal, Strategic Management Journal, Sloan Management Review, California Management Review, Business Horizons, theJournal of Business Research, and other journals.     

Manifestations of compulsiveness in the consumer-marketplace domain

The marketing literature exhibits a consistent lack of concern to recognize the distinct differences among the various possible manifestations of compulsiveness in the consumer-marketplace domain. The practice of using terms pertaining to different manifestations of compulsiveness synonymously, especially when the meaning of the term “compulsive behavior” is itself under debate, creates further semantic uncertainties that hinder typological endeavors in the budding area of abnormal or deviant consumer behavior. This article attempts to remove such uncertainties by elucidating and establishing the differences among the above manifestations.     

When haste makes sense: Cracking down on street markets for illicit drugs

This paper presents an analytical approach to the tactical question: ‘What level of enforcement over time allows one to eliminate a street market for illicit drugs while expanding the least possible total effort?’ The analysis is done in the context of Caulkins' model [6] which predicts the rate of change of dealers as a function of enforcement level and several market parameters. Our analysis suggests that the simple strategy of using the maximum available enforcement intensity until the market has been eliminated minimizes the total enforcement effort required.     

Modelling non-competitive behavior in commodity markets: A game theoretic approach

In this paper, we provide a coalitional alternative to the perfectly competitive and purely non-cooperative assumptions commonly employed in the modelling of commodity markets. These assumptions of perfect competition or pure non-cooperation are usually imposed exogenously without providing an economic basis for assuming why firms that could stand to gain by cooperating would not in fact do so. Three behavioral rules embodied in three different cooperative games are discussed in this paper and a methodology for predicting the coalition structures that would result from each of these is offered. By applying these games to the US copper industry of the 1970's, we show that the theory of games can be profitably employed in conjunction with the traditional institutional approach of industrial organization to yield useful economic predictions.The author is grateful to two anonymous referees whose comments led to a considerably improved version of the paper.     

Searching for the sunk cost fallacy

We seek to isolate in the laboratory factors that encourage and discourage the sunk cost fallacy. Subjects play a computer game in which they decide whether to keep digging for treasure on an island or to sink a cost (which will turn out to be either high or low) to move to another island. The research hypothesis is that subjects will stay longer on islands that were more costly to find. Eleven treatment variables are considered, e.g. alternative visual displays, whether the treasure value of an island is shown on arrival or discovered by trial and error, and alternative parameters for sunk costs. The data reveal a surprisingly small sunk cost effect that is generally insensitive to the proposed psychological drivers. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . Jel Classification C91, D11