Chief Financial Officers as Inside Directors

Considerable prior research investigates whether the extent of insider presence on corporate boards is detrimental. However, the majority of past research treats all inside directors as a homogenous group. This study considers that issue in the context of chief financial officers (CFO) serving on their own company's board. Our research is important because individuals in different executive roles bring different skills and knowledge to board interactions, highlighting the potential for differential contributions. As prior research does not specifically distinguish CFOs from other board insiders, the potential benefits of knowledge sharing due to increased communication with other board members may have been masked. Specifically, the CFO is directly responsible for the quality of the financial reporting process and can therefore be associated with specific outcome measures. Our results show that the percentage of CFOs serving on their own boards is not large, likely due to the perspective (consistent with agency theory and reflected in independence guidelines) that company insiders on boards could promote their own best interest at the expense of shareholders. Contrary to this perception, we find that companies whose CFO has a seat on the board are associated with higher financial reporting quality (i.e., a lower likelihood of reporting a material weaknesses in internal controls or having a financial restatement, and better accruals quality). Yet, we also find potential drawbacks in that CFOs with a board seat tend to have higher excess compensation and lower likelihood of termination following poor performance, signaling greater entrenchment. While our results provide information to companies considering appointing the CFO to the board, both costs and benefits are demonstrated, and thus we conclude that each board should consider this decision based on its own circumstances and composition.     

Can sell-side analysts’ experience,expertise and qualifications help mitigate the adverse effects of accounting reporting complexity?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We examine the relation between accounting reporting complexity and analysts’ performance and whether analysts’ qualifications,...     

Industry expertise on corporate boards

Recent surveys indicate that industry expertise is the most sought-after director qualification. Yet evidence on the value of such expertise is limited. This paper shows that firms that are difficult for non-experts to monitor and advise are more likely to appoint industry expert directors. Such appointments also depend on the supply of industry-experienced candidates in the local director labor market. Board industry expertise reduces R&D-based real earnings management and increases R&D investments. The increase in R&D spending is value-enhancing: firms with industry expert directors receive more patents for the same level of R&D, their R&D spending is associated with lower volatility of future earnings, and their value is higher. Finally, industry expertise is associated with CEO termination and pay incentives that encourage R&D investments.     

The effect of benefits level on take-up rates: evidence from a natural experiment

This paper exploits a quasi-natural experiment to study the effect of social benefits level on take-up rates. We find that households who are eligible for double benefits (twins) have much higher take-up rate—up to double—as compared to a control group of households. Our estimated effect of benefits level is much higher relative to the standard cross section estimates. This finding is less exposed to a selection bias that might plague much of the previous research on the link between benefits level and take-up. It provides strong empirical support for the level of benefits as a key factor in determining take-up rates.     

Intrinsic objective Bayesian estimation of the mean of the Tweedie family

ABSTRACT

The Tweedie family, which is classified by the choice of power unit variance function, includes heavy tailed distributions, and as such could be of significant relevance to actuarial science. The class includes the Normal, Poisson, Gamma, Inverse Gaussian, Stable and Compound Poisson distributions. In this study, we explore the intrinsic objective Bayesian point estimator for the mean value of the Tweedie family based on the intrinsic discrepancy loss function – which is an inherent loss function arising only from the underlying distribution or model, without any subjective considerations – and the Jeffreys prior distribution, which is designed to express absence of information about the quantity of interest. We compare the proposed point estimator with the Bayes estimator, which is the posterior mean based on quadratic loss function and the Jeffreys prior distribution. We carry a numerical study to illustrate the methodology in the context of the Inverse Gaussian model, which is fully unexplored in this novel context, and which is useful to insurance contracts.     

Principal Applications of Bayesian Methods in Actuarial Science

Abstract

Bayesian ideas were introduced into actuarial science in the late 1960s in the form of empirical credibility methods for premium setting. The advance of the Bayesian methodology was slow due to its subjective nature and to the computational difficulties associated with the full Bayesian analysis. This paper offers a brief survey of Bayesian solutions to some actuarial problems and discusses the current state of research.     

Sequential Quasi-Credibility for Scale Dispersion Models

The sequential approach to credibility, developed by Landsman and Makov [(1999a) On stochastic approximation and credibility. Scand. Actuarial J. 1, 15-31; (1999b) Sequential credibility evaluation for symmetric location claim distributions. Insurance: Math. Econ. 24, 291-300] is extended to the scale dispersion family, which contains distributions often used in actuarial science: log-normal, Weibull, Half normal, Stable, Pareto, to mention only a few. For members of this family a sequential quasi-credibility formula is devised, which can also be used for heavy tailed claims. The results are illustrated by a study of log-normal claims.     

The Use and Characteristics of Foreign Component Auditors in U.S. Multinational Audits: Insights from Form AP Disclosures*

This paper investigates the common, yet previously opaque, practice of using foreign audit firms (component auditors) to conduct portions of audit work for U.S. public companies. U.S. regulators have expressed concern for the transparency and quality of audits using component auditors. Employing data disclosed in the newly mandated PCAOB Form AP, we find that component auditor use is largely structural, determined by the size and complexity of clients' multinational operations. We do not find that the mere use of component auditors is detrimental to audit outcomes, but rather the amount of work conducted by component auditors is associated with lower audit quality (i.e., higher likelihood of misstatement), higher likelihood of nontimely reporting, and higher audit fees, which collectively suggest that component auditor engagements are associated with adverse outcomes. Furthermore, we find that only the work performed by less competent component auditors and those facing geographic and cultural/language barriers, including significant geographic and cultural distance, weak rule of law, and low English language proficiency, is associated with adverse audit outcomes. Overall, these findings provide initial archival evidence that the use of certain component auditors on U.S. multinational audits is associated with audit coordination issues, which suggests that PCAOB Form AP disclosures provide relevant information.