Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in Hedge Fund Performance

Using a comprehensive hedge fund database, we examine the role of managerial incentives and discretion in hedge fund performance. Hedge funds with greater managerial incentives, proxied by the delta of the option-like incentive fee contracts, higher levels of managerial ownership, and the inclusion of high-water mark provisions in the incentive contracts, are associated with superior performance. The incentive fee percentage rate by itself does not explain performance. We also find that funds with a higher degree of managerial discretion, proxied by longer lockup, notice, and redemption periods, deliver superior performance. These results are robust to using alternative performance measures and controlling for different data-related biases.     

Uncovering Hedge Fund Skill from the Portfolio Holdings They Hide

This paper studies the “confidential holdings” of institutional investors, especially hedge funds, where the quarter‐end equity holdings are disclosed with a delay through amendments to Form 13F and are usually excluded from the standard databases. Funds managing large risky portfolios with nonconventional strategies seek confidentiality more frequently. Stocks in these holdings are disproportionately associated with information‐sensitive events or share characteristics indicating greater information asymmetry. Confidential holdings exhibit superior performance up to 12 months, and tend to take longer to build. Together the evidence supports private information and the associated price impact as the dominant motives for confidentiality.     

Optimal Mortgage Refinancing: A Closed‐Form Solution

We derive the first closed‐form optimal refinancing rule: refinance when the current mortgage interest rate falls below the original rate by at least In this formula W(.) is (the principal branch of) the Lambert W‐function, where ρ is the real discount rate, λ is the expected real rate of exogenous mortgage repayment, σ is the standard deviation of the mortgage rate, is the ratio of the tax‐adjusted refinancing cost and the remaining mortgage value, and τ is the marginal tax rate. This expression is derived by solving a tractable class of refinancing problems. Our quantitative results closely match those reported by researchers using numerical methods.     

The Role of Soft Information in a Dynamic Contract Setting: Evidence from the Home Equity Credit Market

Credit underwriting is a dynamic process involving multiple interactions between borrower and lender. During this process, lenders have the opportunity to obtain hard and soft information from the borrower. We analyze more than 108,000 home equity loans and lines‐of‐credit applications to study the role of soft and hard information during underwriting. Our data set allows us to distinguish lender actions that are based strictly on hard information from decisions that involve the collection of soft information. Our analysis confirms the importance of soft information and suggests that its use can be effective in reducing overall portfolio credit losses ex post.     

The Labour Process in Rural Haryana (India): A Field-Report from Two Villages

Forms of labour hiring and the extent of unemployment are analysed using primary data collected from two villages in Haryana (India) during 2002–3. Data from these villages show that wage labourers, particularly women, faced extremely high levels of unemployment. Employment in agriculture was limited and new forms of labour hiring contracts had emerged under conditions of high unemployment. Earnings of manual workers were very low and gender disparities in wages very high. In one of the villages, a high concentration of landholdings and a decline in labour use facilitated the use of long-term workers. Labour relations were characterized by significant degrees of unfreedom, although the extent and nature of unfreedom varied considerably between casual and long-term workers, and between the two villages. In particular, long-term siri workers worked under conditions that were akin to bondage. It is argued that a very high degree of unemployment, combined with unequal caste and land relations and dependence on employers for credit, contributed to sustenance of unfree labour relations in rural Haryana.     

Mandatory Portfolio Disclosure,Stock Liquidity,and Mutual Fund Performance

We examine the impact of mandatory portfolio disclosure by mutual funds on stock liquidity and fund performance. We develop a model of informed trading with disclosure and test its predictions using the May 2004 SEC regulation requiring more frequent disclosure. Stocks with higher fund ownership, especially those held by more informed funds or subject to greater information asymmetry, experience larger increases in liquidity after the regulation change. More informed funds, especially those holding stocks with greater information asymmetry, experience greater performance deterioration after the regulation change. Overall, mandatory disclosure improves stock liquidity but imposes costs on informed investors.     

The Importance of Adverse Selection in the Credit Card Market: Evidence from Randomized Trials of Credit Card Solicitations

Analyzing unique data from multiple large‐scale randomized marketing trials of preapproved credit card solicitations by a large financial institution, we find that consumers responding to the lender's inferior solicitation offers have poorer credit quality attributes. This finding supports the argument that riskier type borrowers are liquidity or credit constrained and, thus, have higher reservation loan interest rates. We also find a more severe deterioration ex post in the credit quality of the booked accounts of inferior offer types relative to superior offers. After controlling for a cardholder's observable risk attributes, demographic characteristics, and adverse economic shocks, we find that cardholders who responded to the inferior credit card offers are significantly more likely to default ex post. Our results provide evidence on the importance of adverse selection effects in the credit card market.