Capital Structures in Developing Countries

This study uses a new data set to assess whether capital structure theory is portable across countries with different institutional structures. We analyze capital structure choices of firms in 10 developing countries, and provide evidence that these decisions are affected by the same variables as in developed countries. However, there are persistent differences across countries, indicating that specific country factors are at work. Our findings suggest that although some of the insights from modern finance theory are portable across countries, much remains to be done to understand the impact of different institutional features on capital structure choices.     

Corporate leverage and growth the game-theoretic issues

The equilibrium value of a levered firm facing growth opportunities is shown to involve the valuation of a lottery over (cooperative) games rather than a lottery over specific monetary outcomes. In the absence of assumptions about negotiating risk, the value of the firm's claims is seen to be ambiguous even with zero transactions costs. This ambiguity is compounded if the core of the game is empty. This paper rationalizes specific financial instruments and institutions as means for attenuating negotiation costs and core existence problems. Furthermore, the valuation of these instruments requires determining the certainty-equivalent of a lottery over games.     

Township and Village Enterprises,Openness and Regional Economic Growth in China

The authors argue that under the current political and economic conditions the restructuring of Russian enterprises on a mass scale is impossible, because the aims and methods of the restructuring programme often get in the way of the interests of different groups who in fact prosper on the inefficiency of private enterprise. These groups pay lip service to the restructuring process but do everything possible to slow down and block the process when their interests are threatened. The only group which is truly interested in restructuring of an enterprise is the middle managers. However, they are the least influential and least organised to affect enterprise restructuring. The article also addresses the legislation and especially the new law on bankruptcy, which potentially could speed up the restructuring process to a considerable extent. However, owing to the activities of some of the interest groups analysed, the law is failing to achieve its original aim. The occasional success stories have a very limited impact on Russian industries and in fact confirm the argument.     

Can corporatization improve the performance of state-owned enterprises even without privatization?

This paper examines an important reform program in China concerning State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), namely, corporatization without privatization. It finds that corporatization has had a significantly positive impact on SOE performance. It further shows that the sources of efficiency engendered by corporatization can be traced to the reform of the internal governance structure of these firms. The results indicate that, even without privatization, corporate governance reform is potentially an effective way of improving the performance of SOEs; such reforms represent a policy alternative for countries seeking to restructure SOEs without massive privatization. The results also suggest that it may be optimal for governments to carry out corporatization of SOEs before eventual privatization.     

The Core, Transaction Costs, and the Coase Theorem

This paper clarifies and synthesizes elements of the two decade old debate concerning the Coase theorem and the empty core. Five lessons can be derived from this debate. First, the Coase theorem may break down when there more than two participants (provided the additional participants bring an additional externality to the table). Second, the problem of the empty core does not disappear in a world of positive transaction costs. Under reasonable assumptions about the transactions technology, transaction costs may well exacerbate the empty-core problem. As a consequence, it is important to differentiate between transaction costs (when the core exists) and costs due to the empty core because each has different implications for rationalizing institutional arrangements. Third, the Coase theorem will not break down when the number of participants increases if the new participants do not bring additional externalities with them. If, however, additional participants bring in additional externalities, then the core may be empty and Pareto efficiency may not emerge from costless negotiations. Fourth, Pareto Optimality can be achieved when the core is empty by judicious use of penalty clauses, binding contracts, and constraints on the bargaining mechanism. Fifth, when a non-excludable public good is involved, a free-rider problem arises as the number of agents increases, and this undermines the Coase theorem; in this case, Coasean efficiency requires the participation of all agents affected by the externality in the writing of binding contracts.     

Reorganization in bankruptcy and the issue of strategic risk

The decision by creditors to force the firm into bankruptcy, where bankruptcy includes reorganization, is shown to involve the valuation of a lottery over (cooperative) games rather than a lottery over specific monetary outcomes. In the absence of assumptions about strategic (negotiating) risk, the value of creditor claims is seen to be ambiguous. This paper extends Van Horne's model of the optimal initiation of bankruptcy proceedings to include the reorganization option and strategic risk. A modified decision rule is obtained to determine the optimal solution.     

International exchange risk and asset substitutability

This paper estimates subsitutability/complementarity relations among financial assets denominated in foreign currencies. Utilizing a representative investor and a flexible functional form methodology, a mean-variance utility function was estimated and used to determine expected return and variance elasticities between assets in the world portfolio. The hypothesis that international assets are perfect substitutes was rejected. It was also found that relative changes in variance tended to have a bigger impact on asset demand than did relative changes in expected returns. Substituability/complementarity relationships were not strong except in specific cases where strong relationships were expected a priori.     

Financial constraints and investment: assessing the impact of a World Bank credit program on small and medium enterprises in Sri Lanka

Abstract.  This paper examines the investment behaviour of a sample of small, credit-constrained firms in Sri Lanka. Using a unique panel data set, we analyze and compare the activities of two groups of small firms distinguished by their differential access to financing; one group consists of firms with subsidized loans from the World Bank, while the other group consists of firms without such subsidies. The paper shows that the program led to higher levels of investment for financially constrained firms. However, the evidence is inconclusive on whether the program improved economic efficiency.     

Is Chapter 11 Efficient?

The efficiency of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy process is examined by estimating the impact of Chapter 11 filings on the operating performance of bankrupt firms. We control for firm‐level heterogeneity in prefiling characteristics using matching methods to select benchmark firms comparable to filing firms. We compare bankrupt firms’ operating performances with those of matched nonbankrupt firms. Our results challenge the contention that Chapter 11 is an inefficient, debtor‐friendly mechanism that rehabilitates economically nonviable firms. We demonstrate that firms that file under Chapter 11 perform no worse and, if anything, better than comparable nonfiling firms.