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Transaction costs and asset prices: a dynamic equilibrium model 总被引:13,自引:0,他引:13
In this article we study the effects of transaction costs onasset prices. We assume an overlapping generations economy witha riskless, liquid bond, and many risky stocks carrying proportionaltransaction costs. We obtain stock prices and turnover in closedform. Surprisingly, a stock's price may increase in transactioncosts, and a more frequently traded stock may be less adverselyaffected by an increase in transaction costs. Calculations basedon the 'marginal' investor overestimate the effects of transactioncosts. For realistic parameter values, transaction costs havevery small effects on stock prices but large effects on turnover. 相似文献
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Strategic Trading and Welfare in a Dynamic Market 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
Dimitri Vayanos 《The Review of economic studies》1999,66(2):219-254
This paper studies a dynamic model of a financial market with N strategic agents. Agents receive random stock endowments at each period and trade to share dividend risk. Endowments are the only private information in the model. We find that agents trade slowly even when the time between trades goes to 0. In fact, welfare loss due to strategic behaviour increases as the time between trades decreases. In the limit when the time between trades goes to 0, welfare loss is of order 1/ N , and not 1/ N 2 as in the static models of the double auctions literature. The model is very tractable and closed-form solutions are obtained in a special case. 相似文献
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Summary. In this article we study the effects of transaction costs on asset prices. We assume an overlapping generations economy with
two riskless assets. The first asset is liquid while the second asset carries proportional transaction costs. We show that
agents buy the liquid asset for short-term investment and the illiquid asset for long-term investment. When transaction costs
increase, the price of the liquid asset increases. The price of the illiquid asset decreases if the asset is in small supply,
but may increase if the supply is large. These results have implications for the effects of transaction taxes and commission
deregulation.
Received: December 5, 1997; revised version: March 19, 1998 相似文献
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We develop a search-based model of asset trading, in which investors of different horizons can invest in two assets with identical payoffs. The asset markets are partially segmented: buyers can search for only one asset, but can decide which one. We show the existence of a “clientele’’ equilibrium where all short-horizon investors search for the same asset. This asset has more buyers and sellers, lower search times, and trades at a higher price relative to its identical-payoff counterpart. The clientele equilibrium dominates the one where all investor types split equally across assets, implying that the concentration of liquidity is socially desirable. 相似文献
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Dimitri Vayanos 《The Review of economic studies》2003,70(3):667-695
We propose a model of organizational decision making, in which information processing is decentralized. Our model incorporates two features of many actual organizations: aggregation entails a loss of useful information, and the decision problems of different agents interact. We assume that an organization forms a portfolio of risky assets, following a hierarchical procedure. Agents' decision rules and the organization's hierarchical structure are derived endogenously. Typically, in the optimal hierarchical structure, all agents have one subordinate, and returns to ability are at least as high at the bottom as at the top. However, these results can be reversed in the presence of returns to specialization. 相似文献
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Strategic Trading in a Dynamic Noisy Market 总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6
Dimitri Vayanos 《The Journal of Finance》2001,56(1):131-171
This paper studies a dynamic model of a financial market with a strategic trader. In each period the strategic trader receives a privately observed endowment in the stock. He trades with competitive market makers to share risk. Noise traders are present in the market. After receiving a stock endowment, the strategic trader is shown to reduce his risk exposure either by selling at a decreasing rate over time or by selling and then buying back some of the shares sold. When the time between trades is small, the strategic trader reveals the information regarding his endowment very quickly. 相似文献
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