Housing “Beta”: Common Risk Factor in Returns of Stocks

This study proposes the housing “beta” and tests whether the housing “beta” is a significant determinant for stock returns in a multifactor framework. We hypothesize that the housing market is a systematic risk factor given the impact of the housing market on the overall economy and economic growth of most countries, as well as the effect of homes in the overall wealth of individual investors. The housing market directly affect GDP growth through residential fixed investment and housing services. In addition, the housing market indirectly impacts economic activities via consumption. Our results show that the housing “beta” is positive and significant in explaining stock returns after controlling several other factors from the prior literature. This relationship is stronger, as expected, during the financial crisis period. We conducted several robustness checks using a different study period and housing market indices and obtain results which are consistent with our main findings.

     

Executive compensation in firms with concentrated control: The impact of dual class structure and family management

We examine how two distinct ownership forms of concentrated control affect executive compensation. We compare executive compensation in dual class firms with that in single class companies with concentrated control. Although both samples of companies have agency problems associated with concentrated control, dual class companies have additional problems associated with controlling shareholders holding smaller equity positions. We show that family members in executive positions in dual class companies are paid significantly more than those of single class companies with concentrated control. The excess is in the form of more incentive compensation (bonuses and stock options). This finding is consistent with optimal contract theory of executive compensation in that the higher compensation is given to prevent dual class executives from taking advantage of their higher voting leverage. Our results are robust to an alternative specification of voting leverage which uses the difference between voting and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders.     

Internal Market Efficiency,Market Co-movement,and Cross-Market Efficiency: The Case of Hong Kong and Shanghai Stock Markets

We examine the effects of the 2008 financial crisis on the cross-market efficiency of the Hong Kong and Shanghai stock markets. Our results show a sharp decline in the cross-market efficiency during the financial crisis. We investigate whether this is due to lower internal market efficiency or higher market co-movement. The results show no evidence that the internal market efficiency dropped in Hong Kong or Shanghai during the crisis. In contrast, we document a strong increase in the market co-movement during the crisis. These results suggest that the decline in cross-market efficiency during the financial crisis is due to increased market co-movement and not a decline in internal market efficiency.     

A Quiet Revolution in Corporate Governance: An Examination of Voluntary Best Practice Governance Policies

This paper investigates the effects of several voluntary best practice corporate governance principles on firm performance and firm risk. Using a sample of Standard & Poor's/Toronto Stock Exchange Composite Index firms from 2003–2010, I show that firms with individual director election and detailed disclosure of voting results in director elections have a higher firm value or performance. Firms with independent chairman, majority voting, and detailed disclosure of voting results in director elections have lower idiosyncratic risk. In addition, the results from the panel regression show that detailed disclosure of voting results in director election leads to lower systematic and total risk.     

Management entrenchment and the valuation discount of dual class firms

Prior studies provide empirical evidence that dual class firms are discounted compared to single class firms due to the extraction of private benefits. This study examines the link between managerial entrenchment and the dual class discount. Using propensity score matching and conditioning for past underperformance, the paper shows that investors apply a greater discount to the value of dual class firms as the degree of managerial entrenchment increases. The impact of entrenchment on dual class discount is more pronounced when the CEO is the controlling shareholder compared to when the controlling shareholder is a director or the chairman of the board.     

Are institutional investors informed? The case of dividend changes for REITS and Industrial Firms

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Prior evidence on whether institutions are informed about dividend changes is mixed. We contribute to this debate by examining institutional trade...     

Who uses robo-advising and how?

Using propriety data from a large Indian robo-advisory firm, we show that users of robo-advisory services are relatively young, predominantly male, married, small investors, and professionals. We show that the majority of small retail investors utilize a systematic investment plan (SIP). Additionally, we document that there are differences in demographic characteristics, occupation, and geographic location of investors in utilizing SIP versus one-time lump sum investments. Furthermore, we find that daily user account creation increases during periods of high market volatility.     

CDS contract initiations: REIT board monitoring and corporate decision outcomes

In this article, we investigate whether the negative creditor governance shock due to the initiation of credit default swap (CDS) contracts results in monitoring substitution effects between bondholders and shareholders. Using several mechanisms to test increased shareholder monitoring such as board structure, CEO–chair duality, and institutional ownership, we show that shareholder monitoring increases post-CDS contract initiation. We examine board decision outcomes and show that incentive compensation is higher for real estate investment trusts (REITs) post-CDS initiation. Furthermore, we find that post-CDS initiation, REITs undertake more acquisitions that are more likely to be paid for with stocks and take longer to complete than non-REITs. Finally, we find that REITs industry-adjusted cash holdings and dividend yield increases post-CDS initiation.