Incentive Effects of Rate-of-Return Regulation in Hong Kong: Reply

Journal of Regulatory Economics -     

“Horses for courses”: A stakeholder approach to the evaluation of GDSSs

Evaluation of the performance of GDSSs has been dominated by an experimental and laboratory based approach. Other writers have argued for evaluation to be based in the “real-world” of decision making teams. The evaluation criteria have tended to ignore many of the issues that would be paramount for some of the stakeholders in the evaluation process. This article seeks to explore the criteria that might be used by a wide variety of stakeholders, including developers, facilitators, clients, key actors, vendors, as well as academics. By drawing together the criteria associated with all of the stakeholders we discover a broader, and possibly more thorough, framework for evaluation. The evaluation of any particular GDSS in relation to other GDSSs can then be seen in the context of contingent weighting applied to each of the criteria where each GDSS is able to be seen in its best light and in relation to its declared aims. This article argues for a more eclectic and contingent approach to the evaluation of GDSSs which will encourage their future development to be clearer about purpose and the boundaries of their use.     

The measurement of Poverty: An experimental questionnaire investigation

We re-examine some of the standard axioms used in the literature on poverty measurement. Using a sample of 486 students from Australia, Israel and the USA we investigate the extent to which individuals' perceptions of poverty correspond to the axioms. We find that axioms such as anonymity, growth of the poor and monotonicity are resonably well supported. However there is very little support for the focus axiom and the principle of transfers was the least well supported of the eight specific criteria for poverty measurement that we examined.     

Import quotas, tied aid, capital accumulation, and welfare

Aid conditional on the purchase of an imported capital good increases the supply of, and demand for, the good. Examining the effects of tied aid on capital accumulation, the current account, and welfare, we find that two resultant conflicting forces render the price of the capital good indeterminate. If the demand pressure is larger than the supply response, the capital stock increases at the expense of the current account and welfare improves. Alternatively, if the demand pressure is less than the supply response, capital is reduced. This may be detrimental to welfare. JEL Classification: F35, F11
Contingentement à l'importation, aide liée, accumulation et bien-être. Une aide conditionnelle accordée pour l'achat d'un bien importé accroît l'offre et la demande de ce bien. En examinant les effets d'une aide liée de ce type sur l'accumulation du capital, le compte courant et le niveau de bien-être, les auteurs montrent que deux forces contradictoires rendent le prix du bien capital indéterminé. Si la pression sur la demande est plus grande que la réponse du côté de l'offfre, le stock de capital s'accroît au détriment du compte courant, et le niveau de bien-être s'accroît. D'autre part, si la pression en provenance de la demande est moindre que la réponse du côté de l'offre, le stock de capital est réduit. Cela peut entraîner une réduction du niveau de bien-être.     

A Bayesian Approach to Uncertainty Aversion

The Ellsberg paradox demonstrates that people's beliefs over uncertain events might not be representable by subjective probability. We show that if a risk averse decision maker, who has a well defined Bayesian prior, perceives an Ellsberg type decision problem as possibly composed of a bundle of several positively correlated problems, she will be uncertainty averse. We generalize this argument and derive sufficient conditions for uncertainty aversion.     

Three cheers (sort of) for carbon taxes: a review of recent books on climate change economics and policy

Business Economics -     

Corporate social responsibility,vertical product differentiation and international competition

Would a foreign firm’s consumer‐oriented corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities be rewarded by an importing country’s voluntary tariff reduction? The current paper addresses this question in an import‐competing duopoly model with vertical product differentiation. It is shown that the tariff will decrease if the foreign firm switches from a purely profit‐driven firm to a CSR firm. A consumer‐oriented CSR strategy will always hurt the domestic firm’s profit, whereas the relationship between the foreign firm’s profit and CSR sensitivity (the degree to which a firm cares about consumer welfare) is invertedly U‐shaped. When firms’ decisions to switch to CSR are endogeneized, only the foreign firm will become a CSR firm.     

ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: THE CONSEQUENCES FOR TRADE STRUCTURE AND TRADE VOLUME

The foreign policy literature typically sees Congress abdicating its policy making role to the executive, implying a presidential dominance model is superior to other policy process models (joint participation, congressional dominance, and bureaucratic dominance). This article uses two theoretical approaches to investigate who actually makes U.S. trade policy: a political economy approach and an institutional approach. We look at the 1985 96 period and at individual presidencies: Reagan (1985-88), Bush (1989-92), and Clinton (1993-96). Contrary to the literature, we find strong evidence that Congress is an active participant in the trade policy making process. Using a variety of empirical techniques (crosstabs, the Index of Revealed Comparative Advantage, pairwise correlations, and stepwise logistic regressions), we confirm that the trade policy process for product-industry-specific policies tends to be dominated by Congress whereas the executive branch is more influential in the policy process for country-specific policies. We conclude by noting the advantage of integrating aspects of both the political economy of trade and institu tional literatures to understand the nuances of U.S. foreign trade policy making.