Time-consistent stopping under decreasing impatience

Under non-exponential discounting, we develop a dynamic theory for stopping problems in continuous time. Our framework covers discount functions that induce decreasing impatience. Due to the inherent time inconsistency, we look for equilibrium stopping policies, formulated as fixed points of an operator. Under appropriate conditions, fixed-point iterations converge to equilibrium stopping policies. This iterative approach corresponds to the hierarchy of strategic reasoning in game theory and provides “agent-specific” results: it assigns one specific equilibrium stopping policy to each agent according to her initial behavior. In particular, it leads to a precise mathematical connection between the naive behavior and the sophisticated one. Our theory is illustrated in a real options model.     

A time-inconsistent Dynkin game: from intra-personal to inter-personal equilibria

This paper studies a nonzero-sum Dynkin game in discrete time under non-exponential discounting. For both players, there are two intertwined levels of game-theoretic reasoning. First, each player looks for an intra-personal equilibrium among her current and future selves, so as to resolve time inconsistency triggered by non-exponential discounting. Next, given the other player’s chosen stopping policy, each player selects a best response among her intra-personal equilibria. A resulting inter-personal equilibrium is then a Nash equilibrium between the two players, each of whom employs her best intra-personal equilibrium with respect to the other player’s stopping policy. Under appropriate conditions, we show that an inter-personal equilibrium exists, based on concrete iterative procedures along with Zorn’s lemma. To illustrate our theoretical results, we investigate a two-player real options valuation problem where two firms negotiate a deal of cooperation to initiate a project jointly. By deriving inter-personal equilibria explicitly, we find that coercive power in negotiation depends crucially on the impatience levels of the two firms.

     

Epstein-Zin utility maximization on a random horizon

This paper solves the consumption-investment problem under Epstein-Zin preferences on a random horizon. In an incomplete market, we take the random horizon to be a stopping time adapted to the market filtration, generated by all observable, but not necessarily tradable, state processes. Contrary to prior studies, we do not impose any fixed upper bound for the random horizon, allowing for truly unbounded ones. Focusing on the empirically relevant case where the risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution are both larger than one, we characterize the optimal consumption and investment strategies using backward stochastic differential equations with superlinear growth on unbounded random horizons. This characterization, compared with the classical fixed-horizon result, involves an additional stochastic process that serves to capture the randomness of the horizon. As demonstrated in two concrete examples, changing from a fixed horizon to a random one drastically alters the optimal strategies.