Markovian equilibrium in a class of stochastic games: existence theorems for discounted and undiscounted models

Summary We study a strategic version of the neoclassical growth model under possible production uncertainty. For a general specification of the problem, we establish (i) the existence of stationary Markov equilibria in pure strategies for the discounted game, and (ii) the convergence, under a boundedness condition, of discounted equilibrium strategies to a pure strategy stationary Markovian equilibrium of the undiscounted game as the discount factor tends to unity. The same techniques can be used to prove that such convergence also obtains in all finitestate, finite-action stochastic games satisfying a certain full communicability condition. These results are of special interest since there are well known examples in the literature in which the limit of discounted equilibria fails to be an equilibrium of the undiscounted game.We are grateful to Marcus Berliant, M. Ali Khan, Mukul Majumdar, and an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions, and to Bonnie Huck for technical assistance. The first author acknowledges research support from the Columbia University Council for the Social Sciences.     

Impact of sales force automation on technology-related stress, effort, and technology usage among salespeople

This study unveils factors affecting sales force automation (SFA) technology usage by salespeople. It differs from previous research by: (1) proposing a model that examines the consequences of task complexity on role perceptions and technology usage, and (2) understanding the negative repercussions of SFA technology on the user. The proposed model was tested using data from 150 salespeople employed by a national organization. The results suggest that integration of SFA technology induces adverse role perceptions in salespeople. However, controlling for extraneous variables, effort is significantly related to salespeople's usage of technology. Key managerial implications for theory and practice are discussed.     

Organizational variables, sales force perceptions of readiness for change, learning, and performance among boundary-spanning teams: A conceptual framework and propositions for research

Sales organizations are continuously developing new ideas and approaches to be more competitive. One of the approaches taken by most successful organizations is the move from individuals to boundary-spanning, cross-functional teams. Sales teams are being employed to counter efforts by buying organizations to form buying centers. It is proffered in this paper that organizations that are ready for change are conducive to enhancement of sales team learning. Organization readiness for change is a condition impacted by a variety of organizational antecedent variables such as culture and climate. This paper proposes that sales team learning is impacted by team members' perceptions of the organization's readiness for change. In addition, we also posit the moderating influence of two environmental variables: turbulence and competitive intensity on the relationship between readiness for change and sales team learning. Sales team learning is then proposed to be related to a variety of sales outcomes. In this paper, we present a conceptual framework for understanding the contexts in which team learning occurs and the impact of team learning on team effectiveness. Throughout the paper, we present research propositions that provide opportunities for future examinations of team learning.     

When does Strategic Debt-service Matter?

Recent work in corporate finance has suggested that strategic debt-service by equity-holders works to lower debt values and raise yield spreads substantially. We show that this is not quite correct. With optimal cash management, defaults occassioned by deliberate underperformance (strategic defaults) and those forced by inadequate cash (liquidity defaults) work as substitutes: allowing for strategic debt-service leads to a decline in the equilibrium likelihood of liquidity defaults. In some cases, this decline is sufficiently sharp that equilibrium debt values actually increase and yield spreads decline. We provide an intuitive explanation for these results in terms of an interaction of optionalitiesExpanded versions of this paper were presented in conferences and seminars at the Scottish Institute for Research in Finance, European Finance Association, Western Finance Association, Financial Management Association, 10th Derivative Securities Conference, Santa Clara University, Virginia Tech, the Norwegian School of Management, the Norwegian School of Business and Economics, Duke University, and Carnegie-Mellon University. We benefitted greatly from the comments of participants at these seminars and would particularly like to thank Francesca Cornelli, Kose John, Pete Kyle, Sanjay Unni, and Raman Uppal in this context     

The tragedy of the commons?

Summary We provide a complete characterization of the set of Markov-Perfect Equilibria (MPE) of dynamic common-property resource games a la Levhari and Mirman (1980). We find that all MPE of such games exhibit remarkably regular dynamic behavior. Surprisingly, however, and despite their memoryless nature, MPE need not result in a tragedy of the commons, i.e., overexploitation of the resource relative to the first-best solutions. We show through an example that MPE could, in fact, lead to the reverse phenomenon of underexploitation of the resource. Nonetheless, we demonstrate that, in pay off space, MPE are always suboptimal.The first version of this paper was written when Sundaram was a graduate student at Cornell University; the current version was completed when he was visiting the California Institute of Technology. We are grateful to many people for their advice, and would like to thank, in particular, Mukul Majumdar, Andreu Mas-Colell, Tapan Mitra, Debraj Ray, Aldo Rustichini, and Karl Shell. We also benefitted from the comments of participants at presentations in Columbia University (Fall 1988) and Caltech (Spring 1990), and at various conferences. Partial support for this project was provided by the NSF under Grant 86-06944 (principal investigator: Karl Shell).     

Survival and the art of profit maximization

We study the relationship between rationality and economic survival in a simple dynamic model, where agents from different populations interact repeatedly through random matching. An explicit criterion (“bankruptcy”) determines whether agents survive each interaction; all agents are presumed to be aware of this criterion. Survival in each interaction depends on two factors: the strategies agents adopt when they interact, and the wealth levels they bring to the game. The model is completely symmetric with the only difference between the agents of different populations being their objectives. We consider the case where there are two populations of agents in which all agents from one group have as their objective, maximizing the expected profits from each interaction, while all agents from the other attempt simply to maximize the probability of surviving (i.e., not going bankrupt in) the interaction. We show that under the equilibrium dynamics, the proportions of each group in the total population must be bounded away from zero, but the balance is in favor of the survival-probability maximizers in that their numbers as a fraction of total population must always exceed 1/2, and can be arbitrarily close to unity. On the other hand, the fraction of total wealth controlled by the expected profit maximizers must also be at least 1/2, and can asymptotically tend to unity.     

The Foundations of Freezeout Laws in Takeovers

We provide an economic basis for permitting freezeouts of nontendering shareholders following successful takeovers. We describe a specific freezeout mechanism based on easily verifiable information that induces desirable efficiency and welfare properties in models of both corporations with widely dispersed shareholdings and corporations with large pivotal shareholders. The mechanism dominates previous proposals along some important dimensions. We also examine takeover premia that arise in the presence of competition among raiders. Our mechanism is closely related to the practice of takeover law in the United States; thus, our analysis may be thought of as analyzing the economic foundations of current regulations.