Accounting for control and trust building in interfirm transactional relationships

This paper theorises the accounting-control-trust nexus in interfirm transactional relationships. In the context of such relationships, accounting has predominantly been conceptualised as a control technology. However, in our paper we analyse stable and durable relationships as being the results of interaction between control and trust building. Such an analysis calls for an additional conceptualisation of accounting as a trust building technology. Furthermore, we explain the interaction between accounting for control and accounting for trust building in the context of a process of embedded agency.     

Exploring the contextual and individual factors on ethical decision making of salespeople

This paper studies how salespeople make ethical decisions. For this purpose a structural model has been developed which configures how the organization's environment, the organizations's climate, and personality traits affect ethical decision making. Internal communication and the choice of a control system especially affect ethical decision making. Internal communication also affects the attraction of salespeople with unethical personality traits (Machiavellism), while the control system affects the ethical climate. Ethical climate and salespeople's personality traits also affect the ethical decision making. In fact the study shows that ethical decision making can be influenced by management.Willem Verbeke is assistant professor in marketing, School of Economics, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands. His research concentration is sales management.Cok Ouwerkerk is founder and director of the CSA, a consulting firm for statistical applications, in Mijnheerenland, The Netherlands. He has been involved in many research projects at different Dutch universities and firms.Ed Peelen is associate professor at the School of Economics, The University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. His research concentration is marketing management and logistics.     

Investigating industry context effects in consumer-firm relationships: Preliminary results from a dispositional approach

Few, if any, past studies have attempted to develop a model to capture and explain industry context variability and hypothesize its effects on consumer-firm relationships. Generally, industry effects are ignored, described, or explained post hoc. Using the notion of consumers' dispositions toward a market, a framework is proposed for understanding the influence of industry context on consumer satisfaction, trust, value, and loyalty in relational exchanges. The empirical results of a survey in two service industries show that industry contexts matter and yield significant direct and moderating effects on consumer-firm relationships. The study underscores the promise of a dispositional approach for providing insights for the theory and practice of relationship marketing, resolvin goutstanding questions, and proposing fruitful areas for further examination. Edwin Nijssen, Ph.D., is a professor of marketing at the Nijmegen School of Management at the University of Nijmegen, the Netherlands. His research interest focuses on strategic and international marketing issues, relationship marketing, brand management, and new-product development. He has published inLong Range Planning, theJournal of Product Innovation Management, Technology Forecasting and Social Change, R&D Management, Industrial Marketing Management, and theJournal of International Marketing and has written several books on marketing strategy. Jagdip Singh, Ph.D., is a professor of marketing at the Weatherhead School of Management at Case Western Reserve University. His primary areas of research include consumer dissatisfaction and trust, measurement issues—including relationships between theoretical concepts and empirical observations— and the effectiveness of boundary role personnel. He has published in theJournal of Marketing, theAcademy of Management Journal, theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Behavioral Research in Accounting, andManagement Science, among others. Deepak Sirdeshmukh, Ph.D., is a visiting assistant professor of marketing at the Weatherhead School of Management at Case Western Reserve University. His primary areas of research include consumer trust and consumer processing of brand information. He has published in theJournal of Marketing, theJournal of Marketing Research, theJournal of Consumer Research, theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, and theJournal of Consumer Psychology, among others. Hartmut H. Holzmüeller, Ph.D., is a professor of marketing at the School of Business at Dortmund University, Germany. His research interests include cross-national consumer research and customer relationship marketing. Most of his work has been published in German. His articles also appeared in theJournal of International Marketing, Management International Review, andInternational Business Review.     

Bargaining under Uncertainty and the Monotone Path Solutions

Uncertainty with respect to the feasible set of utility vectors is introduced in an axiomatic bargaining model. Given a criterion for nonprobabilistic decision-making under uncertainty, a natural efficiency requirement can be imposed on a bargaining solution. Using the maximin ordering, thestrictly monotone pathsolutions (generalizations of theegalitariansolution) to the bargaining problem are characterized as the only continuous solutions that satisfy this efficiency axiom. If the maximin criterion is replaced by the maximax ranking or a strict convex combination of the maximin and the maximax criterion, imposing our efficiency axiom and continuity leads to thedictatorialsolutions.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C78.     

Contract renegotiation in a continuous state space

Summary. When players are unable to write complete state contingent contracts it is shown, within the context of a non-cooperative contracting-renegotiation game, that the only subgame perfect equilibrium allocations are those that correspond to the set of first-best allocations. Players are able to implement this set of allocations by signing an initial contract that is subsequently renegotiated in all states of the world. The contracting-renegotiation problem is complicated in an interesting way by assuming that the state space is continuous. The issue of the existence of an initial contract, that is subsequently renegotiated to the set of first-best allocations, must be resolved. Unlike Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey [1994], the results here do not require nor depend upon the comonotonicity of the objective functions. Received: January 27, 1995; revised version July 1, 1996     

The Capital Tax and Welfare Effects from Asymmetric Information on Equity Markets

This paper explores the implications of informational asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors for optimal capital tax rates and welfare. It adopts a model in which asymmetric information implies a home bias in equity. The paper finds that asymmetric information may raise capital tax rates by reducing the marginal cost of taxation. Furthermore, it shows that investors may gain from informational asymmetries. Although asymmetric information increases the uncertainty as perceived by investors, it may also increase tax rates and allow for a higher consumption of public goods. This reflects that asymmetric information may reduce the distortionary effects of competition among governments.     

Personal income tax mimicry: evidence from international panel data

This paper investigates personal income tax (PIT) mimicry at the international level. It is the first to empirically investigate the extent to which PIT mimicry varies along the tax schedule and the first to include nations which are not part of the OECD. We use data on international personal income tax schedules from the world tax indicators to estimate marginal and average tax rates at various multiples of per capita gross domestic product (GDP). These tax rates are then used to estimate the extent to which countries respond to their neighbors’ PIT policy. We find evidence of PIT mimicry using a balanced panel of 53 countries over 24 years. This finding is strongest for tax rates at lower multiples of per capita GDP and survives several robustness checks.