Measurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts

Summary Theory suggests that optimal contracts should include many contingencies to achieve optimal risk sharing. However, in practice, few contracts are as complex as theory suggests. This paper develops a model which is consistent with this observation. The lack of risk sharing results from the interplay of two factors. First, contingencies must be based on information produced by measurement systems, which may be manipulable. Second, when two parties to a contract meet, they often have incomplete information. The type of contract offered may reveal information about the party who proposes it. Different types of agents have different preferences over contingent contracts, because they have different abilities to manipulate the measurement system. These differences in preferences allow the parties to signal their types through the contracts they offer. Noncontingent contracts may be chosen in equilibrium because they are the only contracts which do not give any type an incentive to distort the measurement system and, hence, do not reveal information about the party proposing the contract.We have benefited from conversations with Oliver Hart, Rick Lambert, Michael Riordan and Jean Tirole and the comments of Michel Habib, Nick Yannelis and two anonymous referees. Financial support from the National Science Foundation under grants SES-8920048 and SES-8720589 is gratefully acknowledged.     

Search and Liquidity in Single-Family Housing

A two-stage least squares model of housing prices is estimated with data collected from 3358 single-family home transactions. The results provide evidence for an optimal marketing period and indicate that a liquidity premium is priced in single-family home sales. Consistent with the hypothesis derived from economic search models, the model shows higher selling prices for houses having longer expected marketing periods. The model also shows a price premium for houses that sell faster than expectations. This effect supports the concept that liquidity is a value-enhancing characteristic.     

Wirkungen einer EU–weiten Verlustverrechnung auf das Steueraufkommen

Seit einigen Jahren stellt der Europäische Gerichtshof vermehrt Regelungen der nationalen Steuersysteme in Hinblick darauf in Frage, ob sie mit dem EG-Recht konform gehen. Im aktuellen Fall Marks & Spencer entscheidet der Gerichtshof, ob Konzerne Verluste ausländischer Töchter mit inländischen Gewinnen verrechnen dürfen. Welche Wirkung hätte eine EU-weite Verlustverrechnung auf das deutsche Steueraufkommen?Prof. Dr. Clemens Fuest, 36, ist Direktor des Finanzwissenschaftlichen Forschungsinstituts an der Universität zu Köln und Mitglied des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen; Thomas Hemmelgarn, 30, Dipl.-Volkswirt, ist Mitarbeiter an demselben Institut; Fred Ramb, 39, Dipl.-Volkswirt, ist Mitarbeiter der Deutschen Bundesbank, Economic Research Centre, in Frankfurt. Dieser Artikel repräsentiert die persönliche Auffassung der Autoren und entspricht nicht notwendigerweise der Position der Deutschen Bundesbank oder ihrer Mitarbeiter.     

Informal group influence among situationally/dispositionally-oriented consumers

Consumer susceptibility to reference group influence has been demonstrated for certain products and buying situations. This article reports a study designed to determine if reference group influence varies between consumers classified as situationally-oriented and dispositionally-oriented. Results indicate a considerable difference between the two groups. Independence Health Plan     

Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints

We show that all-pay auctions dominate first-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders face budget constraints. This ranking is explained by the fact that budget constraints bind less frequently in the all-pay auctions, which leads to more aggressive bidding in that format.     

Equilibria and Pareto optima of markets with adverse selection

Summary This paper examines the efficiency properties of competitive equilibrium in an economy with adverse selection. The agents (firms and households) in this economy exchange contracts, which specify all the relevant aspects of their interaction. Markets are assumed to be complete, in the sense that all possible contracts can, in principle, be traded. Since prices are specified as part of the contract, they cannot be used as free parameters to equate supply and demand in the market for the contract. Instead, equilibrium is achieved by adjusting the probability of trade. If the contract space is sufficiently rich, it can be shown that rationing will not be observed in equilibrium. A further refinement of equilibrium is proposed, restricting agents' beliefs about contracts that are not traded in equilibrium. Incentive-efficient and constrained incentive-efficient allocations are defined to be solutions to appropriately specified mechanism design problems. Constrained incentive efficiency is an artificial construction, obtained by adding the constraint that all contracts yield the same rate of return to firms. Using this notion, analogues of the fundamental theorems of welfare economics can be proved: all refined equilibria are constrained incentive-efficient and all constrained incentive-efficient allocations satisfying some additional conditions can be decentralized as refined equilibria. A constrained incentive-efficient equilibrium is typically not incentive-efficient, however. The source of the inefficiency is the equilibrium condition that forces all firms to earn the same rate of return on each contract.Notation ={ ₁,..., _k } set of outcomes - : ₊ generic contract or lottery - A = () ; - A_o A{, where denotes the null contract or no trade - S={1,...,¦S¦} set of seller types - L(s) number of type-s sellers - M number of buyers - u: × S seller's utility function, which can be extended toA× S by puttingu(, s) ; - v. × S buyer's utility function, which can be extended toA × S by puttingv(, s) ; - f:A ₀ ×S ₊ allocation of sellers - g:A ₀ ×S ₊ allocation of buyers - A ₊ sellers' trading function - :A ×S ₊ buyers' trading function This paper has had a long gestation period, during which I have been influenced by helpful conversations with many persons, by their work, or both. Among those who deserve special mention are Martin Hellwig, Roger Myerson, Edward Prescott, Robert Townsend and Yves Younés. Earlier versions were presented to the NBER/CEME Conference on Decentralization at the University of Toronto and the NBER Conference on General Equilibrium at Brown University. I would like to thank John Geanakoplos, Walter Heller, Andreu Mas Colell, Michael Peters, Michel Poitevin, Lloyd Shapley, John Wooders, Nicholas Yannelis and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and especially Robert Rosenthal for his careful reading of two drafts. The financial support of the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 912202 is gratefully acknowledged.