Environmental policies,national culture,and stock price crash risk: Evidence from renewable energy firms

This study investigates the impact of country‐level environmental performance and national culture on the stock price crash risk of renewable energy firms. Employing a large sample of 626 renewable energy firms across 31 countries, we find a significant nonlinear relationship between country‐level environmental performance and crash risk. National culture dimensions are found to strongly predict the crash risk of renewable energy firms, particularly after the global financial crisis. On the contrary, national culture dimensions and environmental policies are observed to not exert any significance in explaining the crash risk of fossil fuel firms. Our results are robust with respect to alternative measures of stock price crash risk and the endogeneity of national culture dimensions. Overall, the findings of this paper contribute to the environmental economics literature by providing new evidence regarding the role of societal and environmental factors in explaining the stock price crash risk of energy firms.     

The liability of foreignness reconsidered: New insights from the alternative research context of transforming economies

Institutional theory has been increasingly used to decipher implications of the liability of being a foreign firm. Earlier studies have argued that multinational corporations bear social costs arising from lack of legitimacy and thus need to engage in isomorphism to increase their likelihood of survival. Drawing on insights gained from transforming economies, this study reconsiders the espoused relationships among legitimacy, local isomorphism, and overcoming the liability of foreignness. We argue that idiosyncrasies of transforming economies could engender (1) varying levels of need for gaining legitimacy of local constituents and (2) alternative ways other than local isomorphism for gaining legitimacy from local institutional actors.     

Moderation of an ideological party

It is a common fear in many countries that ideological parties will come to power through elections but will implement extreme policies. Many countries cope with this problem by overriding the election results when such parties are elected. We demonstrate that the alternative approach of containing these parties within the democratic system is more effective. We show that, as the probability of state's intervention in the next elections increases, an ideological party implements a more extreme policy in equilibrium. This hurts the median voter. Our main result shows that from the median voter's perspective, the optimal intervention scheme can be implemented by committing not to intervene and adjusting election times appropriately. That is, elections are a better incentive mechanism than the threat of a coup.     

An analysis of the MFN clause under asymmetries of cost and market structure

Abstract.  We conduct a welfare comparison of MFN and tariff discrimination in an oligopoly model of trade between two exporting countries and one importing country. While MFN dominates tariff discrimination from a world welfare perspective when exporting countries are asymmetric with respect to either cost or market structure, such need not be the case when both types of asymmetries co‐exist. In particular, when high‐cost exporters are merged and the cost disadvantage of the merged unit relative to competing firms is of intermediate magnitude, tariff discrimination can be welfare preferred to MFN (even when the average tariff is actually lower under MFN). JEL classification: F13, F12     

On the International Linkages between Trade and Merger Policies*

In a three‐country model, this paper investigates linkages between merger incentives of exporting firms and the trade policy of an importing country. When exporting firms come from only one country, the tariff response of the importing country reverses the welfare effects of a merger in the exporting country. If there exist two exporting countries, a merger creates two types of conflicting international externalities. First, a merger in one exporting country increases profits of all firms. Secondly, non‐merged firms lose if the importing country is free to raise its tariff in response to a merger of foreign exporters.     

The effects of engineering design processes on spatial abilities of middle school students

International Journal of Technology and Design Education - The spatial ability is defined as the combination of some abilities such as imagining the movements of objects, mental rotation, and...     

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE WILLINGNESS OF COMPANIES TO INVEST AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS? EVIDENCE FROM LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

In this article we investigate the changes in corporate investment dynamics in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Using firm-level data from six Latin American countries from 2002 to 2015, we show that firms are less constrained and have greater ability to invest after the crisis. However, the willingness of firms to invest optimally is reduced. This is supported by strong evidence that during the postcrisis period investment–cash flow sensitivity disappears, investment-q sensitivity increases, and the estimated speeds of adjustment for target investment decrease. Moreover, after the crisis, firms notably increase their efforts to attain optimal cash and leverage levels. Our analysis implies that firms may not always be willing to invest optimally. The willingness to invest optimally appears to be time variant and moves together with the dynamics of cash and leverage policies, albeit in opposite directions.     

Compatibility and unlearning in knowledge transfer in mergers and acquisitions

Despite wide recognition of the central role of knowledge and its transfer, extant research has focused much on some important aspects of knowledge transfer and paid little attention to others. We focus on two underexplored issues in the knowledge transfer literature, namely: (a) compatibility of new knowledge with recipients’ needs, interpretations of its past experiences and its existing norms, and (b) organizational unlearning, which moderates the relationship between compatibility and extent of successful knowledge transfer. We examine different types and dimensions of knowledge compatibility and organizational unlearning within our proposed knowledge transfer process framework. We situate our discussion primarily within knowledge transfer in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Based on the proposed model, we also offer propositions future research can test.     

A specification test for the propensity score using its distribution conditional on participation

Propensity score matching has become a popular method for the estimation of average treatment effects. In empirical applications, researchers almost always impose a parametric model for the propensity score. This practice raises the possibility that the model for the propensity score is misspecified and therefore the propensity score matching estimator of the average treatment effect may be inconsistent. We show that the common practice of calculating estimates of the densities of the propensity score conditional on the participation decision provides a means for examining whether the propensity score is misspecified. In particular, we derive a restriction between the density of the propensity score among participants and the density among nonparticipants. We show that this restriction between the two conditional densities is equivalent to a particular orthogonality restriction and derive a formal test based upon it. The resulting test is shown via a simulation study to have dramatically greater power than competing tests for many alternatives. The principal disadvantage of this approach is loss of power against some alternatives.     

Foreign direct investment and customs union: Incentives for multilateral tariff cooperation over free trade

The present article examines the implications of a customs union (CU) on the pattern of tariffs, welfare and the prospects for free trade when the non-member firm has an incentive to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI). First, I show that upon the formation of a bilateral CU, the non-member firm has greater incentives to engage in FDI. However, when FDI becomes a feasible entry option for the non- member firm under a CU, member countries have incentives to strategically induce export over FDI by lowering their joint external tariff. When fixed set-up cost of FDI is sufficiently low, this tariff falls below Kemp–Wan tariff and CU leads to a Pareto improvement relative to no agreement. Moreover, using an infinite repetition of the one-shot tariff game under a CU, I show that the presence of FDI incentive of the non-member firm makes the member countries more willing to cooperate multilaterally over free trade while the opposite is true for the non-member country. Finally, I find that, unless fixed cost of having an additional plant is sufficiently low, multilateral cooperation over free trade is easier to sustain when FDI incentive is present.