Intended and unintended termination of international joint ventures

This study proposes that international joint ventures (IJVs) are terminated either when the initial purposes of the formation of the IJV have been achieved (intended termination), or when unanticipated contingencies that emerge in the external, internal, or inter‐partner conditions after the establishment of the IJV impede the continuation of its operation (unintended termination). Our study examines the factors that affect intended and unintended termination and the longevity of IJVs. The findings show that approximately 90 percent of all IJV terminations are unintended and 10 percent intended, and that the frequency of intended termination and unintended termination varies noticeably depending on the initial purposes of formation. This suggests that the termination of IJVs is significantly contingent on their formation. The findings also show that the longevity of IJVs varies according to the initial purposes of formation, the initial conditions under which the IJV is formed, and the types of unanticipated contingencies that it encounters. The key theoretical issues and practical implications of the distinction between the intended and unintended termination of IJVs are also discussed. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Japanese horizontal keiretsu and the performance implications of membership

Our study investigates the effect of Japanese horizontal keiretsu group membership on firm risk and return. Like prior studies, our results show that horizontal keiretsu membership has a negative effect on firm profitability. However, we find that horizontal keiretsu networks are likely to increase the gap between targeted and realized returns, which we call the outcome–aspiration gap. Moreover, in contrast to prior studies, our results indicate that keiretsu membership does not enable member firms to reduce risks by smoothing profitability. Instead, our findings provide evidence that is counter to the conventional notion that Japanese horizontal keiretsu allows their member firms to trade off profits for reduced risk.

Does subnational region matter? Foreign affiliate performance in the United states and China

This study examines the extent to which subnational regions can explain foreign affiliate performance in two host country settings, the United States and China, the world's two largest economies at polar ends of the economic spectrum (i.e., an advanced versus an emerging economy). Our results suggest that the subnational region is significant in explaining foreign affiliate performance, thus confirming its importance as an additional unit of analysis for firm performance. This study also shows that the effects of subnational region are far stronger in China than they are in the United States, thus suggesting that regional differences are more critical in their explanatory power for firm performance in emerging economies than they are in advanced economies. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods

Groves and Ledyard (Econometrica 45:783–809, 1977) constructed a mechanism attaining Pareto efficient allocations in the presence of public goods. After this path-breaking paper, many mechanisms have been proposed to attain desirable allocations with public goods. Thus, economists have thought that the free-rider problem is solved, in theory. Our view to this problem is not so optimistic. Rather, we propose fundamental impossibility theorems with public goods. In the previous mechanism design, it was implicitly assumed that every agent must participate in the mechanism that the designer provides. This approach neglects one of the basic features of public goods: non-excludability. We explicitly incorporate non-excludability and then show that it is impossible to construct a mechanism in which every agent has an incentive to participate.     

Characterizing Natural Implementability: The Fair and Walrasian Correspondences

We characterize natural implementability in exchange economies when a social choice correspondence possibly recommends a Pareto efficient allocation where the common marginal rate of substitution is not determined uniquely. We find that the no-envy and efficient (or fair) correspondence cannot be implemented by any natural mechanism with a price and a quantity announcement, but can be implemented by a natural mechanism with a price and two-quantity announcement. On the other hand, the constrained Walrasian correspondence can be implemented by a natural price-quantity mechanism with budget balance. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D51, D63, D78.     

Technological capabilities and firm performance: The case of small manufacturing firms in Japan

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between technological capabilities and firm performance. We divide technological capabilities into two types—refinement capability, which involves the improvement of the existing asset portfolio, and reconfiguration capability, which involves the restructuring of the asset portfolio through the integration of new assets. The results of an analysis of a sample of 302 small and medium-sized manufacturing firms in Japan suggest that refinement capability relates more positively to operational efficiency than does reconfiguration capability, and that reconfiguration capability relates more positively to strategic performance than does refinement capability. The results also suggest that firms with superior refinement capability tend to possess superior reconfiguration capability. Our findings show that both external and internal factors, such as technological volatility, inter-firm collaboration, and firm age and size, are significantly associated with the level of refinement and reconfiguration capabilities possessed by a firm.

Does country matter?

Previous studies have explored the predictors of business unit performance in multiple‐business firms and investigated the extent of the effect of industry, corporate, and business unit on the performance of a business unit. These studies have focused almost exclusively on examining performance differences within a single country, thus treating country effects as external to business unit performance. In contrast, this study focuses on multinational corporations and examines the extent to which country effects explain the variation in the performance of foreign affiliates. Our findings show that country effects are as strong as industry effects, following affiliate effects and corporate effects. Our results also suggest that corporate and affiliate effects tend to be more critical in explaining the variation in foreign affiliate performance in developed countries, whereas country and industry effects are more salient in developing countries. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Which country matters? Institutional development and foreign affiliate performance

This article investigates the effect of the level of institutional development of host countries on the level of and variation in foreign affiliate performance. Institutional development is defined as the extent to which the economic, political, and social institutions in a host country are developed and are favorable for foreign affiliates. A longitudinal analysis of over 30,000 foreign affiliate‐year cases that include 6,985 foreign affiliates in 38 host countries between 1996 and 2001 shows that foreign affiliate performance varies noticeably both across and within host countries. The results suggest that the level of institutional development, as determined by the Institutional Development Index (IDI), a new measurement developed in this study, has a strong negative curvilinear relationship with the variation in foreign affiliate performance and a negative effect on the level of foreign affiliate performance. The implications for future research, practice, and policymaking are discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Voluntary Participation and Spite in Public Good Provision Experiments: An International Comparison

This paper studies voluntary public good provision in the laboratory, in a cross-cultural experiment conducted in the United States and Japan. Our environment differs from the standard voluntary contribution mechanism because subjects first decide whether or not to participate in providing this non-excludable public good. This participation decision is conveyed to the other subject prior to the subjects' contribution decisions. We find that only the American data are consistent with the evolutionary-stable-strategy Nash equilibrium predictions, and that behavior is significantly different across countries. Japanese subjects are more likely to act spitefully in the early periods of the experiment, even though our design changes subject pairings each period so that no two subjects ever interact twice. Surprisingly, this spiteful behavior eventually leads to more efficient public good contributions for Japanese subjects than for American subjects.