Horizontal mergers between multisided platforms: Insights from Cournot competition

This paper discusses the literature on horizontal mergers between multisided platforms and argues that the Cournot model can provide useful insights into the welfare effects of such mergers. To illustrate those insights, we develop a simple model in which two‐sided platforms offer a homogeneous service and compete à la Cournot, and derive the effects of “average‐marginal‐cost‐preserving” mergers on consumers on both sides of the market. We conclude with a discussion of several research avenues that could be explored to understand better the impact of horizontal mergers between multisided platforms.     

Sustainable Product and Market Development for Subsistence Marketplaces: Creating Educational Initiatives in Radically Different Contexts*

Developing products and business processes to serve subsistence marketplaces (or the roughly 4 billion poor around the world referred to as the bottom of the pyramid) is a significant challenge for businesses. Despite the importance of subsistence marketplaces, most product development educational curricula have been focused on relatively resource‐rich and literate consumers and markets. We teach an innovative year‐long product development course which includes an international immersion experience and which covers a broad spectrum of learning from understanding poverty, to consumer behavior, to product development and engineering design specifically for subsistence consumers. This unique course represents a pioneering effort to focus attention and create knowledge about product development, marketing, management, and engineering practices for subsistence marketplaces. Our two‐semester course sequence for graduate‐level students in a variety of business and engineering disciplines and industrial design combines in‐class pedagogy with experiential learning and results in useful and marketable product concepts and prototypes. Working on projects with multinational companies or startups, students identify an opportunity of general need, conduct field market research to better understand subsistence consumer needs and contexts through an international immersion experience, develop a product concept, convert the concept to a workable prototype, and develop a manufacturing plan, marketing strategy, and overall business plan for the product. Overlaying the content found in a typical new product development lab course we develop a contextual understanding of subsistence marketplaces, setting the stage for new product development. A central aspect of the learning experience is travel to subsistence markets for actual immersion in the context and to conduct market research. Our course is at the confluence of two of the most important issues facing humanity, subsistence and sustainability. Lessons learned here can also be extended to other radically different contexts, such as future scenarios involving severe energy shortages or climate change consequences. Such educational initiatives provide challenging learning experiences in preparing students for the unique demands of the 21st century.     

Tying in Two‐Sided Markets with Multi‐Homing: Corrigendum and Comment

We identify two issues in Choi's [2010] paper on tying in two‐sided markets published in this Journal, and provide solutions to both of them. First, we point out that the equilibrium in the absence of tying requires more restrictive conditions and does not satisfy a natural equilibrium refinement criterion. We offer an alternative timing structure that validates the equilibrium derived in Choi [2010] under the conditions provided there. Second, we show that his equilibrium analysis with tying ignores a profitable deviation. We rectify this analysis under our alternative timing structure and derive the (mixed‐strategy) equilibrium with tying. We also show by means of simulations that tying is welfare‐enhancing whenever it is profitable, which is consistent with the main finding in Choi [2010].     

Charter value,risk-taking and systemic risk in banking before and after the global financial crisis of 2007-2008

ABSTRACT

We investigate how bank charter value affects risk for a sample of OECD banks by using standalone and systemic risk measures before, during, and after the global financial crisis of 2007–2008. Prior to the crisis, bank charter value is positively associated with risk-taking and systemic risk for very large ‘too-big-too-fail’ banks and large U.S. and European banks but such a relationship is inverted during and after the crisis. A deeper investigation shows that such a behaviour before the crisis is mostly relevant for very large banks and large banks with high growth strategies. Banks’ business models also influence this relationship. We find that for banks following a focus strategy, higher charter value amplifies both standalone and systemic risk for large U.S. and European banks. Our findings have important policy implications and cast doubts on the relevance of the uniform more stringent capital requirements introduced by Basel III.     

The impact of online low search costs on firms' incentives to invest in quality

The growing use of the Internet has made search costs lower for consumers. We study the effect of this on the incentives for firms to invest in quality. We assume that there are firms producing high-quality products and others producing low-quality products; we also assume that the market share of the latter is higher than that of the former. Besides, we analyse the changes of both the revenue effect and the quantity effect; we show that they go in the same nonintuitive direction. In other words, when search costs decrease, the incentives to invest in quality increase.     

Cross‐licensing and competition

We analyze the competitive effects of bilateral cross‐licensing agreements in a setting with many competing firms. We show that firms can sustain the monopoly outcome if they can sign unconstrained bilateral cross‐licensing contracts. This result is robust to increasing the number of firms who can enter into a cross‐licensing agreement. We also investigate the scenario in which a cross‐licensing contract cannot involve the payment of a royalty by a licensee who decides ex post not to use the licensed technology. Finally, policy implications regarding the antitrust treatment of cross‐licensing agreements are derived.     

Pricing goods for retailers: A new approach

In the retail sector, pricing goods is usually based on practitioner's experiences. Most of the time, the selling price is obtained by multiplying the buying price by an exogenous multiplier. However, There is no particular scientific procedure to determine such a multiplier except from the Lerner index, which is applicable only if the price elasticity of demand is inferior to −1. This paper generalizes the Lerner index to both elastic and inelastic goods by proposing an original model to determine the optimal markup for both static and intertemporal markets no matter what the price elasticity is. Finally, the paper considers the case of the social planner.