Deregulation,governance structures,and efficiency: the U.S. electric utility sector

The business strategy literature offers apparently opposite views of the ability of vertical integration to cope with the uncertainty related to changing regulatory environments. In this paper, we analyze how the process of retail deregulation affects the comparative efficiency of governance structures, which range on a continuum from fully vertically integrated structures to market transactions. Based on the analysis of 177 U.S. electric utilities from 1998 to 2001, our results show that the process of retail deregulation has a negative impact on firms' productive efficiency, as measured using Data Envelopment Analysis. Furthermore, firms that are vertically integrated into electricity generation, or that rely on the market for the supply of their electricity, are more efficient than firms that adopt hybrid structures combining vertical integration and contracting. This research has important implications because it shows the coexistence of different types of governance structures that cope efficiently with regulatory uncertainty through different mechanisms. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A reflection on analytical work in marketing: Three points of consensus

This article presents three points of consensus about game-theoretic work in marketing: First, equilibrium analysis is necessary for studying situations that have strategic interactions. In many cases, empirical examination of these strategic scenarios is difficult or impossible, at least without the guidance of an equilibrium model. Second, more general models are not necessarily ??better,?? because institutional details matter. Thus, the appropriate compromise between generality and specificity depends on the scope of the research question. Finally, there should be a two-way road between theory and empirics??theory is necessary to interpret empirical results, while empirical findings should guide theoretical modeling choices.     

Discrete choice models of firms’ strategic decisions

This paper outlines the methods and applications related to the nascent area of empirical discrete games in marketing. Many key strategic decisions firms make involve discrete choices such as deciding the location of a new store, determining where in product space to position a product, or what options to offer in a service contract. These decisions are fairly complex and typically involve the consideration of a number of demand, cost, and competitive factors. What makes these discrete choices particularly interesting (and challenging to analyze) is that they are interrelated with the choices of other firms because firms take into account the actions of their competitors when making their own decisions. We describe the basic problem of dealing with interrelated discrete choices in a game-theoretic framework and present the various estimation methods available. A discussion of the existing applications and future research opportunities concludes the article.