Costs, Institutional Mobility Barriers, and Market Structure: Advertising Agencies as Multiproduct Firms

What accounts for the diversity and limited concentration that has long characterized the organization of the advertising agency industry? This question is addressed by treating an advertising agency as a multiproduct firm. The firm's product line or service mix is defined in terms of the set of different media categories where an agency places the advertising messages that it creates on behalf of its clients. Evidence is presented indicating that the structure of demand and costs in the advertising agency industry conforms to the conditions that MacDonald and Slivinski showed were required for an industry to sustain an equilibrium with diversified firms. Building on this framework, we formulate a set of three hypotheses relating to the realization of product-specific scale and scope economies. The first two hypotheses posit that given low fixed costs and minimal entry barriers, both media-specific scale and scope economies are available and can be exploited by relatively small-size agencies. The third hypothesis suggests that large agencies may experience diseconomies of scope as a consequence of excessive diversification induced by two pervasive industry institutional phenomena: (1) “bundling” of agency services to match client demand for a mix of media advertising, and (2) “conflict policy,” which prohibits an agency from serving competing accounts and operates as a mobility constraint. Utilizing a multiproduct cost function, we estimate media-specific scale and scope economies for a cross section of 401 U.S. agencies in 1987. The results obtained support the set of three hypotheses outlined above. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for the restructuring currently underway in this industry.     

Key institutions in business and management education research

The authors investigate institutional productivity in business and management education (BME) research based on the analysis of 4,464 articles published by 7,210 authors across 17 BME journals over a 10-year period, involving approximately 1,900 schools worldwide. Departing from traditional disciplinary silos, they examine the BME research field as a whole by including all traditional business disciplinary areas and producing two top 100 rankings, one based on raw number of author publications and the other based on weighted scores reflecting journal quality and coauthorship.     

SCALE ECONOMIES OF THE FRANCHISED BUSES AND FERRIES OF HONG KONG, 1948–1998

The privatization of state transport operators has been driven by empirical discoveries in transport economic research of the constant or even diseconomies of scale of these operators. With reference to public records and official statistics, this paper is an initial attempt to examine the scale economies of and output relationship between major bus and ferry operators in Hong Kong during the period 1948–1998. The two franchised bus and two franchised ferry companies each experienced unique scale effects during different periods and correlated with each other in terms of production. The paper will also discuss the possible reasons for this phenomenon and policy concerns related to this finding.     

The art of designing markets

Traditionally, markets have been viewed as simply the confluence of supply and demand. But to function properly, they must be able to attract a sufficient number of buyers and sellers, induce participants to make their preferences clear, and overcome congestion by providing both enough time to make choices and a speedy means of registering them. Solutions to these challenges are the province of market design--a blend of game theory and experimental economics. Roth, a professor of both business and economics at Harvard, is a leading market designer. He and his colleagues have rescued failing markets by, for example, designing labor clearinghouses through which U.S. doctors get their first jobs and auctions through which the Federal Communications Commission sells licenses for parts of the radio broadcast spectrum. They have also created marketlike allocation procedures that involve neither prices nor an exchange of money; these include systems for assigning children to schools in Boston and New York and for facilitating exchanges of kidneys. Computers enable the design of "smart markets" that combine the inputs of users in complex ways: In kidney exchange, they run through every possible match of donors and recipients to arrange the greatest possible number of transplants. In the future, computers may make it possible to auction bundled goods, such as airport takeoff and landing slots. As online markets--like those for jobs and dating--proliferate, a growing understanding of markets in general will provide virtually limitless opportunities for market design.     

“My Fifty Shoes Are All Different!” Exploring,Defining, and Characterizing Acquisitive Buying

Why does someone buy the tenth pair of black shoes or the fourteenth white t‐shirt? Typically, extreme buying is associated with negative feelings and consequences: issues of self‐control, guilt, and financial problems are common among compulsive, impulsive, excessive buying, fixated buying, and hoarding. However, through two studies, the authors describe “acquisitive buyers,” who exhibit an extreme yet controlled acquisition process for items in a chosen product category. In his/her mind, these items are minutely differentiated and enrich the inventory, and there is logical justification that every purchase enhances his/her preparedness for anticipated specific product use occasions. Materialism, positive perfectionism and variety‐seeking in a particular product category are some of the characteristics of these buyers. The studies also help distinguish acquisitive buying from other types of extreme buying and mainstream buying.     

Sociological versus strategic factors in bargaining

Most game-theoretic models of strategic interaction, indeed most economic models of any sort, specify potential outcomes entirely in terms of the preferences of the agents, as captured in their (possibly cardinal) utility functions. The underlying assumption is that the outcome of such interactions is determined entirely by these preferences, together with the strategic possibilities available to the agents. The purpose of this paper is to challenge the adequacy of this assumption in general, by investigating it in the specific context of two-person bargaining. In particular, we consider whether certain experimental results reported earlier can be accounted for strictly in terms of players' preferences and strategic possibilities, and we report a new experimental study designed to answer this question. The results strongly support the conclusion that sociological factors, unrelated to what we normally consider to be the ‘economic’ parameters of a game, can decisively influence the outcome of bargaining, in a systematic manner.