A theory of reciprocity

People are reciprocal if they reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. In this paper we present a formal theory of reciprocity. It takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by its underlying intention. The theory is in line with the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental games, such as the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, a reduced best-shot game, the dictator game, the prisoner's dilemma, and public goods games. Furthermore, it predicts that identical consequences trigger different reciprocal responses in different environments. Finally, the theory explains why outcomes tend to be fair in bilateral interactions whereas extremely unfair distributions may arise in competitive markets.     

Cross-sectional earnings risk and occupational sorting: The role of risk attitudes

This paper investigates to what extent individuals' risk preferences are correlated with the cross-sectional earnings risk of their occupation. We exploit data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, which contains a direct survey question about willingness to take risks that has been shown to be a behaviorally valid measure of risk aversion. As a measure of earnings risk, we use the cross-sectional variation in earnings that is left unexplained by human capital variables in Mincerian wage regressions. Our evidence shows that individuals with low willingness to take risks are more likely to work in occupations with low earnings risk. This pattern is found regardless of the level of occupation categories, region, gender and labor market experience.     

Business managers and moral sanctuaries

Moral Sanctuary is used in this paper as a metaphor for any theory which makes actions immune from moral criticism. Three arguments favoring moral sanctuaries for business activities are countered. Two of the arguments rest on faulty analogies. One compares business activities to games, another to the behavior of machines. The third rests on the claim that business is a unique activity. This position is rejected by a reductio ad absurdum argument; it entails the immunity of all professional activities from moral judgment. I argue that business managers are accountable to the combined requirements of professionalism and democratic citizenship, notions which are briefly described at the conclusion of the paper.     

Pflegeberatung ist Vertrauenssache

M?ngeln in der h?uslichen Pflege pr?ventiv begegnen – Vertrauen ohne Kontrolle, Routine, überforderung oder das Nichtbeachten des Beziehungsgeflechtes zwischen Pflegenden und Gepflegten führt oft zu Problemen. Der Gesetzgeber verpflichtete deshalb die Pflegekassen und Tr?gerverb?nde von ambulanten Pflegeeinrichtungen zur Erarbeitung von Richtlinien und standardisierten Verfahren für die Pflegefachberatung. Leider gibt es bislang keine verbindliche Umsetzung.     

Bank reputation in the private debt market

We examine the impact of lead arrangers' reputation on the design of loan contracts such as spread and fees charged. Controlling for the non-randomness of the lender–borrower match (self-selection bias), we find that the reputation of top tier arrangers leads to higher spreads, and that top tier arrangers retain larger fractions of their loans in their syndicates. These larger spreads are especially pronounced for borrowers without credit rating that have the most to gain from the certification assumed by virtue of a loan contract with a top tier arranger. This certification channel differs from the one found in public markets, where certification leads to a reduced spread offered to the best clients. These differences between public and private markets can be explained by differences in the way they operate and are structured. Interestingly, the effect is strongest for transactions done after the changes in the banking regulations (including the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994) that led to significant consolidations in the banking industry, including among the largest commercial banks.     

A theoretical analysis of optimal financing strategies for different types of capital-constrained entrepreneurs

In this paper, we compare two alternative financing strategies that capital-constrained entrepreneurs can adopt: they can either wait until they raised enough money to complete their project (the more conservative strategy) or use limited resources to achieve some intermediate milestone before contacting large outside investors such as venture capitalists (the more adventurous strategy). We examine how the choice of financing strategy is affected by entrepreneurial types (life-style, serial and pure profit-maximizing entrepreneur). We show that specific entrepreneurial characteristics may ultimately affect the shape of firms as they may pursue different strategies to achieve similar goals. The paper generates a number of empirical predictions on security design, the interplay between angel and venture capital finance, and the professionalization of the venture capital market.     

Crowdfunding: Tapping the right crowd

With crowdfunding, an entrepreneur raises external financing from a large audience (the “crowd”), in which each individual provides a very small amount, instead of soliciting a small group of sophisticated investors. This article compares two forms of crowdfunding: entrepreneurs solicit individuals either to pre-order the product or to advance a fixed amount of money in exchange for a share of future profits (or equity). In either case, we assume that “crowdfunders” enjoy “community benefits” that increase their utility. Using a unified model, we show that the entrepreneur prefers pre-ordering if the initial capital requirement is relatively small compared with market size and prefers profit sharing otherwise. Our conclusions have implications for managerial decisions in the early development stage of firms, when the entrepreneur needs to build a community of individuals with whom he or she must interact. We also offer extensions on the impact of quality uncertainty and information asymmetry.