A Modelof Competitive Limit Pricing

This paper offers a new theory of limit pricing. Incumbents from different markets or regions "compete" against one another, with each attempting to price in a manner that deflects entry into the others' markets. An entrant is imperfectly informed as to the incumbents' respective investments in cost reduction and seeks to enter markets in which incumbents have high costs. In a focal equilibrium, the entrant uses a simple "comparison strategy," in which it enters only the highest-priced markets, and incumbents engage in limit-pricing behavior. The influence on pricing of the number of markets and the scope of entry is also reported. Throughout, the central feature of the analysis is that an incumbent's price affects its investment incentives, with lower prices being complementary to greater investment.     

Coauthorship and publication efficiency

This study extends a recent paper by Jean Louis Heck and Peter A. Zaleski [1991] on trends in economics journal publication from 1969–89. The primary purpose of the work is to analyze the impact on article production of an observed dramatically increasing tendency toward coauthorship among scholars in economics. A simple model is tested with total (per capita) articles as a function of time, American Economic Association (AEA) membership, and articles coauthored per year. Results suggest that the increasing trend toward coauthorship enhances productivity in total and per-capita article production. The authors would like to thank Gary Shelley, Janet K. Smith, Peter Zaleski, and an anonymous referee for comments on previous versions of this paper.     

Advertising as Information: Matching Products to Buyers

We consider communication of quality via cheap talk and dissipative advertising expenditures, when consumers have heterogeneous tastes for quality, and price information must be acquired through costly search. For search pods, cheap talk communicates quality when fixed costs are roughly constant across quality levels, while if fixed costs vary greatly with quality, then firms having the higher fixed-cost quality level use dissipative advertising. For experience goods, quality can be communicated by cheap talk in a range where low-quality firms have greater fixed costs, and low-quality firms use dissipative advertising if their fixed costs are greater still.     

Recurrent trade agreements and the value of external enforcement

This paper presents a theory of dynamic trade agreements in which external institutions, such as the WTO, play a central role in supporting credible enforcement. In our model, countries engage in ongoing negotiations, and, as a consequence, cooperative agreements become unsustainable in the absence of external enforcement institutions. By using mechanisms such as delays in dispute resolution and direct penalties, enforcement institutions can restore incentives for cooperation, despite the lack of coercive power. The occurrence of costly trade disputes, and the feasibility of mechanisms such as escape clauses, depend on the degree to which enforcement institutions can verify, and condition on, events that may lead to trade disputes.     

Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of GATT/WTO

Trade negotiations occur through time and between the governments of many countries. An important issue is thus whether the value of concessions that a government wins in a current negotiation may be eroded in a future bilateral negotiation to which it is not party. We identify rules of negotiation that serve to protect the welfare of governments that are not participating in the bilateral negotiation. Our main finding is that the two central principles of GATT/WTO—nondiscrimination (MFN) and reciprocity—preserve the welfare of nonparticipating governments and therefore offer a “first-line of defense” against bilateral opportunism.     

Auctioning countermeasures in the WTO

We offer a first formal analysis of auctioning retaliation rights within the WTO. We show that the auctions exhibit externalities among bidders, and we characterize equilibrium bidder behavior under alternative auction formats. If the violating country is prevented from bidding to retire the right of retaliation against it, then the possibility of “auction failure” arises, whereby no bids are made despite positive valuation by bidders. If the violating country is instead permitted to bid, then auction failure is precluded, and indeed the right of retaliation is always retired. We evaluate these different auction formats from normative (revenue, compliance, efficiency) standpoints.     

PROFIT SHIFTING AND TRADE AGREEMENTS IN IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS*

Do new rationales for trade agreements arise once imperfectly competitive markets are allowed? We consider several trade models that feature imperfectly competitive markets and argue that the basic rationale for a trade agreement is, in fact, the same rationale that arises in perfectly competitive markets. In all of the models that we consider, and whether or not governments have political–economic objectives, the only rationale for a trade agreement is to remedy the inefficient terms‐of‐trade‐driven restrictions in trade volume. We also show that the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination continue to be efficiency enhancing in these settings.     

More on the Cost of Being Other Than White and Male:

ABSTRACT This article analyzes the estimated yearly earnings of white, black, and Hispanic males and white, black, and Hispanic females in order to determine two things: Whether white male earnings continue to exceed those of reference groups, and how the cost of being female (the gender effect) compares with the cost of being nonwhite (black or Hispanic). We find that white males earnings are still greater than those of other groups, but when earnings are adjusted for market related differences, most of the differentials for black and Hispanic (Mexican-American, Puerto-Rican) males disappear. Even after adjustment, however, a considerable portion of females earnings differentials remain unexplained. Gender effects are considerably larger than race or ethnic effects.