Keeping Up with the Joneses and the Home Bias

We argue that when individuals care about their consumption relative to that of their neighbours, a home bias emerges, that is investors overweight domestic stocks in their portfolios. Domestic stocks are preferred because they also serve the objective of mimicking the economic fortunes and welfare of the investor's neighbours, countrymen, and social reference group. We also demonstrate that globalization mitigates the home bias, and derive a modified international CAPM.     

Contestability and Pay Differential in the Executive Suites

In comparison to the abundant evidence on CEOs' compensations, little is known about the compensation of other senior executives, and on how the pay differential between CEO and other senior executives affects firm performance. We examine several potential explanations of the pay differential in the executive suite, using a sample of 367 Israeli firms listed on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange. The empirical results fail to support the tournament and pay equity models. Instead, our evidence suggests a model where senior executives are encouraged (by the structure implied in their pay contract) to cooperate with each other (the team playing model). In a subset of firms managed by their owners we observe greater pay differentials between the owner-CEO and other senior executives. Interestingly, only in this subset of owner-managed firms, higher pay differentials can be associated with better firm performance.     

Long term changes in voting power and control structure following the unification of dual class shares

We study the effects of a regulatory change that induced the unification of most dual class shares in Israel in the 1990s. Specifically, we follow the evolution of ownership structure in a sample of 80 companies that unified their dual-class shares, and compare it with a control sample of firms that maintained their dual share structure at least until 2000. Our main findings are as follows. First, controlling shareholders offset the dilution of voting rights they incurred upon unification by: 1) increasing their holdings prior to the unification (ex-ante preparation), and 2) by buying shares afterwards; by the end of the sample period their voting power was only marginally lower than in the control sample. This offsetting result suggests that marginal voting rights may be important to controlling shareholders even beyond the 50% threshold. Second, share unifications were not associated with much change in the identity of controlling shareholders. Third, the proportion of firms affiliated with pyramidal business groups in the sample of unifying firms was lower than in the population of listed firms as a whole and not different from that in the control sample, suggesting that pyramidal ownership structures did not replace dual class shares. Finally, unifying firms did not exhibit a substantial improvement in their performance and valuation in comparison with the control sample.     

The bright and dark side of staging: Investment performance and the varying motivations of private equity firms

Previous papers that examined investment decisions by private equity funds are divided on whether staging has a positive or negative effect on returns. We believe these opposing views can be reconciled by studying when staging is used during the life of the investment relationship: We find that staging has a positive effect on investment returns in the beginning of the investment relationship, consistent with the notion that staging helps mitigate information asymmetry. However, staging appears to be negatively associated with returns when used prior to the exit decision. Our unique dataset allows us to measure these intertemporal effects precisely.     

Internal monitoring, regulation, and compensation of top executives in banks

This paper examines the relation between incentive pay, monitoring, and regulatory requirements in banks. Using a one-period model with asymmetrical information between the bank owner and the top management team, as well as within the team itself, we show that (1) incentive pay increases the mutual-monitoring activity among top executives; (2) senior executives, especially the CEO, collect more incentive pay than their subordinates; and (3) bank regulations, such as capital adequacy (CAD) requirements, reduce the absolute amount of incentive pay granted to executives.     

Top management successions: the choice between internal and external sources

There is no conclusive evidence on the firm's preference in appointments of top management. In this study four theoretical hypotheses on the likely source of appointment (internal vs. external) are examined using multivariate logistic regressions on a sample of 260 top management appointments in US firms. Two factors were found to have a significant effect: 1) Firm size – larger firms tend to appoint more from their internal sources, probably due to their informal commitment to their reservoir of internal talent; 2) power – the more power the firm is willing to delegate to its next manager, the more likely are external successions. Two other factors, the disposition of the former top manager (left/stayed with the firm) and firm's past performance, were found insignificant.     

Singular mixture copulas

We present a new family of copulas??the Singular Mixture Copulas. We begin with constructing singular copulas whose supports lie on the graphs of two given quantile functions. These copulas are then mixed with respect to a continuous distribution resulting in a nonsingular parametric copula. The Singular Mixture Copulas we construct have a Lebesgue density and a closed form representation. Moreover, they have positive lower and upper tail dependence. As an application we fit the copulas to flood level data. As the results show Singular Mixture Copulas provide an alternative to elliptical copulas, e.g., Gaussian and t-copulas, in modeling strongly dependent random variables.