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A social choice rule (SCR) is a collection of social choice correspondences, one for each agenda. An effectivity rule is a collection of effectivity functions, one for each agenda. We prove that every monotonic and superadditive effectivity rule is the effectivity rule of some SCR. A SCR is binary if it is rationalized by an acyclic binary relation. The foregoing result motivates our definition of a binary effectivity rule as the effectivity rule of some binary SCR. A binary SCR is regular if it satisfies unanimity, monotonicity, and independence of infeasible alternatives. A binary effectivity rule is regular if it is the effectivity rule of some regular binary SCR. We characterize completely the family of regular binary effectivity rules. Quite surprisingly, intrinsically defined von Neumann–Morgenstern solutions play an important role in this characterization. 相似文献
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We introduce an extension of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and construct, by an elaboration on a voting paradox, a superadditive four-person non-transferable utility game whose extended bargaining set is empty. It is shown that this extension constitutes an upper hemicontinuous correspondence. We conclude that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-levelled superadditive NTU game may be empty. 相似文献
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Survival of payoff maximization is the usual as if-justification for assuming rational economic agents. An indirect evolutionary
analysis allows for stimuli which are not directly related to reproductive success although they affect behavior. One first
determines the solution for all possible constellations of stimuli, and then the evolutionarily stable stimuli. Our general
analysis confirms the special results of former studies that payoff maximization in case of commonly known stimuli requires
either that own success does not depend on other's behavior or that other's behavior is not influenced by own stimuli. When
stimuli are private information, one can derive similar necessary conditions. 相似文献
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Bezalel Gavish 《Journal of Banking & Finance》1977,1(2):143-150
Stochastic dominance methods which have been developed in recent years are generally more valid than mean-variance (EV) and higher moment methods for selecting a portfolio from a given finite set of possible portfolios. One of the limitations of these methods is the lack of procedures for building portfolios from a given set of securities and the probability distribution of their returns. Markowitz has developed an algorithm based on the restriction method in linear programming to build undominated portfolios. In this paper a more efficient method based on the relaxation method of linear programming is developed and tested for efficiency. Computational results justify its use as a practical tool for portfolio building. 相似文献
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In standard rational choice modelling decisions are made according to given information and preferences. In the model presented here the `information technology' of individual decision-makers as well as their preferences evolve in a dynamic process. In this process decisions are made rationally by players who differ in their informational as well as in their preference type. Relative success of alternative decisions feeds back on the type composition of the population which in turn influences rational decision-making. An indirect evolutionary analysis of an elementary yet important basic game of trust shows that under certain parameter constellations the population dynamics of the evolutionary process specify a unique completely mixed rest point. However, as opposed to previous studies of preference formation in the game of trust there is no convergence to but only circumventing the rest point if the informational status of individuals evolves rather than being chosen strategically. 相似文献
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We prove that multidimensional generalized median voter schemes are coalition-proof.
Received: 16 July 1998 / Accepted 23 March 1999 相似文献
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Bezalel Peleg 《Journal of Mathematical Economics》1980,7(2):115-134
Let G = (N,W) be a strong weighted majority game and let A be a set of alternatives. Denote by L the set of linear orders on A. A social choice function F:LN → A is a representation of G if the simple game G1(F) associated with F equals G. A coalition S is determining in G if it satisfies the following condition. Let F be a representation of G and let RN ? LN. Then, if a simple majority of the members of S consider an alternative x to be their best choice, then S can ‘enforce’ x to be a Nash equilibrium payoff in the resulting non-cooperative voting game g(F,RN). In this paper we generalize the above notion of a determining coalition to committees (i.e., proper and monotonic simple games), and give a complete characterization of the set of determining coalitions of a committee. Furthermore, we discuss our notion of a determining coalition in the light of some real-life data on formation of coalitions in town councils in Israel. 相似文献
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