Tailored Regulation: Will Voluntary Site-Specific Environmental Performance Standards Improve Welfare?

Increasingly popular tailored regulation (TR) initiatives like the Environmental Protection Agency's Project XL allow industrial facilities to voluntarily substitute site-specific environmental performance standards for inefficient command-and-control regulations. TR can significantly reduce participants' costs of complying with environmental regulations, but in doing so it can also give these participants a competitive advantage. Here we develop an analytical model to show that TR can have adverse welfare effects when if enables relatively inefficient firms in oligopolistic markets to “steal” market share from more efficient firms, and we characterize the regulatory policies that give rise to such outcomes. We also show that regulators' efforts to diffuse the benefits of site-specific agreements among nonparticipating firms dampen incentives to participate in TR.     

Contract modifications and the basis behavior of live cattle futures

The purpose of this study was to assess the basis behavior of the Live Cattle Futures contract at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) before and after the 1995 contract changes. Additionally, an alternative method of basis calculation utilizing weighted mean futures prices versus settlement futures prices was compared to determine which method provides a better representation of the basis level. Within a regression model with heteroskedascity error framework, we found that the level of nearby basis in the period after June 1995 has shifted lower and the average monthly open interest of net commercial long positions has substantially increased after the contract modifications. These empirical results are consistent with the notion that more long activity entered the market in response to the contract modifications. Additionally, an alternative (new) measure of basis calculation (cash price minus weighted mean futures price) produced similar results to two other commonly used measures. In conclusion, the 1995 contract changes have neither increased nor decreased the volatility of live cattle basis. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 24:557–590, 2004     

Construct measurement in strategic management research: illusion or reality?

Strategic management research has been characterized as placing less emphasis on construct measurement than other management subfields. In this work, we document the state of the art of measurement in strategic management research, and discuss the implications for interpreting the results of research in this field. To assess the breadth of measurement issues in the discipline, we conducted a content analysis of empirical strategic management articles published in leading journals in the period of 1998–2000. We found that few studies discuss reliability and validity issues, and empirical research in the field commonly relies on single‐indicator measures. Additionally, studies rarely address the problems of attenuation due to measurement error. We close with a discussion of the implications for future research and for interpreting prior work in strategic management. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Coevolution of the Real and Financial Sectors in the Growth Process

The role of debt and equity changes over time and with the levelof development. What are these changes, and why should theysystematically occur across different countries and time periods?This article characterizes financial innovation as a dynamicprocess that both influences and is influenced by the developmentof the real sector. It focuses on the emergence and developmentof equity markets, using a model that allows for growth andfor capital accumulation that is financed externally througha combination of debt and equity. As an economy develops, theaggregate ratio of debt to equity will generally fall; yet,debt and equity remain complementary sources for the financingof capital investments. The results suggest how various governmentpolicy actions might affect capital accumulation and equitymarket activity.     

Optimal new-product pricing in regulated industries

Intertemporal pricing issues faced by regulated monopolists in market settings characterized by high rates of innovation have received little attention in the regulatory economics literature. Most analyses of regulatory pricing have focused on monopolies characterized by a stable multiple-good product set. In a regulated industry characterized by technological change in the form of new products and services (such as telecommunications), optimal pricing decisions may also reflect intertemporal market and production factors. In this paper, two such intertemporal factors are modeled: learning curve effects on the firm's cost function, and customer demonstration effects on the demand side of the market. Inclusion of these factors leads to an intertemporal pricing rule that may conflict with the standard regulatory practice whereby each product or service must recoup its own resource costs period by period. Our results suggest that this regulatory practice can result in efficiency losses, since it results in a rate of technological diffusion that is too low.     

（某些）品德教育对自由主义民主的危害

本文以在加拿大多伦多市一大郊区开发的一个研究项目为案例,批评了北美“品德教育”的某些方面是怎样对维持一个健康的自由主义民主社会造成危害的。作为这种批评之基础的假设认为,把自由主义的动机作为一种政治理论确定下来,并且认为这种动机就表现在民主的原则和实践中,是为了解决生活在同一社会中的人们之间的(几种)冲突,而且要做到这一点,只要把公民的角色分化出来,按照这个目的进行建构即可。以此为抓手,本文把关注的焦点集中在这种观点的危险性上,认为这种观点无法区分好人和好公民这两个概念,尤其是在文化多元主义已经深入人心的背景中。     

On recalls, layoffs, variable hours, and labor adjustment costs

The paper analyzes the employment policy of a firm that can vary both hours and the level of employment. The analysis differs from previous work in the adjustment cost literature in that the firm is able to change its employment not only through hires, layoffs, and quits, but also by recalls of employees who were previously laid off. Thus, we introduce the possibility of the firm inventorying the labor input. It is shown that this labor inventory potential is necessary if the firm is to ever lay off workers. Further, it is demonstrated that linear rather than strictly convex adjustment costs are then required if the firm is to always recall employees who were previously laid off prior to hiring new workers.