Searle's Monadological Construction of Social Reality

A BSTRACT . One aim of this paper is to make visible the connection between Searle's views on social reality and his general ontology, and at the same time to show that some peculiar features of his analysis of social reality are a natural outcome of his general ontology. The paper contains five sections. In the first Searle's naturalism is philosophically situated and its differentia specifica explained. Then, Searle's view that intentional states exist only in brains is presented. One might say that, according to Searle, each mind is, although caused by a material brain, a Leibnizian monad. This view is related to an important, but neglected, distinction that Searle himself has made between requirement conditions of satisfaction and required conditions of satisfaction. In the third section, it is pointed out that, necessarily, sometimes there has to exist some kind of relation of satisfaction between the two kinds of conditions of satisfaction. Searle, however, has never really discussed what this satisfaction relation may look like. The upshot of all the remarks is that, fourth, Searle's general ontology automatically implies an ontology of social reality according to which a social fact can only exist as a scattered aggregate whose items exist in the brains of the people who constitute it. Finally and fifth, I try to think with Searle against Searle. His monadological view of social reality cannot, Searle notwithstanding, be regarded as being close to the direct realism of common sense. Searle's realism is an indirect realism. However, if Searle's view that intentional states exist only in brains is rejected, then the rest of his ontology has features that may take us closer to a direct realism. Such a move, which in one respect takes us closer to common sense, takes us in another respect away from common sense. The title of the last section is "Social Reality and the Impossibility of Common Sense."     

An Illuminating Exchange The Construction of Social Reality

A BSTRACT . In his The Construction of Social Reality , Searle presents an account of rights, responsibilities, obligations, duties, and similar entities in terms of the formula X counts as Y in context C , where " X " refers in the simplest case to some physical object or event and " Y " to the result of imposing upon X some deontic power or function. Smith attempts to show the limitations of this formula, focusing especially on the examples of contested property rights (where C is not uniquely defined), and of money in bank accounts and other phenomena (where no physical X -term is available). Searle responds to these criticisms, above all by pointing to the fact that some of the problems Smith raises are to be addressed not by an ontological analysis of social reality but rather through legal or political means.     

ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT AND THE INTERPRETATION OF STRATEGIC ISSUES: A NOTE ON CEOS’ INTERPRETATIONS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT*

This paper explores the relationship between organizational context and the interpretation of strategic issues by examining the hypothesis that CEOs' interpretations of foreign investment in the USA are influenced by the organizational context in which they are embedded. Three aspects of organizational context - the global business experience of the firm; the firm's level of organizational inertia (as represented by firm age and size); and the resources available for responding - are examined as predictors of CEOs' perceptions of foreign investment as a threat or an opportunity. Analysis of data from 320 organizations, controlled by industry, shows that global business experience, firm size, and perceived capability are significant predictors of the perception of threat and opportunity. the discussion addresses the implications of these findings for future research on issue interpretation and organizational context.     

New legislation affecting us nonprofits

In the summer of 1996, Congress passed and the President signed, four pieces of legislation of significance to the nonprofit sector: the Taxpayers Bill of Rights 2 (TBR2), the Small Business Job Protection Bill of 1996 (Small Business Act), the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation (Welfare Reform) Act of 1996. Taken together, these four laws contain what are perhaps the most significant changes to the Internal Revenue Code since the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and what are certainly the most profound changes in the rules affecting tax-exempt organisations since the enactment of the 1969 legislation governing private foundations. This paper highlights the most significant features of these laws as they affect nonprofits.¹     

Health, Government, and Irving Fisher

A bstract    This paper provides a few historical notes on government involvement in health, followed by a summary of the theoretical arguments that economists offer in its support. Irving Fisher's views and recommendations about health are examined in the light of today's perceptions concerning health, health economics, and health policy. The wide variety of roles that the U.S. and other governments currently play in health is reviewed, and the ability of economics to explain these roles is assessed. The consequences of government involvement for the health of populations, for expenditures on health care, and for political and social stability are examined. The paper concludes with an overview of new worldwide trends in health policy and some probable explanations for these trends.     

Road infrastructure and economic development in the periphery: the case of A55 improvements in North Wales

This paper examines the impact of a major road improvement programme on the economic development of North Wales. The paper identifies the economic impacts of the road on a selection of firms and organisations in North Wales, and provides a modelling framework to examine the static and dynamic effects of road improvements. Road improvements across North Wales are found to be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for economic development in this peripheral area.     

Fashion consumers and fashion problem recognition style

Consumer spending over the life span of today's 18‐ to 25‐year‐old emerging adults will reach into the $10 trillion range. Emerging adults are a powerful force in shaping demand for consumer products. The problem recognition styles associated with emerging adults can help marketers understand this group of consumers and provide insight into what kinds of products, services, and messages will appeal to them as lifelong consumers. The purpose of this study was to examine differences between men and women and among fashion consumer groups in fashion problem recognition style. Participants were a convenience sample of emerging adult consumers from one Midwestern university in the US, 136 men and 158 women who completed the Measure of Fashion Innovativeness and Opinion Leadership, Fashion Problem Recognition Style Scale, and provided demographic information. Both fashion followers and men reflected a need‐based approach to problem recognition. Both fashion change agents and women reflected a want‐based approach to problem recognition. Male fashion followers differed from all other groups in indicating a need‐based approach to problem recognition. This study built on previous work by examining differences in problem recognition style owing to fashion consumer group and gender. The basic premise behind problem recognition style was validated; that is, actual state (need‐based) vs. ideal state (want‐based) approaches to fashion problem recognition did relate to fashion consumer group membership and gender.     

Can Collective Intentionality Be Individualized?

A BSTRACT . Searle's philosophical construction of social reality has three basic "building blocks": collective intentionality, constitutive rules, and the imposition of functions. This article will focus on the first of these, collective intentionality, which is taken to be the central span on the bridge from physics to society. Searle analyzes this notion in terms of his own internalist theory of intentionality. In his view, we could have all the collective intentionality we have even if we were a brain in a vat, i.e., even if we were radically mistaken about the outside world. It will be argued that such an internalist view of collective intentionality cannot capture normative aspects of social phenomena. Social reality requires a radical relational approach.