Temptation and social security in a dynastic framework

We investigate welfare and aggregate implications of a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system in a dynastic framework in which individuals have self-control problems. The presence of self-control problems induces individuals to save less because of their urge for temptation towards current consumption. Individuals' efforts to balance between the short-term urge for temptation and the long-term commitment for consumption smoothing result in self-control costs. In this environment PAYG social security works as a self-control cost reducing device. In contrast, the presence of altruism induces individuals to save more. This in turn mitigates the adverse effects of self-control problems and PAYG social security on savings but magnifies the self-control costs. We find that in our environment the adverse welfare effects of a PAYG system are further mitigated relative to the environments that incorporate altruism and self control issues separately. However, the level of mitigation is quite modest.     

Housing prices and transaction volume

We use annual, quarterly and monthly data from the US to show that the correlation between housing prices and transaction volume (number of existing houses sold) differs across different frequencies. While the correlation is high at the low frequencies it declines to the levels close to zero at high frequencies. Granger causality tests for different frequencies show that the way of causality in housing market changes from region to region. Our findings provide a litmus test for the existing theories that are proposed to explain the positive correlation between transaction volume and housing prices.     

Regulating a Manager‐controlled Natural Monopoly with Unknown Costs

We study the regulation of a manager‐controlled natural monopoly with unknown costs, borrowing from Baron and Myerson (BM) (1982), where the monopoly is controlled by the owner. We consider the case where the regulator can tax the owner as well as the case where she cannot. We find that the optimal price schedule generally lies below the one in the BM model and that it can be as low as the marginal cost if the compensation parameter is sufficiently small and the regulator cannot tax the monopoly owner. We also identify the cases where the monopoly owner prefers to delegate the control to a manager. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic interaction and dynamics under endogenous time preference

This paper presents a strategic growth model with endogenous time preference. Due to the potential lack of concavity and the differentiability of the value functions associated with each agent’s problem, we employ the theory of monotone comparative statics and supermodular games based on order and monotonicity properties on lattices. In particular, we provide the sufficient conditions of supermodularity for dynamic games with open-loop strategies based on two fundamental elements: the ability to order elements in the strategy space of the agents and the strategic complementarity which implies upward sloping best responses. The supermodular game structure of the model lets us provide the existence and the monotonicity results on the greatest and the least equilibria. We sharpen these results by showing the differentiability of the value function and the uniqueness of the best response correspondences almost everywhere and show that the stationary state Nash equilibria tend to be symmetric. Finally, we numerically analyze to what extent the strategic complementarity inherent in agents’ strategies can alter the convergence results that could have emerged under a single agent optimal growth model. In particular, we show that the initially rich can pull the poor out of the poverty trap even when sustaining a higher level of steady state capital stock for itself.     

MNEs and wages: The role of productivity spillovers and imperfect labor markets

Disentangling the labor market implications of increased foreign capital flows remains important. This paper provides a unifying framework allowing to study the wage implications of multinational enterprise (MNE) activities, pointing to the importance of controlling for both labor market imperfections and productivity spillovers from foreign to local firms. Results show that increased MNE activities increase average wages in the local economy while contributing to a larger wage dispersion between the MNE and local firms. While the results pertaining to average wages depends heavily on the frictions in the labor market, how much the wage dispersion alters also depends on the extent of productivity spillovers from the MNEs to the local firms and the complementarity between domestic and foreign capital.     

Inflation Target Credibility: Do the Financial Markets Find the Targets Believable?

We investigate the credibility of inflation targeting (IT) central banks (CBs) by estimating perceived inflation targets of the financial markets. We calculate financial markets’ beliefs about the inflation targets of 24 IT countries. Then, we analyse whether the financial markets’ beliefs about inflation targets match the announced targets. We conclude that the perceived upper bound of the inflation target is significantly higher than the announced one in many countries. Additionally, the perceived target band is narrower and asymmetric around the mid‐point of the target for most CBs. We examine the implications of these findings and find that IT CBs are more likely to miss their targets when the perceptions of the financial markets are higher than the announced IT targets. These results indicate that IT CBs should pay attention to the perceptions of the announced targets when implementing policy actions.     

The Development Problem under Embodiment

This paper studies technology adoption in an optimal growth model with embodied technical change. The economy consists of the final good sector, the capital sector, and the technology sector which role is the imitation of exogenous innovations. Scarce labor resources are allocated to the technology and final good sectors. The final good is allocated to consumption and to the capital sector. The authors analytically characterize the long run optimal allocations. Using a calibrated version of the model, they find that an acceleration in the rate of embodied technical change should not be responded by an immediate and strong adoption effort. Instead, adoption labor should decrease in the short run, and the optimal technological gap is shown to increase either in the short or in the long run. The state of the institutions and policies around the technology sector is key in the design of the optimal adoption timing.     

Optimal money growth in a limited participation model with heterogeneous agents

This paper studies optimal money growth in a cash-in-advance production economy with heterogeneity in patience levels and know-how. We show that the rate of deflation suggested by the Friedman rule is limited by the subjective discount rate of the most patient agent in the economy. The output distortion due to cash-in-advance constraints on firms can completely be eliminated by means of the Friedman rule if and only if firms are run by the most patient agents.Received: 16 August 2003, Accepted: 22 March 2005, JEL Classification: D52, D90, E21, E41, E52Parts of this paper were completed while the first and second authors were visiting the University of York and Princeton University respectively. We are thankful for the hospitality of these institutions. The second author also acknowledges the hospitality and support of Bilkent University that he is currently visiting, the support from the Turkish Academy of Sciences in the framework of the ‘Distinguished Young Scientist Award Program’ (TUBA-GEBIP/2004), the grant awarded by the Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) under the NATO Science Fellowship Program as well as the support from the Center for Economic Design of Bogaziçi University. This paper was presented in the ERC/METU Second International Conference on Economics, Ankara, September 1998, and at seminars in Bilkent, Bogaziçi and Ohio State Universities. We thank, in particular, Emre Alper, Sumru Altug, Huw Dixon, Tatsuro Ichiishi, Ivan Pastine, Murat Sertel and Alan Sutherland for useful comments. We also thank two anonymous referees for comments and suggestions. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect that of the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey.     

Taboo on TV: gender,religion, and sexual taboos in transnationally marketed Turkish soap operas

ABSTRACT

This study illuminates the ways in which men and women consume soap operas as a means of reflecting on and discussing sociocultural taboos. Through interpretive research we examine the ways in which religion, sexuality and gender relations are depicted in popular Turkish soap operas and how these depictions are consumed in the Balkans and the Middle East. This study challenges the assumption that consumption of taboo discourses leads to active identity modification or public defiance. Instead, in-depth interviews and online ethnography reveal that consumption of soap operas that challenge local religious and gender norms provide a liminal space for discussing taboo topics. Firstly, the findings indicate that talking about taboo topics seen in soap operas enables consumers to speak about what they expect gender and religious norms to be. Secondly, consumers get their mediated understandings of what religion is through soap operas. Thus, rather than simply offering escape, soap opera consumption facilitates the discussion of taboo topics.