The venture capital entry model on game options with jump-diffusion process

This paper aims to apply game options to construct the optimal decision-making and management tool for venture capital (VC) firms. This model emphasizes the inferences with game options on the market structures formed by different competition and investment strategies of the two VC firms to reflect the investment returns. These market structures are classified into an entry-deterred game (specific monopoly), a leader's dominated strategies (duopoly), and simultaneous investment. It is considered how to select investment timing to avoid any potential competitive threats in order to provide the optimal expected threshold values for the investment decisions of VC firms.     

Applying jump-diffusion processes to liquidate and convert venture capital

This study attempts to apply real options and expand the model designed by Lin and Huang [Lin, T.T., Huang, Y.T.: J. Technol. Manage. 8(3), 59–78 (2003)], which helps venture capital (VC) companies to optimize project exit decisions. The expected discounted factor and a jump-diffusion process combine to assess the value of a start-up company, and determine the threshold of the exit timing of liquidation or convertibility for establishing the optimal disinvestment evaluation model for VC companies. When the project value is below V_L^*V_L^\ast, the VC company carries out liquidation, but when the project value exceeds V_C^*V_C^\ast, the VC company performs convertibility. The project value is ranging between (V_L ^*,V_C^*)\left({V_L ^\ast,V_C^\ast}\right), and the best choice is holding the decision and waiting to carry out the rights of liquidation and convertibility next time. Besides, this work attempts to identify the expected discounted time in terms of the investment time for VC companies.     

Applying Game Options in a Loan Exit Model

This study explores market exit decisions of financial institutions into a duopolistic loan in the evaluation concept. A game options approach is used to analyze how uncertainty influences loan decisions. Suppose that the loan market only contains two financial institutions (the leader and follower), and these two roles can be chosen freely. The financial effect for outside shock follows the Poisson downward jump process, and the leader and follower exit the thresholds and are compared to the loan market in the continuous time diffusion process. This study obtains the following results: In the exiting model, the exit costs for the leader are influenced by those of the follower. If the ratio of the leader to follower exit costs is stable, the first-in-first-out or last-in-first-out optimal evaluation models are derived during two financial institutions exiting the loan market.     

国有企业家的人力资本产权难题

本文从国有企业家的内涵与特点入手,从人力资本产权的角度,分析国有企业家为何在国企改革过程中不能真正实现突破,并就如何保护国有企业家产权、创新人力资本产权的激励制度进行讨论。