The effect of corporate real estate ownership on R&D innovation: credit relief vs. resource replacement in China

Against the background of supply-side structural reform and the real estate financialisation in China, this study investigates the impact of real estate holdings on R&D investment using data of enterprises listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Our empirical results yield five main findings. First, enterprises holding more real estate assets face more serious financial constraints, thus restraining corporate innovation efficiency. Second, when the profit margin gap between entity enterprises and the real estate industry is larger, enterprises are more inclined to transfer industrial capital into the real estate industry, thus reducing R&D investment. Third, when the degree of marketisation is high, intensified market competition, the optimal allocation of factor and product markets, and stronger patent protection will weaken the restraining effect of corporate real estate holdings on R&D investment. Fourth, monopoly enterprises obtain potential profits more than undertaking risks from the real estate industry, they are more willing to hold real estate, thus strengthening the restraining effect of real estate holdings on innovation. Finally, investors' regional preference intensifies the restraining effect of corporate real estate holdings on R&D investment. Our empirical evidence can guide entity enterprises on how to effectively balance short-term (non-productive) and long-term (productive) capital investment.     

The Relation Between Insider-Trading Restrictions and Executive Compensation

In this study I investigate the relation between firm‐level insider‐trading restrictions and executive compensation. Using a trading‐window proxy for the existence of such restrictions, I test predictions that insiders will demand compensation for these restrictions and that firms will need to increase incentives to restricted insiders. I find that firms that restrict insider trading pay a premium in total compensation relative to firms not restricting insider trading, after controlling for economic determinants of pay. Furthermore, these firms use more incentive‐based compensation and their insiders hold larger equity incentives relative to firms that do not restrict insider trading. These results hold after controlling for the endogenous decision to restrict insiders and are consistent with the notion that insider trading plays a role in rewarding and motivating executives.     

Improving on two-stage estimators for scale families

Summary Consider the problem of finding an estimator for a scale parameter such that its risk function is bounded by a preassigned constant. As a solution of the problem, two-stage estimators based on only the second sample have been proposed. The paper shows that these estimators can be improved by combining the first and the second sample.     

Management earnings forecasts and other forward-looking statements

We identify forward-looking statements (FLS) in firms’ disclosures to distinguish between “forecast-like” (quantitative statements about earnings) and “other”, or non-forecast-like, FLS.  We show that, like earnings forecasts, other FLS generate significant investor and analyst responses. Unlike earnings forecasts, other FLS are issued more frequently when uncertainty is higher. We then show that earnings-related FLS are more sensitive to uncertainty than quantitative statements, suggesting that managers are more likely to alter the content than the form of FLS when uncertainty is higher.  Our study indicates that incorporating other FLS into empirical measures provides a more comprehensive proxy for firms’ voluntary disclosures.     

Making out and making do: how employees resist and make organisational change work through consent in a UK bank

This article draws on fieldwork conducted in the back‐office of a major retail UK bank and explores how, when introducing change, management drew on contradictory normative and rational discourses. Its primary concern is to explore how, in this context, employees engaged in contradictory acts that combined elements of both resistance (‘making out’) and consent (‘making do’) that are difficult to disentangle. It is argued that although both are moves within the game, they can be distinguished from each other because the former works against the grain of corporate intentions, whereas the latter works with them.     

The kill programme: an ethnographic study of ‘dirty work’ in a slaughterhouse

It has been argued that ‘dirty work’ is characterised by strong occupational and workgroup cultures. This literature has mainly focused on direct workers, but this article largely attends to indirect ‘dirty’ workers, specifically meat inspectors, through ethnographic research conducted in a UK slaughterhouse. Four arguments are developed; the first is that ‘dirty workers’ may not all display group cohesiveness; indeed, individualisation may be more evident depending upon the technology used, internationalisation and employment conditions. Second, there is complexity and diversity within ‘dirty work’ and even single occupations can contain considerable variety, rendering generalisations problematic. Third, we argue that much greater attention needs to be given to the wider contextual issues affecting ‘dirty work’, specifically changing labour markets, itinerant labour, economic conditions and technologies. Finally, we argue that stigmatised work may become more so if it is equated with the low wage economy and/or undercutting conditions of employment through exploiting migrant labour.     

Entry and capital structure mimicking in concentrated markets: The role of incumbents’ financial disclosures

We examine whether the public availability of product market incumbents' financial disclosures leads to greater capital structure mimicking of incumbents by entrants. Exploiting a change in disclosure enforcement for German private firms in the mid-2000s, we find entrant-incumbent mimicking rises substantially in concentrated markets once incumbents' financial statements are publicly available. Additional tests exploring potential mechanisms are more consistent with interfirm learning underlying the effect than alternative channels. Our findings shed light on the effects of competitor financial statement disclosure on private firms’ initial financing decisions and highlight how capital structure dependencies among peer firms arise.     

Examining the Information Content of Residuals from Hedonic and Spatial Models Using Trees and Forests

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - Machine learning algorithms such as neural nets, support vector machines, and tree-based techniques (classification and regression trees) have...     

Coherent Distortion Risk Measures and Higher-Order Stochastic Dominances

Abstract

We show that the only coherent distortion risk measure that is consistent with respect to 3-convex order and hence with stochastic dominance of order 3 is the expected value, thus generalizing previous results of Hurlimann and solving a problem posed by Yamai and Yoshiba.     

A Simple Model of Insurance Market Dynamics

Abstract

This paper constructs and studies a simple but realistic model of an insurance market. The model has a minimalist construction in the sense that the number of parameters defining it is strictly limited and the elimination of any one of them would destroy its realism. There are 11 essential parameters. Each of the parameters has a physical interpretation. Some determine competitive effects within the market, some barriers to entry, and so on. The effect of each on various aspects of the market is examined in the presence of simulated loss experience. The aspects of the market considered include stability of premium rates, profitability, and market concentration. Some of the parameters are capable of use as regulatory controls. Two parameters, in addition to the original 11, are explicit price controls. Despite its simplicity, the model displays considerably complex behavior. Some results are intuitive, but some are not. For this reason, regulatory controls need to be applied with great caution lest they induce perverse effects, possibly even the reverse of those intended. The effect of the parameters on market behavior is first studied in the absence of catastrophic events from the loss experience. Subsequently, the effect of a single such event is studied.