Job Characteristics and Labor Market Discrimination in Promotions

We extend promotion signaling theory to generate new testable implications concerning racial differences in promotions. In our model, promotions signal worker ability. When tasks differ substantially across job levels, the opportunity cost of not promoting qualified non‐whites/non‐Asians is large, so employers are less likely to inefficiently withhold their promotions. Thus, given prepromotion performance, the extent to which non‐whites/non‐Asians have lower promotion probabilities decreases when tasks vary more across levels. Racial differences in wage increases at promotion diminish when tasks vary more across levels. Evidence from a single firm's personnel records supports the model's predictions concerning promotion probabilities.     

LIQUIDITY AND ASSET PRICING UNDER THE THREE‐MOMENT CAPM PARADIGM

We examine whether the use of the three‐moment capital asset pricing model can account for liquidity risk. We also make a comparative analysis of a four‐factor model based on Fama–French and Pástor–Stambaugh factors versus a model based solely on stock characteristics. Our findings suggest that neither of the models captures the liquidity premium nor do stock characteristics serve as proxies for liquidity. We also find that sensitivities of stock return to fluctuations in market liquidity do not subsume the effect of characteristic liquidity. Furthermore, our empirical findings are robust to differences in market microstructure or trading protocols between NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ.     

Spatial Cournot Competition among Multi-Plant Firms in a Circular City

We characterize equilibrium plant locations for a spatial multi-plant Cournot oligopoly in a circular city. Previous work demonstrates that for a two-plant duopoly, all four plants are equally spaced. We establish that the equilibrium location pattern is unique if there are two firms with an equal number of plants. In most other scenarios, multiple equilibria arise. Next, we endogenously determine both the number of plants per firm and plant locations for a duopoly. It is shown that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium may not be unique, and for identical set-up costs, the firms may choose different numbers of plants.     

Depositor Discipline in the Banking Sector in India: An Empirical Investigation

Journal of Quantitative Economics - The paper traces the determinants of depositor discipline in Indian banking. Using annual data on commercial banks covering the period 1996 to 2003, the findings...     

On the existence of pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium

Summary The paper analyses the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in price competition (or Bertrand equilibrium) in a homogeneous product market when costs are strictly convex and proves that if output is demand determined such equilibrium always exists. This paper also characterises such equilibria and shows that if firms are identical such equilibria are necessarily non-unique. However for firms with asymmetric costs it can be unique or non-unique.I am greatly indebted to Anjan Mukherji and Kunal Sengupta for this paper. I also express my profound gratitude to a referee of this journal for a very helpful set of suggestions.     

On Stackelberg games in a homogeneous product market

In a homogeneous product duopoly with concave demand and strictly convex costs we bring together all the standard results of quantity Stackelberg games, provide some new results with price Stackelberg games and compare the equilibrium configuration of the quantity games with the price games. In the price Stackelberg game we show there is a unique SPNE where the leader chooses a lower price than the follower, but both get equal payoffs. We prove that generally quantity Stackelberg games are less competitive than price Stackelberg games. However, we also demonstrate the possibility of a reversal of this result.     

Cross-hedging foreign currency risk: Empirical evidence from an error correction model

In this article, the traditional price change hedge ratio estimation method is extended by applying the theory of cointegration in the case of cross-hedging of spot exchange risk of the Belgian franc (BF), the Italian lira (IL), and the Dutch guilder (NG) with U.S. Dollar Index futures contracts. Previous studies ignore the last period's equilibrium error and short-run deviations. The findings of this study indicate that the hedge ratio estimated by the error correction method is superior to that obtained from the traditional method, as evidenced by the likelihood ratio test and out-of-sample forecasts. Hedgers will be able to control the risk of their portfolios more effectively at a lower cost.     

On the Earnings and Price Momentum Strategies: Evidence from European Real Estate Firms

We test the performance and interaction between earnings and price momentum for European real estate companies by first making use of decile portfolios sorted on the previous 3- to 12-month returns, standardized unexpected earnings and a combination of both. Then, the relation is tested on a risk-adjusted basis employing a 3-factor asset pricing model and Fama and Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regression analyses. Our analyses reveal several critical findings: (1) both price and earnings momentum are effective for European firms, the effect being stronger for the UK than EU firms; (2) unlike U.S. REITs, price momentum seems to dominate drift for European firms; (3) there is weak evidence for positive interaction between drift and price momentum, contrary to the U.S. evidence; (4) the performance of momentum strategies depends on the state of the economy, while controlling for systematic factors; (5) idiosyncratic risk of real estate property firms may influence the returns on drift and momentum factors.