Grid analysis for sales supervision

Falling to recognize the unique need and desire of salespeople, the sales manager tends to allocate supervisory time according to the amount of his or her past selling experience. This time allocation results in either the excessive or insufficient supervision of sales personnel. This article describes a process of arriving at a more optimum allocation of supervisory time.     

Does vertical separation reduce cost? An empirical analysis of the rail industry in European and East Asian OECD Countries

The main purpose of this study is to analyze structural separation policies, especially vertical (i.e. operation-infrastructure) and horizontal (i.e. passenger-freight service) separation. Using the total cost function of a railway organization, we evaluate whether or not vertical separation and/or horizontal separation can reduce costs. For this analysis, we selected 30 railway organizations in 23 European and East Asian OECD countries over 14?years, from 1994 to 2007. Our findings show that horizontal separation reduces railway cost. As for vertical separation, effects change according to the train density of a railway organization. With lower train density, vertical separation tends to reduce cost, while with higher train density vertical separation increases cost.     

The new communication age in Japan

Moriya Koyama, Japanese Vice-Minester of Posts and Telecommunications, outlines the need for and format of the recent reforms in Japan's telecommunications. Importantly, the principle of competition has been introduced throughout Japanese telecommunications, with private enterprises now able to provide main categories of service. The principles of impartiality between domestic and foreign suppliers and of fairness in competition have been enshrined in the reform. Further, Japan wishes to promote cooperation in the Pacific basin area to develop economic growth throughout the region.     

Does yardstick regulation really work? Empirical evidence from Japan’s rail industry

This paper investigates the effectiveness of yardstick regulation by using a data set of rail companies in Japan and estimating the variable frontier cost function. In the variable cost function, both the coefficient of the yardstick regulation dummy and the coefficient of the competitive pressure outside the industry show the negative sign with statistical significance, indicating that the introduction of yardstick regulation and competition tend to decrease a rail company’s variable cost. Between 1995 and 2000, railways to which yardstick regulation was applied improved cost efficiency by about 11.5%.     

Privately Owned Railways' Cost Function,Organization Size and Ownership

This paper aims to find the optimal size of an urban private rail organization as well as to evaluate cost difference by ownership. First, after selecting privately owned rail companies, we explore explanatory variables which affect the cost of rail service. Second, keeping in mind previous cost studies of the urban passenger rail industry, we estimate variable cost function with the translog cost function and we construct the total cost function. Third, based on the average cost function, conditions are pinpointed which attain minimum average cost. Finally, based on estimated results, we calculate the size of an urban private rail company and the ownership effects on cost. We conclude that optimal size is about 231 million vehicle-km per year, with a network of 63.8 km length. In terms of total costs, public railways have higher costs than private railways. There is no cost difference, however, in terms of variable costs.     

Asymmetric‐information allocation to avoid coordination failure

In the context of team production, this paper studies the optimal (deterministic and stochastic) information allocation that implements desired effort levels as the unique Bayesian equilibrium. We show that under certain conditions, it is optimal to asymmetrically inform agents even though they may be ex ante symmetric. The main intuition is that informing the agents asymmetrically can be effective in avoiding “bad” equilibria, that is, equilibria with coordination failure.     

Determinants of privatization of public corporations: evidence from the Japanese experience

The main purpose of this study is to find factors affecting privatization decisions. This study investigates the determinants of privatization by applying the probit model for a data set of special public corporations in Japan. In December 2001, the Japanese government made a resolution to consider the privatization of special public corporations, evaluating 74 special public corporations for possible privatization. In the empirical analysis on the determinants of privatization, we find that among several factors affecting privatization decisions, two are important—the market condition factor and the policy/regulation factor. As for market conditions, a public corporation which exists in a commercialized industry is about 20% more likely to be privatized than others. As for the policy and regulation factor, the public corporation’s privatization under a single regulator is about 25% more likely, compared with the public corporation’s privatization under multiple regulators.     

Why do medium- and large-scale farmers succeed practicing CA and small-scale farmers often do not? – experiences from Paraguay

Conservation agriculture (CA) is defined as a system comprising no or minimum mechanical soil disturbance, permanent organic soil cover, and crop species diversification [FAO. (2014). What is Conservation Agriculture? FAO CA website, consulted on 15.09.2014. Retrieved September 15, 2014, from http://www.fao.org/ag/ca/1a.html]. The vast majority of medium- and large-scale farmers in Paraguay and neighbouring countries (Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay) who use tractor-based farming systems have moved from conventional agriculture and adopted CA through no-tillage technologies. Among this farmer type, very few wish to return to the old system of tillage agriculture. However, despite massive efforts to transmit the technology to small-scale farmers by development aid projects and local governments, widespread adoption of CA has not happened on farms that use animal traction or manual farming systems; in fact significant dis-adoption of CA practices by smallholders has occurred. Some of the reasons for this dynamic are analysed in this paper. The reasons for dis-adoption by small-scale farmers can be generally divided into two groups. One group has to do with the fact that, comparatively, small-scale farmers are less able to cope with the factors related to CA (e.g. degraded soils, recuperating and maintaining soil fertility and know-how) than medium- and large-scale farmers. The second group of reasons has to do with the approaches and strategies that development aid agencies and local governments have taken towards small-scale farmers, which have influenced small-scale farmers’ ability to adopt and maintain CA practices. Small-scale farmers’ main asset is the soil and the CA/no-tillage system is a knowledge-based, learning-intensive system. However, despite the technical support provided by aid agencies and local governments, small-scale farmers often lack a deeper understanding of the CA concepts and practices. This is attributable to the short- to medium-term and rather conservative transfer-of-technology approaches that have been applied by development aid agency and local government programmes over the years, without any changes and without adaptive research. The latter can be derived, for instance, from the accountability of results to donor agencies or the one-size-fits-all approach applied in order to achieve ‘numbers’. One consequence of this is that ownership by and empowerment of farmers is often absent among dis-adopters. It therefore seems more suitable to apply long term, adaptable approaches to CA with smallholders. The lessons learned in Paraguay may well serve to properly direct future development intervention efforts in this country and also serve to mend development strategies in other countries in South and Central America, Africa or Asia.     

Structural reform of the electricity industry and economic growth

Using 782 panel data from 34 OECD countries from 1991 to 2013, this study aims to evaluate how structural reform affects GDP growth rate. We use the Barro-type GDP growth rate regression model and apply both fixed and random effect models. Eight structural reform variables are selected: (i) third party access, (ii) wholesale market dummy, (iii) choice of supplier, (iv) private ownership, (v) generation-others separation, (vi) transmission-others separation, (vii) distribution-others separation and (viii) overall vertical separation. Major finding results are as follows: (i) third party access can positively contribute to GDP growth rate, (ii) wholesale market and overall vertical separation might have a small negative effect, and (iii) other variables have no significant effect.